

# Africa: From Crisis to Opportunity

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A Draft Proposal to Manage Change and Migration in Africa

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# Vorwort/Preamble

## Vorwort

Immer weiter zunehmende Migration ist eine Realität, die wir akzeptieren und steuern sollten, anstatt zu versuchen, sie zu verhindern. In manchen Fällen ist Migration unvermeidlich, wenn das Land wegen des Anstiegs der Ozeane, der Wüstenbildung oder Verschmutzung einfach unbewohnbar wird. Diese notwendige Migration muss von Maßnahmen begleitet werden, die eine berufliche Neuorientierung von Migranten, Infrastrukturentwicklung und Umsiedlung an neue Standorte ermöglichen.

Die zahlreichen Krisen und Konflikte in Verbindung mit diesen Umweltbelastungen und dem anhaltenden Bevölkerungswachstum in Teilen des Mittleren Ostens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas hat dazu geführt, dass sich immer mehr Menschen auf den Weg machen. Zwangsmigration stieg seit 2004 um mehr als 50 Prozent, auf das höchste Niveau seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Diese Zahlen werden weiterhin steigen und sie werden durch globale Interkonnektivität, bessere Information und Verfügbarkeit des nationalen sowie transnationalen Transports angetrieben. Während angenommen wird, dass verzweifelte Migration in erster Linie mit arbeitsbezogenen Problemen verbunden ist, wird Migration paradoxerweise auch erzeugt durch die Steigerung des Wohlstands und, wie im Fall von Afrika, durch Erfolge im Wirtschaftswachstum, in engem Zusammenhang mit einer rasch ansteigenden Mittelklasse, die derzeit auf rund 200 Millionen geschätzt wird.

Afrika ist auch an einem Wendepunkt, weil bemerkenswerte Erfolge durch Impfkampagnen und Gesundheitsdienstleistungen erzielt wurden, welche die Lebenserwartung verbessert und die Mortalität und Morbidität verringert haben, während die Bevölkerung immer noch wächst und die Geburtenraten nur langsam fallen. Jedoch wird die gesellschaftliche Wende zu niedrigeren Geburtsraten noch eine Generation dauern und ist abhängig von weiterem Wirtschaftswachstum, Bildung und einer Verlagerung der Prioritäten. Bessere Gesundheit führt zu Überbevölkerung und hat die Notwendig-

keit und Bereitschaft zur Migration hin zu Orten, die bessere Chancen bieten, vor allem innerhalb des Kontinents, erhöht.

Es kann angenommen werden, dass weltweit knapp eine Milliarde Menschen „auf dem Weg“ sind: 65 Millionen sind Flüchtlinge und Binnenvertriebene durch Konflikte und Verfolgung, 240 Millionen werden als Migranten gezählt und der Rest sind Menschen, die in städtische Zentren umgezogen sind und unbeständig sowie mobil sind. Heute leben über zwei Milliarden Menschen unter unsicheren, ungesunden Bedingungen: in Slums, Camps und gefährlichen Siedlungen und Dörfern ohne sauberes Wasser, Energie, Hygiene und elementare Lebensgrundlagen. Die rasche Expansion der städtischen Zentren, die mehr als 50 Prozent der Weltbevölkerung beherbergen, sind von besonderer Bedeutung, vor allem wenn ihr unkontrolliertes informelles Wachstum nicht gesteuert wird. Im Gegensatz dazu steht, dass produktive landwirtschaftliche Flächen schrumpfen, entweder durch mangelnde Arbeitskräfte oder Umweltschäden. Die Handelspolitik wirkt sich negativ auf die Produktivität aus, zumal die natürlichen Ressourcen nicht lokal verarbeitet werden.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ist ein Wechsel im Paradigma sowie dem Narrativ in der öffentlichen Debatte in Europa dringend notwendig, um die Aufmerksamkeit vom Management der Mittelmeerroute auf eine aktive und ehrliche Unterstützung für die Entwicklung nachhaltiger, wachsender Volkswirtschaften in Afrika zu verlagern. Dieser Wechsel beinhaltet die Behauptung, dass Migration und demografische Veränderungen in erster Linie für Afrika und seine Menschen eine große Herausforderung darstellen, und dass diese Veränderungen viel größer sind als diejenigen, mit denen Europa konfrontiert wird.

In Anbetracht aller genannten Gründe ist es ein gefährlicher Fehler zu glauben, dass Migration gestoppt werden kann und muss. Es ist gleichermaßen eine Illusion, darauf zu vertrauen, dass repressive Maßnahmen ausreichen, um unsichere Migration und illegales Einreisen zu verhindern. Ziel der modernen Migrationspolitik sollte sein, einen Punkt zu erreichen, an dem Migration nicht mehr als Bedrohung betrachtet wird, sondern, wenn gut gehandhabt, als Chance für Migranten und aufnehmende Gesellschaften gleichermaßen. Der Ansatz dieses Konzeptes ist es, die Migration aus der täglichen Politik herauszuholen und in eine mittel- und langfristige Strategie und einen Umsetzungsplan zu investieren, um mit Migration richtig umzugehen.

Der Bericht "Afrika: Von der Krise zur Chance" (AFCO) ist der Versuch, einen umfassenden Überblick über die vielfältigen Initiativen, Prozesse, Pläne, Programme und Projekte im Hinblick auf das auf Afrika bezogene Entwicklungs- und Migrationsmanagement zu geben. AFCO zielt darauf ab, Lücken und Synergien zu identifizieren und beabsichtigt, Orientierung für mögliche neue und innovative Wege

zu geben, mit denen Afrikaner und Europäer die Herausforderungen bewältigen können, mit Unterstützung von Österreich.

Als wichtiger europäischer Partner, und mit dem OSZE-Vorsitz in 2017 bzw. der EU – Ratspräsidentschaft im zweiten Halbjahr 2018, kann Österreich eine zentrale Rolle bei der Förderung einer neuen "Migrationsagenda" und bei der Definition einer neuen europäischen Beziehung zu Afrika einnehmen. Führung und Partnerschaft sind erforderlich. Österreich kann der ehrliche europäische Vermittler (honest broker) sein, wenn es um den Wandel von der Krise zur Chance in Afrika geht.

## Preamble

Ever-increasing migration is a reality we must embrace and manage rather than attempting to prevent. In some cases migration is unavoidable as land becomes simply uninhabitable due to the rise of the oceans, desertification or pollution. This necessary migration needs to be accompanied by measures allowing for professional reorientation of migrants, infrastructure development and settlement in new locations.

The multiplication of crises and conflicts combined with these environmental pressures and continued population growth in parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America has resulted in the number of people on the move rising fast. Forced migration increased by more than 50 per cent since 2004 to its highest levels since WWII. These numbers will continue to grow and are propelled by global interconnectivity, better information and availability of national and transnational transportation. While desperate migration is expected to be primarily linked to poverty related issues, migration is paradoxically also generated by increasing wealth and, as in the case of Africa, successes in economic growth, closely connected to a rapidly rising middle class currently estimated at some 200 million persons.

Africa is also at a turning point since considerable successes in vaccination campaigns and health services have improved life expectancy, reduced mortality and morbidity while the population is still growing and fertility rates are only falling slowly. The social shift to lower fertility will take another generation and depend on further economic growth, education and shifted priorities. Better health is leading to overpopulation and has increased the need and preparedness to migrate to locations which offer better opportunities, primarily within the continent.

Globally close to one billion people can be considered as being on the move: 65 million are refugees and internally displaced persons by conflict and persecution, 240 million are counted as migrants and the remainder are people who have moved to urban centers and are unstable and mobile. Today, over two billion people live in unsafe, unhealthy conditions: slums, camps, and unsafe settlements and villages without clean water, energy, sanitation, and basic provisions. The rapid expansion of urban centers hosting more than 50 per cent of the global population is of particular concern if their uncontrolled informal growth is not managed. In contrast, productive agricultural land is shrinking either by lack of labor force or environmental damage. Trade policies continue to negatively impact on productivity, natural resources are not processed locally.

Against this background, there is an urgent need to shift the paradigm and narrative in the public debate in Europe, and shift the attention, from the management of the Mediterranean route to an active and honest support to the development of sustainable, growing economies in Africa. This shift includes affirming that migration and demographic changes are a major challenge first and foremost for Africa and its people, and they are much bigger in scale compared to the challenges facing Europe.

In view of all the above it is a dangerous mistake to believe that migration can and must be stopped. It is equally an illusion to trust that repressive measures will suffice to prevent unsafe migration and illegal entries. Reaching a point where migration is no longer seen as a threat but, if managed well, an opportunity to migrants and receiving communities alike must be the goal of modern migration policies. Taking migration out of day-to-day politics and investing into a medium and long term strategy and implementation plan to help manage migration is the approach taken in this paper.

The “Africa: From Crisis to Opportunity” (AFCO) report is the attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the multiple initiatives, processes, plans, programs and projects as regards African development and migration management. AFCO aims at identifying gaps and synergies and intends to provide some guidance on possible new and innovative ways in which Africans and Europeans could cope with the challenges ahead and in which Austria could support and assist in this journey.

As an important European partner, current chair of the OSCE and EU Presidency in the second half of 2018, Austria can play a pivotal role in fostering a new “Agenda for Migration” and in defining a new European relationship with Africa. Leadership and partnership is required. Austria can be the honest European broker in moving Africa from crisis to opportunity.





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# Zusammenfassung / Executive Summary

## Zusammenfassung

Im Kapitel 1 ziehen wir Bilanz der aktuellen Migrationssituation, mit Fokus auf der Zentralen Mittelmeerroute, einschließlich ihrer Bedeutung für Europa und Österreich. Wir schauen uns Szenarien für die kommenden Jahre an, die zeigen, daß die Zahl der Migranten, als Folge des Bevölkerungswachstums, der Auswirkungen des Klimawandels und der bewaffneten Konflikte, steigen wird.

Auf dieser Grundlage beschreiben wir die neuesten und relevantesten Initiativen zur Bewältigung der Herausforderungen von Migration, aus und in Afrika, einschließlich, jedoch nicht ausschließlich, der Initiativen der G20, der Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union, der Afrikanischen Union, der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen, der Zivilgesellschaft, der Wirtschaft und einzelner Länder wie China. Wir sehen uns auch die aktuellen Bemühungen Österreichs an.

Unsere Untersuchungen führen zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass es eine breite Palette von Plänen, Programmen und Projekten gibt, um die kurz-, mittel- und langfristigen Herausforderungen der zunehmenden Migration aus und in Afrika zu bewältigen.

Daher schlagen wir nicht vor, „das Rad neu zu erfinden“, viel mehr glauben wir, dass es ein großes Potential gibt, neue Ideen mit bestehenden Initiativen, wo immer möglich, zu verbinden, inklusive der Verbesserung von Synergien und Informationsaustausch.

Wir denken allerdings, dass neue Ideen und Initiativen, angesichts der begrenzten Ergebnisse der vorherrschenden, erforderlich sind. Dies führt im Kapitel 2 zu einer Reihe von Vorschlägen (an Österreich) und Empfehlungen (für internationale Akteure) und in Kapitel 3 zu unserem Kernvorschlag. Kapitel 4 ist eine Synopse im Tabellenformat.

Im Wesentlichen schlagen wir vor:

- Österreich sollte sich nachdrücklich für ein neues Denken in der Migrationspolitik einsetzen, in dem Migranten als Konsumenten und Produzenten gesehen werden und allgemein vom Objekt zum Subjekt der Entwicklungen werden;
- Österreich sollte sich für einen neuen praktischen Ansatz in der Migrations- und Entwicklungspolitik einsetzen, nämlich durch die Schaffung von integrativen Special Development Zones (SDZs); und
- Österreich sollte, im Zuge der bevorstehenden EU-Präsidentschaft, seinen EU- und internationalen Partnern anbieten, zu verbesserten Synergien und verbessertem Informationsaustausch über bestehende Initiativen zur Migration und Entwicklung in Afrika beizutragen, z.B. durch Erkundung, welche Mechanismen gestärkt werden könnten.

Im Einzelnen finden wir, dass der gemeinsame Valletta-Aktionsplan der EU alle verschiedenen Elemente einer sinnvollen Migrations- und Entwicklungsstrategie bereits enthält:

- Den Schutz von Migranten und Asylbewerbern deutlich verstärken;
- Illegale Migration, Migrantenschmuggel und Menschenhandel verhindern und bekämpfen;
- Zusammenarbeit zu Rückkehr, Rückübernahme und Reintegration verbessern;
- Zusammenarbeit bei der legalen Migration und Mobilität verstärken und
- Eigentliche Ursachen für irreguläre Migration und Umsiedlung anpacken.

Da Österreich noch keine nationale Migrations- und Entwicklungsstrategie hat, schlagen wir vor, dass die nächste Regierung eine solche Strategie entwickelt, die alle oben genannten Elemente enthält. Die Entwicklung dieser Strategie würde auch deutlich machen, dass es keinen Kompromiss (trade-off) und Widerspruch gibt

- zwischen einem menschenrechts- und einem sicherheitsorientierten Ansatz („Menschen in der Wüste statt dem Mittelmeer sterben zu lassen“ ist keinesfalls eine Strategie, sondern schlicht inakzeptabel),

- zwischen kurzfristig mehr humanitärer Finanzierung sowie mittelfristig mehr privater Finanzierung, und
- zwischen einer Wertschätzung der österreichischen Kultur und einer offenen Gesellschaft.

Im Hinblick auf den Schutz der Migranten, die Bekämpfung der irregulären Migration und des Migrantenschmuggels sowie einer vernünftigen Rückkehrpolitik, schlagen wir, unter anderem, folgendes vor:

- Österreich unterstreicht seine fortgesetzte Unterstützung der EU-Pläne und Operationen, einschließlich EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, und unterstreicht dabei, dass das Völkerrecht, insbesondere die Menschenrechte von Migranten, jederzeit und unter allen Umständen, respektiert werden muss;
- Österreich unterstützt den Vorschlag, eine Vereinbarung, die dem EU-Türkei-Abkommen ähnelt, mit einem afrikanischen Staat oder einer Gruppe afrikanischer Staaten anzustreben;
- Österreich tritt innerhalb der EU dafür ein, dass die EU Beschlüsse zur Um- und Neuansiedlung von Geflüchteten (Relocation and Resettlement Schemes) umgesetzt werden;
- Österreich kündigt seine Bereitschaft an, sich weiterhin an der EU- Umsiedlungsinitiative zu beteiligen, mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf Nordafrika und dem Horn von Afrika (unter Berücksichtigung seiner Entwicklungspartnerländer einschließlich Äthiopien).

Im Hinblick auf die Bewältigung der Ursachen der sog. verzweifelten Migration (desperate migration) schlagen wir unter anderem vor

- Österreich sollte sein Engagement für Frieden, Konfliktverhütung, Mediation und Demokratie in Afrika fortsetzen, auch um die Agenda des UN Generalsekretärs für mehr und bessere Konfliktverhütung zu unterstützen;
- Österreich sollte das Konzept der "Investition in Investitionen" in enger Zusammenarbeit mit der WB-Gruppe, UNIDO und dem österreichischen Finanzsektor weiterhin stark unterstützen;
- Österreich sollte prüfen, eine öffentlich (ADA, OeEB, andere) - private (WKO, andere) Internetplattform einzurichten, die sich auf Werbung für alle beste-



henden Initiativen zur Schaffung von Anreizen für private Investitionen in Afrika konzentriert, einschließlich derjenigen, in denen Österreich nicht oder noch nicht mitwirkt;

- Österreich könnte für eine nationale oder EU-weite Experten-Anhörung im Hinblick auf die anhaltende Kritik an den neuen Handelsabkommen der EU mit Afrika (sog. EPAs) eintreten, die dazu beitragen würde, den bevorstehenden EU-Afrika-Gipfel im November 2017 vorzubereiten;
- Österreich sollte sein derzeitiges Engagement für Erneuerbare Energien in Afrika fortsetzen und verstärken, insbesondere indem es noch enger an das Wirtschafts- und Geschäftspartnerschaftsprogramm der Österreichischen Entwicklungsagentur (ADA) anknüpft;
- Österreich könnte die Initiative ergreifen, um die internationale Unterstützung der "Großen Grünen Mauer der Sahara und Sahel-Initiative" zu fördern, z.B. indem es dieses Thema auf die Tagesordnung des nächsten EU-Afrika-Gipfels im November 2017 setzt; und
- Österreich könnte mehr Städtepartnerschaften mit afrikanischen Städten fördern, insbesondere in den EZA-Partnerländern Burkina Faso, Äthiopien, Mosambik und Uganda, auf der Basis der bestehenden internationalen Netzwerke für Know-how-Transfer und Best Practices.

Während wir der Meinung sind, dass alle diese Vorschläge wichtig sind, um die Ursachen der verzweifelten Migration zu bekämpfen, denken wir, dass unser Kernvorschlag, die Schaffung von Special Development Zones in Verbindung mit der Stadtentwicklung, ein enormes Potenzial hat.

Special Development Zones ist ein Begriff, den wir geprägt haben, um spezielle Wirtschaftszonen, Freihandelszonen, Freizonen, freie Häfen, Exportverarbeitungszone und Wirtschafts- und Handelskooperationszonen einzubeziehen, aber er geht auch darüber hinaus, denn es geht um neue Governance-Modelle, z.B. für den Migranten einbeziehenden Aufbau und für die Schaffung institutioneller Vorkehrungen zur Gewährleistung der sozialen Inklusion, des Schutzes und der ökologischen Nachhaltigkeit. Die SDZs würden die Möglichkeit bieten, dringende Notwendigkeiten, nämlich zu garantieren, dass Migranten sicher sind und in Würde leben können, mit mittel- und langfristigen Möglichkeiten für Migranten und Einheimische gleichermaßen zu verknüpfen.

Schlussfolgerung: 40 Jahre nachdem die Nord-Süd-Kommission und ihr Vorsitzender Willy Brandt die Grundlagen für die UN-Millenniums-Ziele und für die heutige Agenda 2030 gelegt haben, ist es höchste Zeit für neue Ideen und praktische Konzepte. Denn "die Menschen in der Wüste statt im Mittelmeer sterben zu lassen" ist keine Strategie, sondern schlicht inakzeptabel.

## Executive Summary

In chapter 1, we take stock of the current migration situation with a focus on the Central Mediterranean Route, including what it means for Europe and Austria. We look at scenarios for the coming years, which show that the number of migrants will increase as a consequence of population growth, lack of perceived economic opportunities, the impact of climate change, and armed conflict.

On this basis, we describe the most recent and most relevant initiatives to cope with the challenges of migration from and within Africa, including, but not limited to, initiatives from the G20, the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, International Financial Institutions, Civil Society, the Business Community, and countries like China. We also look at Austria's current efforts.

Our research leads to the conclusion that there is a very broad range of plans, programs, and projects to address the short-, medium-, and long-term challenges of increasing migration from and in Africa. Therefore, we do not propose to “reinvent the wheel”, rather we think that there is great potential in linking new ideas and initiatives to existing ones where ever possible, including by improving synergies and information sharing.

We do, however, think that new ideas and initiatives are needed, given the limited results of the predominant ones. This leads, in Chapter 3, to a range of proposals (to Austria) and recommendations (for international actors), and, in Chapter 4, to our core proposal. Chapter 5 is a synopsis in table format.

In essence, we propose that:

- Austria should strongly advocate a new thinking in migration policies, where migrants are seen as consumers, producers and more generally economic assets rather than liabilities;
- Austria should advocate a new practical approach in migration and development policies, namely the creation of migrant-inclusive Special Development Zones (SDZs); and
- Austria, in building momentum for its forthcoming EU presidency, should offer to its EU and international partners to contribute to improved synergies and better information sharing regarding existing initiatives on Migration and Development in Africa, e.g. by further exploring which mechanisms could be strengthened.

In more detail, we find that the EU's Joint Valletta Action Plan contains all the different elements of a sensible Migration and Development Strategy:

- reinforce protection of migrants and asylum seekers;
- prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings;
- work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration;
- enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility and
- address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement.

Since Austria has no national Migration and Development Strategy yet, we propose that the next government develops such a strategy, containing all the above elements. Developing this strategy would also make it very clear that there is no trade-off between:

- a Human-Rights oriented approach and a security oriented approach (“letting people die in the desert instead of the Mediterranean” is no strategy at all, it is simply unacceptable),
- more humanitarian funding in the short term and more private funding in the medium term, and
- cherishing Austrian culture and being an open society.

With regard to protection of migrants en route, the fight against irregular migration and migrant smuggling and a reasonable policy on returns we propose inter alia that

- Austria underlines its continued support to the EU plans and operations, including EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, stressing that international law, in particular the human rights of migrants, must be respected at all times and under all circumstances;
- Austria supports the proposal to seek an agreement similar to the EU-Turkey agreement with an African state or a group of African states;

- Austria advocates for intra-EU compliance with the EU Resettlement and Relocation Schemes;
- Austria announces its readiness to continue to with the EU’s resettlement scheme with a particular focus on North Africa and the Horn of Africa (also considering its development partner countries including Ethiopia).

With regard to addressing the root causes of desperate migration we propose inter alia that

- Austria should continue its exemplary engagement for peace, conflict prevention, reconciliation and democracy in Africa, also in support of the UN-Secretary General’s agenda for more and better conflict prevention;
- Austria should continue to strongly support the concept of “investing in investment” in close cooperation with the WB group, UNIDO and the Austrian financial sector;
- Austria should consider to create a public (ADA, OeEB, others)- private (WKO, others) internet platform focusing exclusively on advertising, broadening and deepening all existing initiatives for unlocking private investment in Africa including those where Austria is not, or not yet, a contributor;
- Austria could call for a national or EU-wide experts hearing with regard to continued criticism regarding the EU’s new trade agreements with Africa (EPAs), which would help to prepare the forthcoming EU-Africa summit in November 2017;
- Austria should continue and reinforce its current engagement for Renewable Energies in Africa, in particular by connecting it even closer to the Austrian Development Agency’s (ADA’s) Economic & Business Partnerships Program;
- Austria could take the initiative for boosting international support to the “Great Green Wall of the Sahara and Sahel Initiative”, e.g. by making it a subject at the next EU-Africa summit in November 2017; and
- Austria could encourage more city partnerships with African cities, especially in the ADC partner countries Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda, on the basis of the existing international networks for know-how transfer and best practices.

While we think that all these proposals are important to combat the root causes of desperate migration, we think that our core proposal, the creation of Special Development Zones in conjunction with urban development, has a tremendous potential.

Special Development Zones is a term we coined to include special economic zones, free trade zones, free zones, free ports, export processing zones, and economic and trade cooperation zones, but it goes beyond, by also referring to new governance models e.g. for their migrant-inclusive set-up and for establishing institutional safeguards to ensure social inclusion, protection and ecological sustainability. They would offer a way to link urgent short term needs, namely to guarantee that migrants are safe and can live with dignity, with medium and long term opportunities for both migrants and host communities.

In conclusion: 40 years after the North-South Commission and its Chairman Willy Brandt started to lay the groundwork for the UN-Millennium Goals and for today's Agenda 2030, it is high time for new ideas and new practical concepts. And "letting people die in the desert instead of the Mediterranean" is no strategy at all, it is totally unacceptable.



# Taking Stock of Migration Patterns and Governance

## Introduction

Migration to Europe is not a new phenomenon. However, in recent years it has been increasing in scope, scale, and complexity. In 2015, more than 1 million refugees and migrants arrived by sea to Europe, another 360,000 arrived by sea in 2016, and 110,000 arrived until July 2017.<sup>1</sup> Numbers for arrival to Europe by land are negligible, with less than 3,000 arrivals in 2017.<sup>2</sup>

Three principal routes describe the migration flows in the Mediterranean: the Western Mediterranean route between Western Africa and the Spanish Peninsula;<sup>3</sup> the Central Mediterranean Route mainly via Libya and Italy; and the Eastern Mediterranean route arriving primarily in Greece.


In 2014, Italy was still the dominant landing site for sea arrivals when more than 170,000 migrants reached its shores.<sup>4</sup>

That changed with the 2015 refugee crisis towards the Eastern Route but shifted back again in 2016 and 2017, when more than 180,000 and up to August 2017 more than 90,000 migrants reached Italy respectively. Numbers for migrant deaths are alarming for the whole of the Mediterranean, with 5,000 reported dead or missing in 2016 and more than 2,000 so far in 2017, almost all on the Central Route.<sup>5</sup>

### 1.0.1 The Central Mediterranean Route is the Main Route to Europe

The Central Mediterranean Route from North Africa to Italy has (again) become the primary entry point for most irregular migrants to Europe, enabling onward movement to other EU member states. In fact, since the EU-Turkey Agreement and the closure of borders between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2016, arrivals from the Eastern Route decreased significantly (see Fig. 1.1).





**Figure 1.1:** Annual Mediterranean Arrivals. Sources: UNHCR and Frontex. Last updated 27 July 2017

There are two developments which should be noted: i) in 2017, arrivals to Spain through the Western Route have doubled compared to last year<sup>6</sup> and ii) August 2017 has seen a sharp drop in arrivals in Italy, related to recent Italian initiatives vis-à-vis Libya and NGO rescue boats.

## 1.0.2 Push Factors in Countries of Origin Have Become More Relevant Than Pull Factors

Limited access to safe and legal pathways have left migrants with little choice but to undertake risky journeys. Asylum seekers and economic migrants are increasingly moving together, seeking the same transit and destination points, travelling via the same routes, and using the same means of transport. As a result, the distinction between refugees and migrants is not fixed. It is important to note that individuals often have various motivations for moving and may not fit into a single category. Motivations can also change over time. Today, a large part of migrants arriving from Northern and sub-Saharan Africa are not refugees as defined by the 1951 Geneva Convention. footnoteEuropean Commission, “Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean: From Emergency Responses to Systemic Solutions”, Issue 22: 2 February 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/irregular-migration-central-mediterranean\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/irregular-migration-central-mediterranean_en).


Push factors in countries of origin appear more relevant than pull factors in driving current migration movements, including armed conflicts and situations of generalized violence, fear of political or religious persecution, political instability, human

rights violations, diffuse poverty, lack of economic opportunity, natural disasters, and climate change-driven famine.<sup>7</sup>

Such factors may be complex and overlapping or even change during the course of the journey. The increase in “mixed migration” creates fluidity in labeling a country as one of ‘origin’, ‘transit’, or ‘destination’, and has a wide-ranging impact on all three, with transit and destination ones struggling with the short- and long-term challenges of managing irregular migration. In particular, transit countries in the global South are often unable to provide legal protection, safety/security, and economic opportunities and, thus, contribute to the onward movements toward Europe. For example, migrants in Libya, once a destination country and now a major transit one, were often driven onward by violence in fear for their lives.<sup>8</sup>


### 1.0.3 Sea Arrivals through the Central Mediterranean Route Originate Mainly from Africa

People migrating from Africa to Europe currently constitute less than 4 per cent (about 9 million) of all international migrants, which are estimated at 244 million in 2015. While African migration remains overwhelmingly intra-continental, the current trend goes towards a diversification of destination areas, including Europe. A number of armed conflicts and situations of generalized violence in the African continent have influenced the current migratory trends, e.g. with regard to Eritrea and Nigeria (see Fig. 1.2 below).




**Figure 1.2:** Major Countries of Origin. Source: UNHCR, 2017

The majority of migrants continue to be young men (see Fig. 1.3).



**Figure 1.3:** Demographics of Arrivals. Source: UNHCR, 2017. Note: UASC = unaccompanied and separated children

Recent increases of female migrants and minors has been noted for single countries, such as Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire or Guinea Conakry (See Fig. 1.4).



**Figure 1.4:** Demographics of Arrivals by Nationality. Source: UNHCR, 2017

### 1.0.4 Libya: The Gateway to Europe

For persons arriving in Europe via the Central Mediterranean Route, Libya is by far the main country of departure. Although Libya may still remain a destination country despite political instability and a decrease in economic opportunities since

the fall of the Gaddafi regime, for most it is the gateway to Europe. Between January and June 2017, 96.5 per cent of arrivals into the EU (80,791 persons) crossed the sea from Libya to Italy, consistent with trends observed in 2015 and 2016.<sup>9</sup>

Migrants from East Africa reach Libya mainly through Ethiopia and Sudan, which have emerged as main transit countries due to their well-established migration routes and advanced smuggling networks.<sup>10</sup> West Africans, on the other hand, often pass through Niger and Mali due to free movement policies within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).<sup>11</sup>

Routes through Algeria and/or Morocco are less used given greater border controls and the higher risk of apprehension.<sup>12</sup> Libya's geographic location makes it an ideal platform to depart across the Mediterranean, while the Sahara Desert makes border control a serious challenge.

Since the collapse of the Libyan central government in 2011, the control of national borders and territory has been ineffective, which, in combination with the country's weak state institutions, makes Libya a particularly attractive hub for smugglers.

### 1.0.5 Likely Scenarios

It is projected that sea arrivals will continue to increase in absolute terms throughout the year for the Central Mediterranean route,<sup>13</sup> while arrivals via the Western Route have already started increasing.

In this vein, it is most likely, that the increase in migration to Europe will continue also next year and beyond, either moderately or on a larger scale.

There are three likely scenarios that imply such an increase. First, the continued increase in migration via North Africa to Europe if the political and security situation in Libya remains unstable and the implementation of the Italy – Libya agreement has limited effect.<sup>14</sup> In this case, migration patterns remain the same, border controls remain inefficient, smuggling activities continue or become even more organized and deaths at sea and in the Sahara will continue.<sup>15</sup>

Second, the large increase in migration and re-admissions in case the security situation and the ineffective law enforcement in Libya continues or worsens which may also be likely coupled with improved and expanded smuggling operations.<sup>16</sup> In this scenario, the number of migrants in transit increases, as do crossings via the Central Route and alternative routes via Egypt, Algeria and Morocco.

This consequently creates economies of scale for smuggling operations and an increased number of deaths and people missing, while the large increase in arrivals may put pressure on EU countries to tighten movement control for migrants and increase pressure on existing capacity and mechanisms for processing asylum claims, re-admissions and returns.<sup>17</sup>

The third scenario foresees the case of an enforced closure of the Central Route and tougher measures by the EU to disrupt smuggling in Libya and prevent migrants crossing.<sup>18</sup> In this scenario, the arrivals to Italy drop, but as long as root causes of migration remain untreated and there is continued demand for moving, smuggling networks have proved to adapt to new situations, which would mean not only an increase in people stuck in Libya with worsening humanitarian consequences, but also an increase in arrivals via alternative and new routes, which could involve longer and more dangerous journeys.

As long as push factors in the countries of origin are not addressed, it is unlikely that migration to Europe will decrease. The way forward lies in opening up legal channels of entry and in cooperating with countries of origin and transit countries.<sup>19</sup>

## 1.0.6 EU's Relocation and Resettlement Schemes

In the context of managing irregular migration, provide legal and safe pathways to enter the EU and to avoid displaced persons in need of protection having to resort to the criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers, the European Commission proposed the European Resettlement Scheme, which was adopted by the Council in July 2015. The two year agreed scheme will see over 22,000 people in need of international protection resettled from outside of the EU to the EU Member States. For example, with regards to the EU-Turkey Agreement, the 1:1 mechanism has been agreed (for every Syrian national returned from the Greek islands another will be resettled to the EU directly from Turkey) which aims to replace irregular flows of migrants travelling in dangerous conditions across the Aegean Sea by an orderly and legal resettlement process.

In September 2015, the European Council also adopted the European Relocation Scheme, which refers to relocation among member states towards the direction of burden sharing. Under the EU Relocation Scheme, adopted by the Council in September 2015, asylum seekers with a high chance of having their applications successfully processed are relocated from Greece and Italy, where they have arrived, to other member states where they will have their asylum applications processed. If these applications are successful, the applicants will be granted refugee status with

the right to reside in the member state to which they are relocated. As of June 2017, 22 504 people have been resettled under both schemes.<sup>20</sup>

In July 2017, the EU Council presidency obtained a mandate to pursue the so called “Blue Card Directive” covering entry and residence for highly qualified workers coming from third countries.

### 1.0.7 Who Applies for Asylum in Austria?


In 2016, Austria had a migration stock of over 150,000 persons. The majority of new migrants in the same year originated from Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Morocco, and Iraq. Out of these new arrivals, slightly more than 63,000 applied for asylum (see Fig. 1.5) and 63 per cent were recognized as refugees or obtained a humanitarian visa.

Nationality	2014	2015	2016
Afghanistan	5.0762	5.563	11.794
Syria	7.730	24.547	8.733
Iraq	1.105	13.633	2.862
Pakistan	596	3.021	2.460
Iran	743	3.426	2.460
Nigeria	673	1.385	1.855
Russian Federation	1.996	1.698	1.633
Somalia	1.162	2.073	1.537
Morocco	296	731	1.052
Algeria	563	945	1.032
Stateless Persons	1.314	2.235	1.149

Source: Austrian Federal Office of Statistics, 2017

**Figure 1.5:** Top Nationalities of Asylum Seekers in Austria. Source: Austrian Federal Office of Statistics, 2017

The total number of refugees was determined by high acceptance rates for Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and stateless persons. Accepted asylum claims from the majority of other countries of origin were low. For instance, out of a total of 1,855 asylum applications received from Nigerians, 57 per cent were rejected. The same holds for Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mali, and Guinea Conakry, indicating that West Africans are mainly considered economic migrants. Compared to all migrants arriving in Austria in 2016, asylum seekers were slightly younger (about one-third were minors) and women represented a bigger share (especially for minors) (see Fig. 1.6).



**Figure 1.6:** Gender & Age of Asylum Applicants. Source: Austrian Federal Office of Statistics, 2017.

### 1.0.8 Migration from the African perspective: A continent ‘on the move’

Migration from Africa to Europe seems large, but it constitutes less than 4 per cent (9 million) of the global mobility (224 million in 2015).[1] African migration remains overwhelmingly intra-regional or intra-African with Africans predominantly migrating within Africa. From the 34 million migrant Africans who live outside the country of their birth, the majority are located within Africa, especially in west and southern Africa. It is estimated that African migrants are overwhelmingly found within the eight sub-regional economic communities in Africa: approximately 80 per cent in the West, 65 per cent in the South, 50 per cent in Central Africa, and 47 per cent in Eastern Africa.[2] African migration outside the continent raised by 6 per cent in the last decade and the current migration trend goes towards a diversification of areas of destination including Europe in the last years,[3] however migration is also expanding and is expected to expand given the demographic boom in the working-age population.

## 1.1 Reference 1: Recent Policy Developments

Including the Paris Meeting from August 2017 and G20 “Compact with Africa” from July 2017.

When looking at ways and means to address migration from Africa to Europe, it is necessary to take stock of existing initiatives from international and national stakeholders.

The most recent initiative is the ‘Paris mini-summit’ hosted by the French President Emmanuel Macron on August 28, 2017, when African and European leaders from seven nations - France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Chad, Niger, and Libya - met “to build a new relationship aiming at cutting migration from northern Africa into Europe in return for aid”.<sup>21</sup>

Participants recognized that the migration crisis is a common challenge between the EU and the AU and concluded with a Joint Statement<sup>22</sup> building, among others, on the 2015 Joint Valletta Action Plan (see below), ongoing Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) efforts, the EUCAP (EU Capacity Building Sahel Mali and Sahel Niger) and EUBAM (European Border Assistance Mission Libya) missions.

Participants also agreed to further assist migrants’ countries of origin, especially Niger, Chad, and Libya, to prevent loss of life at sea and in the desert, and to create a new task force for the implementation of the Joint Statement. The statement refers to the EU-IOM partnership for West Africa and Libya adopted under the EU Trust Fund (EUTF), including the protection centers created along the route.

There is also the expressed goal to support “the resilience of host communities and providing alternative economic growth models” to “enhance economic cooperation with communities along migration routes in Libya, with the aim of creating alternative sources of income” and to improve human rights protection and living conditions for migrants in Libya (“setting up facilities with adequate humanitarian standards”).

A further appeal from Paris, called “Protection Missions for the Resettling of Refugees in Europe,”<sup>23</sup> will be implemented in the framework of the current resettlement program launched by the EU Commission in July 2017.

Austria’s Defense Minister Doskozil welcomed the outcomes of the Paris meeting in a press release. “The discussion is now leading in the right direction ... With the implementation of procedural centres outside the EU, border control and migration management could be optimized.”<sup>24</sup> While advocating for the elimination of illegal migration with a new EU asylum concept, Doskozil highlights that a consistent return mechanism for those who have no right to asylum needs to be included in the concept.



The other relevant new initiative is G20's "Compact with Africa" (CWA) as approved at the summit in Hamburg in July 2017. It aims at structured partnerships between African countries and the G20 (and beyond), including key multilateral and bilateral partners and the private sector. The aim is to boost private investment and infrastructure in Africa with country-specific investment compacts, which will specify measures and instruments for improvement.<sup>25</sup>

The initiative defines three building blocks:<sup>26</sup>

- The macroeconomic framework for investment, covering economic policies to maintain macro-stability and ensure adequate public infrastructure provision;
- The business framework in which firms operate, including the general climate for private business, regulatory practices and predictability, sectoral policies, support for project preparation, and state capacity to operate public-private partnerships; and
- The financing framework for would-be investors, including the availability of efficient risk mitigation instruments (provided by Multilateral Development Banks, Development Finance Institutions, and aid agencies), access to domestic debt instruments, and potential support from long-term institutional investors in major financial systems.

The CWA is open to all African countries. To date, seven African countries have committed themselves to the initiative, consistent with their own development agendas: Cote d'Ivoire,<sup>27</sup> Morocco,<sup>28</sup> Rwanda,<sup>29</sup> Senegal,<sup>30</sup> Tunisia,<sup>31</sup> and Ghana.<sup>32</sup> Each CWA partner country has presented their specific country and investment profiles to the G-20 Deputies but no signed compacts have been disclosed yet.<sup>33</sup>

In the context of the G20's CWA, Germany's Ministry for Development has released what is being called a "Marshall Plan with Africa," a private sector oriented map to revise development aid and join forces. Germany aims to reflect the plan in preparations for the next EU-Africa Summit of heads of states and governments in November 2017. In addition to the CWA, the G20 launched three new initiatives on African Renewable Energy, on Rural Youth Employment, and on #eSkills4Girls fostering women education, training and employment-related prospects in the digital world.

Previously, the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in Sicily in May 2017 called on action to fight "violent extremism" and address the large-scale movement of migrants and refugees "through a comprehensive approach linking together security, social inclu-

sion, and development.”<sup>34</sup> Participants agreed to establish strategic partnerships to protect and empower refugees and migrants in countries of origin, transit, and destination.<sup>35</sup>

They committed to increase global assistance to boost financial and technical support and to increase G7 efforts towards conflict prevention, stabilization, and post-conflict peace building. The declaration also calls for the enhancement of legal channels for migration through “temporary admission of refugees and the establishment of safe and orderly resettlement schemes.”<sup>36</sup>

Further, cooperation and partnerships with countries of origin and transit should facilitate the safe and dignified return and reintegration of migrants who are not eligible for international protection.

To support economic and governance reform efforts in the MENA region, the commitment to the Deauville Partnerships - a key platform for dialogue and cooperation with the Arab countries in transition (ACTs), regional partners, and relevant international institutions - was reiterated. Concerning Africa, the G7 devoted to increase assistance to address the immediate and root causes of current trends.

The G7 and the World Bank are also supporting initiatives to build insurance solutions in order to mitigate the risks from natural disasters (droughts, floods and epidemics) and strengthen the resilience of states and individuals.

In this context, already in 2012, the African Risk Capacity - ARC - was established as a specialized insurance agency of the African Union. By pooling their risks, ARC members obtain reinsurance against such risks at a lower cost than they would individually. The ARC’s Conference of the Parties comprises 32 African countries. ARC membership also includes its contributors of returnable ‘development capital’ of co-financing. The United Kingdom and Germany are the principal financial backers through what are effectively twenty-year interest-free loans.

At the 2015 Summit in Germany, the G7 endorsed ARC as exactly the kind of initiative they wanted to help meet their “InsuResilience” target of extending climate risk insurance to 400 million people in the most vulnerable developing countries. The G7 and the World Bank’s position is that climate insurance policies should be expanded to include individuals.

The model was criticized by some NGOs, for example ActionAid UK (2016), when parts of the population of Malawi was exposed to starvation when a small drought did not warrant payout due to farmers use of crops that were too sensitive to small droughts.

Part of the criticism is that global warming is caused by rich developed nations and therefore African nations should not pay for anything - the cost of the impact should be carried by developed nations as they are the alleged root causes of global warming according to ActionAid and other NGOs.

It should be noted that the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) is engaging with the insurance and reinsurance industry to address business and sovereign risks, particularly in more vulnerable states.

**UNISDR is led by SRSG Robert Glasser from Austria and Austria is contributing significantly to its work.**

## 1.2 Reference 2: UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030) and Austria's Strategy to Implement

The **UN Agenda 2030** was adopted in September 2015.<sup>37</sup> It was significantly enlarged from the Agenda 2015 (8 Millennium Development Goals) and consists of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with 169 associated targets which are integrated and indivisible – each goal has specific targets to be achieved over the next 15 years.<sup>38</sup> **Migration is directly or indirectly relevant to all 17 SDGs and remains one of the major cross-cutting issues.**

As an example, the targets under Goal 10: "Reduce inequality within and among countries" ask for i) the facilitation of orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, ii) the promotion of planned and well-managed migration policies, and iii) the provision of financial flows to developing countries including remittances ("reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent").<sup>39</sup> Critical voices say that the Agenda 2030 still focuses primarily on the migrant as a beneficiary rather than an agent of sustainable development.<sup>40</sup>

Austria took an active role in the preparation of the SDGs and is now implementing Agenda 2030. The report "Contributions by the Federal Ministries to implement Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development through Austria" was published in March 2017 by the Federal Chancellery (BKA) and the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (BMEIA), detailing the commitment to the cause, the intention to promote discourse with the interested public, and to prepare for reporting to the United Nations High Level Political Forum.

Closely related to the Agenda 2030 and indirectly to the migration and development agenda are the UN's ongoing Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding activities, which are, however not covered in this report.

### 1.3 Reference 3: UN High Level Meeting on Refugees and Migrants

In September 2016, the UN High Level Meeting on Refugees and Migrants assembled 193 UN Member States in New York and aimed to improve the way in which the international community responds to large movements of refugees and migrants. The set of agreements, unanimously adopted by all Member States, reflects a consensus that protecting those who are forced to flee, and supporting the countries that give them refuge, are joint international responsibilities that must be carried out more fairly and predictably. Further, the Member States underlined the continuing importance of the international refugee protection regime; committed to respect the rights of refugees and migrants; assured to provide more predictable and sustainable support to refugees and their host-communities; and to expand opportunities to achieve durable solutions for refugees.<sup>41</sup> Among the key elements are commitments by States on:

**Migrants and Refugees**, namely “to implement border control, efficient management and strengthen border cooperation; to entitle states to take measures to prevent irregular border crossings; to collect accurate data regarding large movements of refugees and migrants; to take measures to identify correctly nationalities and reasons for movement; to intensify cooperation to strengthen search and rescue efforts and mechanism; to strengthen support for rescue efforts and mechanism over land along dangerous or isolated routes; to consider reviewing policies that criminalize cross border movements; to pursue alternatives to detention; to vigorously combat human trafficking and migrant smuggling and to identify victims of human trafficking or those at risk of trafficking; to review, establish or upgrade national and regional anti-human trafficking policies; to take measures to provide adequate, flexible and predictable humanitarian financing; to combat xenophobia, racism and discrimination; as well as to take measures to improve integration and inclusion.”<sup>42</sup>

**Migrants**, namely “to improve cooperation to facilitate and ensure safe, orderly and regular migration, including return and readmission, while accepting the sovereign right of states to determine whom to admit; to take measures to inform migrants on their arrival and stay in countries of transit, destination and return; to address drivers of movements; to enhancing employment opportunities in countries of origin;

to reduce the costs of labour migration and promote ethical recruitments policies and practices between sending and receiving countries; to strengthen global governance of migration and to promote faster, cheaper and safer transfers of migrant remittances in both source and recipient countries, including through a reduction in transaction costs, as well as the facilitation of interaction between diasporas and their countries of origin.”<sup>43</sup>

**Refugees**, namely “to ensure that refugee admission policies or arrangement are in line with UN obligations; to assist states to conduct early and effective registration and documentation of refugees and recognize the importance of early and effective registration and documentation; to guarantee that aid delivery to refugees and host communities is adapted in relevant context and strengthen security in refugee camps; to expand existing humanitarian admission programmes and flexible arrangements to support family reunification, private sponsorship and education; to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and support community-based development programmes that benefit both refugees and host communities; to support early childhood, primary and secondary education and promote skills training and tertiary and vocational education; and to support host communities to safeguard access to basic services to refugees.”<sup>44</sup>

The New York Declaration sets out key elements of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), in order to ensure immediate and efficient reception and admission methods. In this regard, the CRRF aims to meet four objectives: to decrease pressures on host communities and countries of large numbers of refugees, to support refugee self-reliance, to increase third-country solutions, and to support circumstances in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. The implementation process of CRRF will be guided by UNHCR. To date, i.a. Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Djibouti, and Ethiopia started applying the CRRF. In future, consultations will be conducted to expand the CRRF to new emergency situations and contexts beyond the pilots.<sup>45</sup> The lessons drawn from the implementation process in various refugee situations will form the basis for the Global Compact on Refugees to be adopted in 2018.

In addition, the New York Declaration also provides for the adoption of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, also to be adopted in 2018. It is envisaged that the compact will “set out a range of principles, commitments and understandings among Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions” and would therefore “make an important contribution to global governance and enhance coordination on international migration.”<sup>46</sup> To properly prepare for the Global Compact on Migration, global and regional consultative processes are ongoing. In this context, the 3rd Pan African Forum on migration

“Towards a Common African Position on the Global Compact on Migration” took place in May 2017 in Nairobi.

Part of the global civil society criticized the New York summit results as “too little, too late” because what was originally called the “Global Compact on Responsibility-Sharing for Refugees” was not adopted. Also under criticism is that one of the tangible targets, to relocate 10 per cent of the refugees annually under resettlement programs, as recommended by UNHCR, was not met.

Apart from the UN Summit, a “Leaders’ Summit,” commonly referred to as “The Obama Summit,” took place the next day where the World Bank announced the launch of the World Bank’s Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF). Also, 17 Member States with significant refugee populations pledged to enact policy changes that will allow one million more refugee children to attend school and an additional million refugees to pursue lawful employment and livelihood activities.<sup>47</sup>

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in February and May 2016 respectively, the London Conference on “Supporting Syria and the Region” and the UN-led World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul acknowledged that humanitarian and development efforts, relating to both refugees and migrants, must be better connected to achieve better results. Outcomes of the Humanitarian Summit include the so-called “Grand Bargain,” a set of 51 commitments to reform humanitarian financing; a new “Global Partnership for (Disaster) Preparedness” to help the 20 most at-risk countries attain a basic level of readiness by 2020; and the “Education Cannot Wait” fund, the first global fund to prioritize education in humanitarian action.

EU and Austria’s Position: Austria, like the EU as a whole, fully supported the outcome of these summits. Austria underlined the crucial importance of stopping the irregular flow of migrants; providing legal ways to migrate including through resettlement programs; and addressing root causes in the countries of origin.<sup>48</sup> In cooperation with international organizations, Austria aims to create job opportunities, offer education and training programs, and support capacity building in good governance and rule of law. Austria also pointed to its significant contributions to the EU-Turkey Refugee Facility and to the EU Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes.

As regards resettlement, European Resettlement Scheme was adopted in 2015, to assist 22,000 persons in need of international protection. This agreement is complemented by the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and the temporary Emergency Relocation Scheme. Austria confirmed it will continue admitting refugees under family reunification and offered 1,900 resettlement places for 2017.

Among the key new elements concerning refugees are commitments by States to:

Reinforce and assist crisis responses to refugee movements and shift to sustainable methodologies that advance the resilience of both refugees and host communities;

Deliver further and viable humanitarian funding and development support to host countries;

Investigate additional ways for refugees to be admitted to third countries, including through increased resettlement; and

Support the development and use of a comprehensive refugee response framework (CRRF) for large refugee movements, in line with both protracted and new situations.

## 1.4 Reference 4: Relevant Plans and Programs of UN Organizations and related activities

### 1.4.1 UNHCR

UNHCR is engaging with Member States and its international, national, local partners and relevant stakeholders to implement the CRRF (see above) in a range of specific refugee situations and to assess the impact of its implementation. Based on the CRRF, the **Global Compact on Refugees** will have four key objectives: to ease pressures on countries that welcome and host refugees; to build self-reliance of refugees; to expand access to resettlement in third countries and other complementary pathways; to foster conditions that enable refugees to voluntarily return to their home countries.<sup>49</sup> UNHCR is also expected to ensure coherence and complementarity between the Global Compact on Refugees and the **Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration**.

Following the large-scale migration flows towards Europe in 2015, UNHCR initiated the **Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) for Europe** together with IOM and 72 other partners.<sup>50</sup> Other existing Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) and Refugee Response Plans (RRPs) of UNHCR that cover the needs of refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs), and host communities include: Regional Refugee Response Plans in South Sudan, Burundi, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and Yemen; the Syrian Humanitarian Response Plan; and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in response to the Syria Crisis.

It has been an issue of concern that the present-day capacities of displaced youth are not recognized and their perspectives are not heard by either community leaders or relief agencies.<sup>51</sup> Responding to this concern, UNHCR and the Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC) undertook the **Global Refugee Youth Consultations (GRYC)** to amplify youth voices in decisions that affect them. The initiative was launched at the 2015 UNHCR – NGO Consultations and funded by the Swiss Government, the United States Government, and UNHCR. In the GRYC, more than 1,200 young people participated in 56 national or sub-national consultations held in 22 countries between October 2015 and June 2016. During the consultations, young refugees had the opportunity to interact and share their thoughts and ideas on specified topics and topics of their choice along with host community youth, as well as representatives from national youth organizations and, where possible, national governments.<sup>52</sup>

### 1.4.2 IOM

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is (since 2016) a UN related agency for migration dedicated to promoting orderly and humane management of migration, facilitating international cooperation on migration issues, identifying practical solutions to migration challenges, and providing humanitarian assistance to migrants in need (including refugees and internally displaced people). IOM’s work can be grouped into four broad areas: i) migration and development; ii) facilitating migration; iii) regulating migration; and iv) forced migration. Cross-cutting activities include the promotion of international migration law, policy advocacy and dialogue, protection of migrants’ rights, migration health or migration data and research.<sup>53</sup>

IOM plays a key role in providing direct assistance to migrants (e.g. humanitarian aid, camp management). In 2012, IOM developed the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF), combining humanitarian activities and migration management services to tackle migration aspects of a crisis more effectively. Since 2015, IOM coordinates the “Migrants in Countries in Crisis” Initiative (MICIC),<sup>54</sup> a government-led effort to improve the protection of migrants when the countries in which they live, work, study, transit, or travel experience a conflict or natural disaster. In the same year, IOM also launched a “Response plan for the Mediterranean and beyond”<sup>55</sup> setting out a comprehensive strategy designed to address the multiple aspects of the migration flows heading towards Europe. IOM closely collaborates with the EU to promote the effective implementation of the Joint Valletta Action Plan.<sup>56</sup>



IOM contributes to shaping the global migration agenda through its IOM Council Meetings, its International Dialogue on Migration (IDM), its facilitation of Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs), and through a number of studies and reports on a broad range of different migration topics,<sup>57</sup> such as the World Migration Reports. At the New York meeting in 2016, IOM was assigned to facilitate the creation of the **Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)** in 2018. Finally, IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) promotes a better understanding of, access to, and use of global migration data, enhancing IOM's efforts to meet governments' requests for migration data capacity-building, data analysis, and monitoring of global migration trends and SDG migration-related targets.<sup>58</sup>

### 1.4.3 ILO

The International Labour Organization (ILO), as a UN specialized agency, advocates and promotes the rights of migrant workers mainly through its labor standards, migration-related conventions (i.e. Conventions No. 97, 86, 143 and 151) complemented by the broader 1990 International "Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families," and its Multilateral Framework on Labor Migration (i.e non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labor migration).<sup>59</sup>

ILO is active in different areas of work in labor migration such as recruitment, decent work, remittances, domestic work, and skilled migration. Most relevant ongoing initiatives include the 2017 global media competition on labor migration, the guiding principles on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labor market, ILO's response plan to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, an integrated program on fair recruitment (FAIR,) the global action to improve the recruitment framework of labor migration (REFRAME), and a support program to free movement of persons and migration in West Africa.<sup>60</sup>

ILO usually adopts tripartite actions bringing together ministries of labour and employers' and workers' organizations to build consensus on a fair migration agenda that accounts for labor market needs and protects the interests and rights of all workers. This should lead to migration regimes which respond equitably to the interests of countries of origin and destination, migrant workers, employers, and nationals.

#### 1.4.4 UNDP

The international community seeks greater policy coherence between migration and development, acknowledging the linkages between the two and the need for mainstreaming migration policy into development policy and planning processes. As a concrete response to this call, the UNDP and IOM are implementing the Joint Global Program on Mainstreaming Migration into National Strategies funded by the Swiss Government through the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in partnership with governments of the participating countries and with the contribution in knowledge, expertise, and networks of ILO, UNHCR, UNFPA and UN Women. The joint program was first piloted from 2011 to 2013 in Bangladesh, Jamaica, Republic of Moldova, and Tunisia, while Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, and Serbia have joined the program's second phase from February 2014 until January 2018.<sup>61</sup>

To further strengthen the contribution of migration to development, UNDP and IOM implemented the Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMIDI) in 2008, funded by the European Union and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in partnership with IOM, ILO, UNHCR, UNFPA, UN Women and UNITAR. The JMIDI aims to maximize the contribution of migration to development by reinforcing its local dimensions through targeted support to local authorities and non-state actors.<sup>62</sup>

#### 1.4.5 UN-HABITAT

Urbanization in developing countries is a growing topic of public concern, as is the impact of human mobility and migration towards the transformation of cities. At the end of 2016, the New Urban Agenda adopted during the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) addresses urbanization challenges through national and local development policy frameworks.<sup>63</sup> It recognizes the importance of responding to the needs of refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and migrants (regardless of their migration status) and promotes their positive contribution to cities.<sup>64</sup>

With regards to the African continent, the strategy document “Optimizing the Urban Advantage”<sup>65</sup> and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 served as key references for developing the African Urban Agenda Program (AUA). The African Urban Agenda is an initiative launched in 2015 by UN-Habitat “to raise the profile of sustainable urbanization as an enabler for attaining structural transformation in Africa and the Agenda 2063.”<sup>66</sup>

To that end, the AUA aims, among others, to stimulate debates and buy-in from governments, to support inclusive and participatory human settlement development, to promote democratic governance through involvement of non-state actors, and to enhance the capacities of African countries in preparing national reports and building consensus.

The AUA currently runs two projects, “The Strengthening Partnership for an African Urban Agenda (SPP)” and the “Presidential Initiative (PI),” led by Nigeria and Ghana respectively.<sup>67</sup> The SPP focuses on the involvement of non-state actors; the PI promotes the prioritization of urbanization in national and regional development plans. UN-Habitat supports AUA’s implementation and, more broadly, assists state governments in developing national urban policies.

#### 1.4.6 UNICEF

In 2016, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) and the UN Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW Committee) began to develop a Joint General Comment on the Human Rights of All Children in the Context of International Migration - the first of its kind by the CRC Committee - which is expected to be finalized in late 2017 and will substantially clarify the obligations of states parties to the CRC and CMW vis-à-vis children on the move.<sup>68</sup>

In 2017, and as a follow up to the 2010 Barcelona Conference on Children on the Move, the Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts, organized and held the Global Conference on Children on the Move on 12-13 June 2017 in Berlin, Germany. Apart from providing the opportunity to take stock of progress since 2010, the conference proposed goals for states for the two Global Compacts and provided recommendations for protecting, promoting, and implementing the human rights of children on the move.

UNICEF has a four-point plan to help children on the move:

- “Refugee and migrant children must be protected against trafficking and exploitation and given the same access to services, including protection, health, and education, as other children in the community.
- Under no circumstances should children be locked up just because they are refugees or migrants, or sent back to their home countries if they face harm or death there.

- Unaccompanied or separated children must be kept safe. Family reunification is often the best way to do this.
- Safe and sustainable legal global pathways for migration must be established, and root causes of irregular migration, such as conflict, poverty and climate, must be addressed .”<sup>69</sup>

### 1.4.7 UNIDO

Programs of United Nations Development Organization UNIDO<sup>70</sup> share the common objective to give people and small-to-medium sized enterprises (SMEs) the tools, skills, education, and infrastructure to pull themselves out of poverty and create sustainable livelihoods. UNIDO acknowledges that the global economy in any given country is driven by the activities of SMEs, which account for 95-99 per cent of all registered companies, depending on the country, and on average, 2/3 of GDP.

The African Union Commission, with UNIDO’s assistance, has formulated the “Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA),” a strategy which aims to mobilize both financial and non-financial resources and increase Africa’s competitiveness with the rest of the world. Since the Industrial Development Decade of Africa of the 1980s and ‘90s, and the Alliance for Africa’s Industrialization (AAI) of 2003, this Action Plan is the latest far-reaching initiative endorsed by African leaders.

UNIDO has a focus on youth employment as agents of change. The youth employment program enables young people to collaborate and implement their business ideas. The entry of skilled young people into the productive sector enables the economy to sustain and increase its productivity, production capacity, and competitiveness on the global market. Youth employment also encourages social integration and stability in border communities.

Austria is supporting UNIDO in supporting SMEs to create more economic opportunities locally to ease migration. Towards this direction, Austria has also initiated and co-launched the Global Impact Investing Foundation (GIIF), which aims to promote and foster the growing field of impact investing by developing appropriate partnerships, networks, market structures and tools to enable and exhibit solutions to urban and global challenges.

GIIF undertakes a number of activities, including: offering a global industry know-how database, uniting information from various sources all over the industry and

ranging from books and press articles to reports and events as well as focused studies executed by the foundation itself; a Global Impact Investing Platform (GIIVX), which serves as market place where impact investors and entrepreneurs offering projects with specific and measureable impact can link up and co-operate; a news section dedicated to impact investing in collaboration with CNN; and a developing innovating impact measurement tool.<sup>71</sup>

”We have to give people an opportunity to have prospects for good living conditions in their native countries so that they do not have to flee.

Impact investment is one of the most sensible ways to help people in their countries and, at the same time, to develop cooperation with them.

By adopting this joint declaration we, in cooperation with the GIIF, want to make Vienna, the seat of UNIDO, a pioneer of impact investment.”

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*Chancellor Kern*

#### 1.4.8 UNFPA

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) promotes policy dialogue and research on the socio-economic development potential of migrants and advocates for mainstreaming migration into development planning. Particular focus is given to women and young migrants and the fight against social discrimination and human trafficking.

UNFPA played a key role at the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) which, among others, discussed the follow-up of the Programme of Action (PoA) agreed at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994. The PoA includes dedicated chapters on population, urbanization, and internal migration (chapter IX) and international migration (chapter X), explaining linkages between population dynamics and sustainable development and outlining a human-rights-based framework to address associated challenges and seize opportunities.<sup>72</sup> UNFPA coordinated the preparation of the

“ICPD Beyond 2014 Review” - subsequently endorsed by the UNGA in 2014 - including “Place and Mobility” as one of its five key pillars.

#### 1.4.9 UN Secretary General Special Representative and Special Rapporteur

The 2017 Report of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on international migration provides an agenda for action setting commitments between States and migrants, among States, and between States and other stakeholders. It also identifies five policy priorities: (a) managing crisis-related movements and protecting migrants in vulnerable situations; (b) building opportunities for labour and skills mobility; (c) ensuring orderly migration, including return; (d) fostering migrants’ inclusion and development; and (e) strengthening migration governance capacities; and gives 16 recommendations to move forward.<sup>73</sup>

The 2017 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants proposes the development of a 2035 agenda for facilitating human mobility. Based on targets 10.7 and 8.8 of the SDGs, the agenda foresees eight human mobility goals, together with targets and indicators, aimed at facilitating human mobility in the next 15 years, while ensuring respect for the human rights of all migrants based on the principles of non-discrimination and equality.<sup>74</sup>

#### 1.4.10 UN Secretary General Initiative on Private Sector and Displacement

The private sector has only rarely been involved in discussions about international migration at global or regional levels. In 2014, the UN Secretary General launched the Solutions Alliance, a multi-stakeholder alliance to advance a partnership-oriented approach for addressing protracted displacement. The Solutions Alliance seeks to promote and enable the transition for displaced people from dependency to increased self-reliance, resilience, and development.<sup>75</sup> The Alliance also aims to change the current approach to displacement, from providing emergency aid to one of sustainable development. It works with national groups in Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia while supporting local and comprehensive approaches in Uganda and Myanmar. The Solutions Alliance has sought to engage the private sector and in June 2014 created the Engaging the Private Sector Thematic Group to explore ways to “better engage the private sector – local small- and medium-sized enterprises, as well as international companies – and linking their contributions to displacement challenges in order to create development opportuni-

ties and economic value for displaced persons and their host communities.” In June 2016, Business Consultations were held in Amsterdam.<sup>76</sup>

#### 1.4.11 WFP

The World Food Program has an array of programs to help communities reinforce their essential food and nutrition security systems and infrastructures, as well as their adaptability to climate change — including vouchers, cash, and food-based safety nets. Since the introduction of the Cash-for-Change initiative by WFP in 2010, there has been a paradigm shift leading to steady increases in voucher and cash-based interventions. WFP has been using cash-based transfers (CBTs) as part of an integral solution to respond faster to people’s needs, as they bring flexibility and agility to traditional assistance. WFP programs switch from food to cash and vice versa depending on the local context. In 2016, WFP transferred in cash 800 million US dollars to more than 14 million people in 60 countries, whereas in 2011 the cash transfer value was around 200 million US dollars.<sup>77</sup> WFP is currently using CBTs to provide food assistance in 95 operations across 60 countries as an effective means of reaching the Zero Hunger development goal by 2030, since CBTs reduce the distribution cost of providing food assistance while maximizing the number of people reached and, if used correctly, creates or supports local markets.<sup>78</sup>

#### 1.4.12 GMG

Besides the UN agencies mentioned here above, there are others equally contributing to improved global migration governance. This includes UN Regional Economic Commissions (e.g. ECA, ECE or ESCWA), UNDESA, OHCHR, UNODC or UNITAR to mention a few. The Global Migration Group (GMG) brings together key UN actors to promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive, and better-coordinated approaches to the issue of international migration.<sup>79</sup>

The GMG allows its member agencies to speak with one voice for joint global advocacy and provides a pool of expertise for the development of guidance products and the delivery of trainings. It also reinforces coordination and capacities at the global, regional, and country levels to support governments and other relevant constituents on migration and development.

The GMG Multi-Annual Work Plan 2016-2018 focuses on six thematic areas: data and research; mainstreaming migration into development planning; migration; hu-

man rights and gender equality; decent work; and capacity development.<sup>80</sup> Relevant recent initiatives include two 2015 stock-taking reports on crisis-related migration and on protection at sea, both including key recommendations for governments.

#### 1.4.13 Identity for Africa - ID4Africa

Not directly related to the UN, but consistent with SDGs and in particular with the objective (16.9) to promote legal identity for all in Africa and to empower individuals to claim their rights and to benefit from the fruits of development, the ID4Africa initiative started in 2015, in Tanzania. ID4Africa is a multi-stakeholder movement that promotes the transparent and responsible adoption of digital identity systems as drivers of socio-economic development in Africa.<sup>81</sup>

Its aims are to share experience and establish real world best practices in launching and sustaining successful identity programs and to transform individual expertise and experience into sustainable and collective knowledge for the benefit of the identity community in Africa. The ID4Africa Forum is comprehensive covering identity issues from foundational identity programs such as national ID and civil registration, to functional applications such as the use of digital identity in social protection and labor, elections, health care, mobile payments, to improving national security, border management and population management of refugees and migrants.<sup>82</sup>

ID4Africa holds annual meetings to create a platform for governments of African states to jointly explore how national electronic identity can further the economic and social development in their countries and held its 3rd Government Forum on Electronic Identity in Africa, in April 2017, in Namimbia.

#### 1.4.14 R20 – Regions of Climate Action

With the support of the UN, the R20 (Regions of Climate Action) was founded by former Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, in November 2010. The R20 is a multi-stakeholder coalition bringing together sub-national governments, international organizations, NGOs, academia, the private sector, and financial institutions. The common mission is to build a ‘green economy’ by helping sub-national governments “to develop and communicate low-carbon and climate resilient economic development projects,” while also sharing best practices in energy efficiency.<sup>83</sup> The R20 Foundation was also created to drive bankable portfolios of such projects. Currently, R20 has identified over one hundred projects around the world on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and waste management infrastructure, while leading



training and capacity building, feasibility studies, investment funds, and project implementation.<sup>84</sup>

#### 1.4.15 Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region

On 24 February 2017 Germany, Nigeria, Norway, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) co-hosted the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region, recognizing the need for an immediate and strong response to the unfolding crisis in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. The Oslo Conference was a one-day-event to raise awareness on the humanitarian crisis that had been overlooked to generate support for the needs outlined by the Humanitarian Response Plans and appeals from the respective countries.<sup>85</sup> In addition, it highlighted the need to foster resilience, to address medium- to long-term development needs and identify durable solutions for the affected population, and to increase funding for the humanitarian appeals.

The Oslo Conference raised three thematic areas in cooperation with the respective UN agencies: food and security, protection and access, and education in emergencies<sup>86</sup> and resulted in the establishment of the Oslo Consultative Group on Prevention and Stabilization in the Lake Chad Region (also known as Lake Chad Consultative Group) to engage in the region and additional humanitarian, conflict prevention and stabilization efforts and for the Conference participants to follow up on their commitments.

#### 1.4.16 City Networks & Urban Development Support

In the New Urban Agenda of October 2016, UN-Habitat emphasized the role of city networks in achieving the SDGs. The document highlighted the need for knowledge sharing and also indicated the potential for sub-national political action on issues of global importance such as climate change and migration. In the opinion of UN-Habitat, urban local governments can be more pragmatic in addressing these issues than national governments. Peer-to-peer knowledge sharing is the main means by which city networks can improve urban competence and upgrade skills. City networks are also organized to advocate for the needs of their members. The most influential city networks are the following:

- United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), a network of 240,000 cities, towns, regions, and metropolises. UCLG advises the United Nations on local

governments, promotes their interests internationally, and assists in capacity building by facilitating exchanges.

- Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) is a network of over 1,000 cities and towns that focuses on climate change and sustainability issues, along with knowledge exchanges and advocacy.
- Climate Change Leadership Group (C40) contains 80 megacities and innovative cities representing 25 per cent of global GDP and focuses on climate action plans that can reduce climate risks by facilitating exchanges and cooperation.
- Metropolis is a global network of 136 metropolises that works to build sustainable cities by conducting urban diplomacy and by developing urban capacity through resource sharing.
- Commonwealth Local Government Forum is a network of over 200 members in 53 countries of the Commonwealth, primarily focused on practitioner-to-practitioner support.

Cities Alliance is another important organization that offers direct support to cities and local governments, often acting as a clearinghouse for best urban practices among the different city networks. It focuses on capacity building by leveraging donor funds and global expertise. It is not a city network but its members include city networks along with academic institutions, NGOs, multilateral organizations, governments, and donors. It is also very active in Africa, with projects focusing on a range of issues from slum upgrading to the creation of urban master plans.

“Connective Cities: cities for sustainable development” is another initiative and was launched in 2014 as a joint venture between the Association of German Cities (Deutscher Städtetag), the German non-profit organization Engagement Global – Service for Development Initiatives and the German development cooperation agency GIZ on behalf of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation BMZ. The network is designed to bring together practitioners from across the globe to implement best practices. The four thematic clusters are Good Urban Governance, Integrated Urban Development, Local Economic Development and Municipal Services.

Other city networks include The Council of European Municipalities and Regions CEMR with its international activities, representing the European section of UCLG, and the Climate Alliance / Taking local action on global climate change.

## 1.5 Reference 5: Global Forum on Migration and Development

The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) is the key platform bringing together 195 participating states to discuss the migration and development nexus in practical and action-oriented ways at all levels. The Turkish presidency in 2015 added the topic of forced displacement on the agenda. In this context, a fair resolution of actual or potential conflicts of interest among countries of origin, transit, and destination is high on the GFMD's agenda in order to fight the root causes of forced displacement, control irregular migration, and foster local integration, return and reintegration.

Under the theme “Towards a Global Social Contract on Migration and Development,” the GFMD assembled for the 10th time in Berlin in June 2017. The Berlin meeting focused on three different areas: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Domestic Policies through National Strategies, Creating Perspective for Inclusive Development through Multilateral and Bilateral Partnerships, and Finding Strategies beyond the State. The outcomes of the tenth session will feed into the ongoing process of forging a Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration.<sup>87</sup>

## 1.6 Reference 6: EU-Africa Partnerships on Migration and Human Mobility

### 1.6.1 Legal Framework for Cooperation

#### The 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement

The overarching framework governing EU-Africa relations is the 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement replacing the Lomé Convention first signed in 1975. The Cotonou Agreement represents one of the world's broadest partnerships aimed at fostering development cooperation, economic growth and trade collaborations, and policy dialogue between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.<sup>88</sup>

Article 13 of the Cotonou agreement laid the foundations for collaboration on international migration by mentioning the need to improve the conditions in countries of origin and transit, promote legal migration, and return irregular immigrants. While

the agreement includes 48 Sub-Saharan countries, Northern African countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya or Egypt are not part of it.

In 2020, the agreement will come to an end, raising questions on how the succeeding agreement should be framed. At the end of 2016, the EU Council started discussing possible options for a Cotonou follow-up agreement, in particular with regards to its nature, structure, and geographical scope.<sup>89</sup>

The related EU Joint Communication mentions migration and mobility as one of the key policy priorities for EU-ACP relations, stressing that migration should be turned into an opportunity from which all can benefit.<sup>90</sup> While the current framework is binding for all parties, some advocate for more flexibility in a future agreement which could facilitate discussions on more complex topics such as cross-border migration.

The European Development Fund (EDF) managed by DG DEVCO is the major financial tool for development programmes in ACP Countries. The 11th EDF Programme amounts to 30.5 billion Euro for the period 2014-2020.

#### The EU Southern Neighborhood Policy

Launched in 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) serves as a framework for the EU's relations with 16 of the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbors (including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia). It aims to promote stabilization, security, and prosperity and favors economic integration with the EU market.

The ENP has been revised several times to adapt to the changing political and socio-economic context and different degrees of involvement by partner countries. This led, for instance, to the introduction of the “more for more” principle, which in relation to migration mainly refers to the exchange between readmission and visa facilitation. The 2015 Review refocused the ENP more on stabilization, resilience, and security, and reinforced the principle of flexibility and joint ownership based on partner's needs and EU's interests. It also identified four core domains, including migration and mobility.<sup>91</sup>

In line with objectives of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) and the European Agenda on Migration, the ENP aims at facilitating structured dialogues on migration, mobility and security and implementing Mobility Partnerships, related agreements, technical support, and programs that improve migration management between the EU and its partners.

In the Southern Neighborhood, Migration Partnerships have been stipulated with Morocco and Tunisia (see part 6.3). Major current initiatives of the ENP for Southern Neighbours include the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis and the North Africa window of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).

Coordinated by European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EC, the ENP is mainly financed through the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) with over 15 billion euros for the 2014-2020 period of which between 7.5 and 9.2 billion euros are foreseen for the Southern Neighborhood region.<sup>92</sup>

### The EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

Since 2005, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) is the key reference for the EU's external migration and asylum policy. It defines the EU's cooperation with non-EU countries – including with African countries – on migration and asylum. The GAMM is an integral part of the EU's foreign and development cooperation policies and is closely linked with related domains such as poverty reduction, peace and security, and human rights promotion <sup>93</sup>.

Major thematic working areas covered by the GAMM include: i) organizing legal migration and fostering well-managed mobility; ii) preventing and combating irregular migration and eradicating trafficking in human beings; iii) maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility; and iv) promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum.

EU neighboring countries play a particular prominent role in GAMM and special attention is given to migratory routes and countries of origin and/or transit of strategic interest to the EU.

## 1.6.2 Key Instruments for Implementation

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the ENP and the GAMM are put in practice through a variety of different initiatives such as policy dialogues, joint action plans, technical support, capacity building, or program/project development. The implementation of these tools is carried out on different levels (i.e. continental, regional, bilateral) to complement each other.

## Continental Instruments

The EU-Africa Partnership foresees different types of formal dialogues: firstly, summits between heads of state or government usually held every three years; secondly, ministerial-level meetings bringing together more regularly representatives from African and EU countries, the AU Commission, and EU institutions; and thirdly, bilateral AU-EU Commission meetings. The 4th EU-Africa Summit took place in April 2014 leading to a joint declaration stressing the importance of fighting irregular migration, promoting return and readmission, but also addressing root causes of migration. The summit allowed the elaboration of an action plan for the 2014-2017 period. The next summit is foreseen for November 2017; a joint communication calls for revitalizing the framework for joint action and suggests a 2018-2020 roadmap focusing on prosperity and stability in the two continents.<sup>94</sup>

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted at the EU-Africa Summit in 2007 represents the major tool for putting the Cotonou Agreement into practice. It aims at creating a long-term strategic, political partnership between EU and AU institutions and countries and is implemented by periodical action plans.<sup>95</sup>

The 2007 Summit established the Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) Partnership – along seven other thematic partnerships – and led to the adoption and implementation of two MME action plans for the 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 period.<sup>96</sup>

In 2014, the summit led to the adoption of the 2014-2017 Roadmap focusing on five priority areas: peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; and global and emerging issues.<sup>97</sup>

Migration is a major cross-cutting issue and extensively discussed under human development. In addition, it was agreed to transform the MME into a broader Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue (MMD) with the aim to promote the protection of migrants' rights and to maximize the development potential of migration and mobility within Africa and between Africa and the EU. The MMD connects and combines migration dialogues (such as the Khartoum and Rabat Processes), capacity building initiatives and support to African diasporas development organizations.<sup>98</sup>

A joint declaration and related EU-Africa Action Plan on Migration and Mobility 2014-2017 focuses on a large range of topics including fighting trafficking in human beings, remittances, diasporas, mobility and labor migration (including intra-

African mobility), international protection (also for internally displaced persons) and irregular migration.<sup>99</sup> The JAES is mainly financed by the Pan-African Program 2014-2020 which is funded under the EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) with an overall budget of 845 million Euro for the period 2014-2020.

In 2015, the Valletta Summit on Migration, the first of its kind, brought together European and African heads of state and government with the objective to strengthen cooperation, address current challenges and identify opportunities of migration. Participants acknowledged that migration is a shared responsibility of countries of origin, transit and destination. The summit led to the adoption of a political declaration and the Joint Valletta Action Plan aiming to: i) address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; ii) enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility; iii) reinforce the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; iv) prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and v) work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration.<sup>100</sup>

The Valletta Summit also launched the Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF). The Trust Fund has three operational windows: in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad region, and the North of Africa. As of June 2017, the EC has approved more than 118 projects under the EUTF, which has increased to around 2.8 billion Euro.<sup>101</sup>

One of the three key pillars of the Cotonou agreement relates to trade collaboration. While the political and development pillars are valid until 2020, the trade pillar expired in 2007 and was replaced by the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). These new partnerships are basically free trade agreements (FTAs) aiming at progressively reducing tariffs to create a free trade area between the AU and ACP countries themselves. The aim is to promote trade and development, regional integration, sustainable growth, and to combat poverty.

EPAs also introduced reciprocal trade preferences replacing preferential exchanges foreseen under the Lomé Convention. In October 2014, the EU decided to remove unilateral trade preferences with any country that has not signed or ratified the EPAs. EPAs have been criticized by many governments (recently including EU Member States), in the European Parliament, and by development experts. It is argued that, by obliging ACP countries to reduce taxes on imports, to abolish fees for exports, and to liberalize public services markets, EPAs lead to tariff revenue losses, threats to local industries, unemployment, serious disruption of existing or planned customs unions, loss in policy space, and the displacement of existing regional trade and regional production capacities.

The loss in tariff revenues is seen as especially dangerous as they represent a major source of income (in some cases up to 30 per cent of total state budgets) for countries with large informal economic sectors where income tax and VAT are not effective. EPAs, in this view, impact negatively on resources available for key public services such as the education and health systems and can indirectly be seen as contributing to migration towards Europe. It is also argued that EPAs appear to undermine EU development aid aiming at promoting sustainable economic growth for ACP countries, and that they should be implemented more gradually, in order to allow for import substitution in the industry, services and agricultural sectors.

Alternatives to EPAs are the EU's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance (GSP+). All experts agree that it is important to keep some degree of preferential treatment as otherwise there is little motivation for governments to progress economically and move out of the regimes foreseen for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).<sup>102</sup>

In Africa, EPAs are currently implemented with Cameroun, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. Negotiations for regional EPAs have been concluded and may be soon adopted for the West African region (i.e. 15 ECOWAS countries except Nigeria and Gambia) and the East African region (all five EAC countries).

Finally, with regard to migration, it is important to note that bi- and multi-lateral free trade agreements often raised questions on whether to include the supply of services, opening the debate on temporary cross-border movements of persons under "Mode 4" of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

### Regional Instruments

In addition to continental formal consultations, informal dialogues between governments have shown over time an increasing role in bringing the international migration agenda forward. So-called "Regional Consultative Processes" (RCPs) on migration represent today an integral part of the global migration governance structure.<sup>103</sup> The most relevant RCPs for EU-Africa relations are currently the Khartoum Process, the Rabat Process and the EU-ACP Dialogue.

Launched in 2006, the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (also called Rabat Process) brings together governments of more than 60 European and African countries from North, West and Central Africa,<sup>104</sup> together with the EC and



ECOWAS. While mainly consisting of thematic meetings, workshops, and exchanges during its first years of existence, the 2014 Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development led to the adoption of the Rome Declaration and Action Plan 2014-2017 to put the objectives of the Rabat Process into practice.

The Action Plan identifies four key pillars of intervention: i) organizing mobility and legal migration; ii) improving border management and combating irregular migration; iii) strengthening the synergies between migration and development; and iv) promoting international protection.<sup>105</sup>

Alongside with the Khartoum Process and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy, the Rabat Process has also been tasked to monitor the implementation of the priority actions included in the Joint Valletta Action Plan for the period 2016-2018. The process is funded by a variety of EU funding instruments, including the Pan-African Program, the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF), and the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI).

The Khartoum Process (EU Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative) was launched in 2014 between EU Member States and nine African countries from the Horn of Africa and transit countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia). The European Commission, the AU Commission, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are also part of this initiative. The dialogue focuses on addressing trafficking in human beings as well as smuggling of migrants.

It aims to establish continuous dialogue, implement concrete projects, and provide a new impetus to the regional collaboration between countries of origin, transit, and destination regarding the migration route between the Horn of Africa and Europe. The Khartoum Process is supported by the EU through its Pan-African Program and anchored in the EU-Africa Action Plan on Migration and Mobility 2014-2017.

The third key RCP for EU-Africa relations is the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and Development initiated by the ACP Group of States and the EU in 2010. Discussions mainly focus on three priority areas: remittances, readmission, and visa facilitation. In 2015, the ACP-EU Migration Action (“the Action”) was launched with the aim to support activities implementing the ACP-EU Council of Ministers 2012 recommendations. Funded by the European Development Fund, the Action operates under the auspices of the ACP Secretariat and the EC.

Besides these regional dialogues and action plans, in 2015, the EU also launched new Regional Development and Protection Programs (RDPPs) in North Africa (led by Italy) and the Horn of Africa (led by the Netherlands). These programs build

on the experience gained by previous Regional Protection Plans (RPPs) and target countries hosting large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. RDPPs assist governments in dealing with protection and developmental needs, enhance state capacities, and improve coordination with regards to protection and development initiatives.

The EU-Africa partnership also includes collaborations with major RECs in Africa such as ECCAS, IGAD, ECOWAS or CEN-SAD. The EU supports these RECs through financial and technical support as well as tailored programs<sup>106</sup> to increase their capacities in managing migration flows.

Free movement of persons is a key objective of most RECs and provisions in that direction have been developed but in absence of effective implementation population movements are still regulated by restrictive policies causing irregular migration flows. The 1979 ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol is likely the most advanced – including the introduction of ECOWAS passports in 2000 – but it is reported that inconsistencies in travel documents, lack of common understandings between authorities, and corruption at borders and checkpoints are still widespread.

As for the right to residency and establishment – closely linked to labor mobility, trade integration, and tariffs – progress has been quite limited. The CEN-SAD also aimed at creating a free movement zone between member states going from west to east through the Sahara. Compared to ECOWAS' Free Movement Protocol, the CEN-SAD community only developed not-binding recommendations which – with the exception of a few bilateral agreements (e.g. Libya-Sudan) – have not been implemented.

Relevant regional initiatives taken up separately by the AU and the EU respectively include, for instance, the AU-Horn of Africa Initiative (AU-HoAI) on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants. Adopted by the AU in 2015, the AU-HoAI provides a forum to improve cooperation on migration management in the Horn of Africa and to address the challenges of human trafficking and irregular migration. Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan are core countries to the initiative; Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan also are taking part. On the EU side, the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan (RAP) adopted in 2015 aims to implement the 2011 EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa focusing i.a. on combating violent extremism.<sup>107</sup>

In May 2015, the EU launched its new European Agenda on Migration which stepped up the collaboration with key third countries and introduced a series of immediate measures in the short-term (e.g. enhanced role for Frontex, a multi-functional pilot center in Niger, introduction of EU “hotspots”). In the mid- and

long-term the new migration agenda aims to reduce the incentives for irregular migration, saving lives and securing the external borders, strengthening the common asylum policy, and developing a new policy on legal migration.<sup>108</sup>

In the same year, the EC adopted the Action Plan Against Migrant Smuggling 2015-2020 designed to transform smuggling from a 'high profit, low risk' activity into a 'high risk, low profit' business, while ensuring the full respect and protection of migrants' human rights.<sup>109</sup>

Finally, the European Council adopted the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 to address the prevention and countering of radicalization; creation of appropriate conditions for youth; migration, mobility and border management; the fight against human trafficking; and transnational organized crime.<sup>110</sup>

### Bilateral Instruments

At bilateral level, a variety of agreements (e.g. visa facilitation, readmission, etc.), programs and projects have been implemented between the EC and single African countries to promote institutional and legislative reforms and reinforce government capacities in managing migration. Under the GAMM, the EU promotes Mobility Partnerships (MP) and the Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility (CAMM). They provide a flexible and non-binding framework for promoting joint and responsible migration management through dialogue and specific technical cooperation.

Both of these instruments adopt a broad approach focusing on the thematic areas of the GAMM: legal migration and mobility, fight against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, border management, migration and development, and asylum and international protection. These agreements also aim at including specific targets and commitments from the signatory country in exchange for support measures by the EU and EU Member States.

MPs are mainly used for neighboring countries and have a greater focus on return and readmission; CAMM are usually more balanced and used for other non-EU countries. To date, nine MPs (including Morocco, Tunisia and Cape Verde) and two CAMMs (with Ethiopia and Nigeria) have been signed. Since 2016, the Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF) – funded mainly through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – supports the preparation and implementation of MPs and CAMMs as a rapid tool designed to provide targeted, flexible and tailor-made assistance.<sup>111</sup>

A new tool of bilateral cooperation are the “compacts” for countries of transit and origin introduced by the EU’s new Partnership Framework on Migration in July 2016 (see below). Lastly, EU Member States and African countries also develop bilateral agreements between themselves on specific migration-related topics mainly consisting of technical and financial support complementary to EU initiatives and funded by national budgets.

It is worth highlighting that since 1 Jul 2011, Austria has made possible the immigration of skilled workers from third countries, by the ”Rot-Weiß-Rot – Karte” (Red-White-Red Card system) based on a points system. The points system is a criteria-led immigration system (credits gained based on criteria such as qualifications, work experience, age, language skills, etc) that allows qualified workers from third countries (a different system applies to people from EU member states Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and their family members to immigrate legally and permanently to Austria.

### 1.6.3 Policy Developments and Priorities Since 2016

#### New Partnership Framework on Migration (July 2016)

Following the Joint Valletta Action Plan, the EC introduced a new migration partnership framework deepening the EU’s cooperation with key countries of origin and transit with the objective to tackle irregular migration and address root causes of migration.<sup>112</sup>

The new approach is based on the concept of “compacts” (also known as “Migration Compacts”) calling for country-specific, tailored action plans with clear targets and joint commitments for each partner country.

The new framework is currently being implemented with Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia.<sup>113</sup>

European migration liaison officers on the ground in 12 partner countries are also part of the new approach. The fourth progress report on the Partnership Framework on Migration published in June 2017 – taking stock after one year of implementation – highlights how this new approach has i) improved coordination between different EU actors and Member States, ii) contributed to progress in the fight against smuggling and trafficking, iii) increased assisted voluntary returns of stranded migrants (while progress with regards to re-admissions is still limited), and iv) supported job creation and social projects in key partner countries.<sup>114</sup>

The new Partnership Framework combines short-term resources (such as the EUTF for Africa) and long-term financial instruments (i.e. External Investment Plan) to achieve its objectives.

#### EU External Investment Plan (EIP) (September 2016)

In line with the aim to address the drivers of irregular migration flows towards Europe, in September 2016 the EC proposed an External Investment Plan (EIP) – also known as the External Juncker Plan – promoting private investment and job creation in Africa and the European neighborhood.

With this proposal the EC tries to go beyond traditional development assistance and set an example for a new type of partnership. With limited public resources available, the EIP promotes investments and collaboration with the private sector, international financial institutions, donors, etc. to meet the challenge of achieving sustainable development. achieving sustainable development.<sup>115</sup>

The EIP aims at mobilizing funds for African partner countries where otherwise investments would be low and targets socio-economic areas that favor job creation. European enterprises can apply for co-funding and investment guarantees, including for smaller projects. Complementary measures aim at creating a good business climate and provide technical support to project development. The new European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) represents the major financing tool for the proposed EIP. Together with an European Development Fund (EDF) contribution and additional public and private investments, a total of 44 billion euro is expected. If Member States and other partners respond to the EC's request to match the Fund, a total of 62 to 88 billion euro could be reached.

#### Malta Declaration (February 2017)

The informal Malta Summit from February 2017 adopted the Malta Declaration which focuses on measures to stem the flow of migration from Libya to Italy, following over 181,000 irregular arrivals in 2016 and a new record high in migrants missing or dead at sea. The objective is to stabilize Libya, break the business model of smugglers, and save lives by intensifying cooperation with the Libyan authorities.

Identified priorities include capacity building and operational support of the Libyan national coast guard (in addition to stepping up EUNAVFOR MED Operation

Sophia), fostering reception capacities and conditions in Libya, improving the socio-economic situation and resilience of local communities, particularly in Libya's coastal areas and land borders, increasing information campaigns and outreach addressed at migrants, and helping to reduce the pressure on Libya's land borders by working both with the Libyan authorities and all neighbors of Libya.

The Declaration also emphasizes the need to reinforce EU return capacities, prepare an updated Action Plan on Returns, provide guidance for more operational returns by the EU and Member States, and support IOM in significantly increasing assisted voluntary return activities. Funding will mainly come from the EUTF with 200 million euro pledged to the North of Africa, prioritizing Libya.<sup>116</sup>

#### Renewed Action Plan on Return (March 2017)

Returns and readmissions are an integral part of the new results-oriented Migration Partnership Framework. Following the informal Malta Summit from February 2017, the EC issued a “Renewed Action Plan on Return” – to be implemented in parallel to the 2015 EU Action Plan on Return – aiming at substantially improving return rates.

The renewed Plan proposes among others to: i) increase financial support for national and joint return and reintegration activities (200 million euro in 2017 alone); ii) improve information exchange to enforce returns; iii) exchange best practices to ensure reintegration packages are consistent and coherent to avoid “return-shopping”; iv) set up a commercial flight mechanism for financing returns; and v) conclude readmission agreements with Nigeria, Tunisia, and Jordan and continue negotiations with Morocco and Algeria.<sup>117</sup>

Several of the suggested actions (e.g. increased use of detention, shorter appeal periods against return decisions) have been criticized by migrant rights' activists, academia and the media for being more restrictive than what is originally foreseen in the 2008 EU Return Directive, the key legislative tool regulating the return of irregular migrants.

The EU's Return Policy is mainly financed by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) coordinated by DG Home. The AMIF has an overall budget of 3.1 billion Euro for the period 2014-2020 out of which about 806 million euro are used for return and readmission activities.<sup>118</sup>

Following the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration, DG DEVCO started financing voluntary return initiatives linked with community development and sustainable reintegration in the country of origin.

#### Extension/Amendment of the Mandate for EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia (July 2017)

Operation Sophia was launched in June 2015 as part of the EU's comprehensive approach to manage irregular migration and disrupt human traffickers and smugglers' networks. Active since October of the same year, this EU naval operation has been contributing to the identification, capture, and disposal of vessels used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers. Capacity building of the Libyan coast guard and navy started in 2016 as well as information sharing in support of the UN arms embargo/UNSC RES 2292. In July 2017, the mandate of Operation Sophia has been extended until 31 December 2018 and amended to: i) set up a monitoring mechanism of trainees to ensure the long-term efficiency of the training of the Libyan coast guard; ii) conduct new surveillance activities and gather information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya; and iii) enhance the possibilities for sharing information on human trafficking with member states' law enforcement agencies, FRONTEX and EUROPOL.<sup>119</sup>

#### Action Plan to Support Italy and Reduce Pressure Along the Central Mediterranean Route (July 2017)

Following the Joint Communication on the Central Mediterranean route in January 2017,<sup>120</sup> the Malta Declaration and specific conclusions from the European Council in June 2017,<sup>121</sup> the EC adopted an Action Plan to support Italy in managing migration flows.

The Plan identifies five key areas of intervention: i) saving lives (through better coordination in search and rescue activities, capacity building of Libyan coast guard, establishing Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia); ii) fighting trafficking in Libya (by preventing movement to Libya, promoting Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) from Libya and Niger and opening legal pathways towards the EU); iii) improving cooperation with partner countries (i.e. readmission agreements); iv) stepping up returns (e.g. deployment of the EU 'Rapid Return' teams to Italy, expedited return procedures from Italy, increased reception and pre-removal detention capacity in Italy); and v) increasing EU Solidarity. By end of July, the EUTF committed 46 million euro to reinforce

the integrated migration and border management capacities of the Libyan authorities.<sup>122</sup>

Already in April 2017, 90 million Euro from the EUTF were assigned to reinforce the protection and resilience of migrants and refugees (including in centers), and the host communities in Libya.<sup>123</sup> In addition, in June 2017, the EU announced its intention to support the operationalization of the G5 Joint Force (composed by forces from Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad) for securing sensitive border regions with up to 50 million euro.

#### State of Play of the ENP in the Southern Neighborhood

With regards to migration and human mobility, the EU Syria Trust Fund and the North Africa window of the EUTF currently represent the major regional initiatives of the ENP in the Southern Neighborhood. In addition, two out of the four priority actions identified by the 2016 Annual Action Plan for ENI South countries are closely linked to managing current and future migration flows: The second action entitled “Security Package 2016” includes the exchange of operational information on smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings; action four aims at promoting job creation, economic development, and inclusiveness in the Southern Mediterranean countries.<sup>124</sup> Ongoing collaborations at national levels differ significantly between African ENP partner countries:

Morocco - The 2000 Association Agreement was followed in 2013 by the Migration and Mobility partnership<sup>125</sup> which re-launched previously failed negotiations on re-admissions. To date no agreement has been reached, mainly due to the clause on readmitting third country nationals transiting through Morocco.<sup>126</sup>

The EU mainly supports Morocco bilaterally through Annual Action Programs funded under ENI. In 2016, a total of 165 million euro were allocated to enhance social protection schemes (EUR100 million), reform the vocational training system (EUR15 million), implement the government’s migration policies (EUR 35 million) and support the civil society (15 million).<sup>127</sup> An additional contribution of 25 million Euro came from the EUTF.

Tunisia - Agreements include the 2012 Privileged Partnership and related ENP Action Plan; in 2014, Tunisia signed a Mobility Partnership with the EU.<sup>128</sup> The 2016 EC Joint Communication “Strengthening EU Support for Tunisia” aims at long-term stability, good governance, socio-economic development, and security for all Tunisians. Migration and mobility - ranging from addressing root causes, border



management, asylum system, readmission to legal migration, and mobility schemes - is indicated as one of the core areas of intervention.<sup>129</sup> To finance these actions, the EU will provide a grant of 300 million Euro in 2017 and maintain a sustained level of financing until 2020.

Algeria - The Association Agreement entered into force in 2005 and represents the key legal basis of EU-Algeria relations. ENI provided Algeria about 148 million Euro for the 2014-2017 period, part of which was dedicated to job creation. A 2017 assessment serves as a basis to define future partnership priorities and to guide the EU-Algeria dialogue until 2020.<sup>130</sup>

Egypt - The entrance into force of the Association Agreement in 2004 was followed by the 2007 EU-Egypt Action Plan, which provides the foundation for cooperation in the political, social, and economic fields. In 2016, Egypt received 100 million euro bilateral funding, in part going to the EU Facility for Inclusive Growth and Job Creation. In July 2017, the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017-2020 were adopted, foreseeing closer collaboration with regards to stabilizing their common neighborhood, crisis management and humanitarian assistance, and security and terrorism, as well as managing migratory flows for mutual benefit.<sup>131</sup>

Libya - No Association Agreement has been signed, leaving Libya outside of the structures of the ENP. Libya is, however, eligible under the ENI 2014-2020 including ENI's regional programs. Thematic assistance programs (including on migration or human rights) represent additional funding opportunities.<sup>132</sup>

All of these countries area eligible for funding under the North Africa window of the "EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa."

### Protecting Migrants and Refugees En Route to the EU

Since 2015, the EU and its Member States have considerably stepped up efforts in response to new arrivals of migrants and refugees. Initiatives range from conducting search and rescue operations, providing humanitarian assistance, fighting smuggling networks to secure external borders, stopping irregular entry to the EU, and promoting returns and readmissions to countries of origin. As mentioned above, the EU, Germany, and Italy launched in December 2016 a new initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration of Returnees along Central Mediterranean Migration Routes, which will cover the Sahel and Lake Chad region and neighboring countries, including Libya.

**Saving lives at sea:** Migrants losing their life while crossing the Mediterranean has become an increasing concern in the media and public debate.<sup>133</sup> The 2015 EU Agenda on Migration identifies saving lives at sea as one of the key short-term priorities. Over the last two years, Frontex has seen its mandate and operations extended and claims to have contributed in assisting almost 90,000 people through the Joint Operation Triton in the Central Mediterranean Sea and Operation Poseidon in the Aegean Sea.<sup>134</sup>

In 2016, Frontex turned into the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG).<sup>135</sup> It is, however, important to note that the main function of Frontex remains border surveillance. Similarly, other EU initiatives such as the “smart borders” introduced by the European Border Surveillance System’s (EUROSUR), the creation of the Internal Security Fund (ISF) 2014-2020, and overseas military operations under EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), are all very much focused on border control with few or no measures foreseen to protect migrants from life hazards during their travel.

Thus, in addition to national maritime authorities such as Italy’s Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC), the role of the civil society has become crucial in rescuing migrants risking their lives in the Mediterranean. In July 2017, the introduction by the Government of Italy of a “code of conduct” for NGOs engaged in search and rescue activities has led to a heated international debate.

While participants at mini-summit in Paris in August 2017 praised the code as a positive development allowing more effective coordination for rescue operations, it has been harshly criticized by many NGOs. According to MSF, Jugend Rettet and others, the code of conduct undermines the neutrality of their work, impacting negatively on the trust these actors are able to build with migrants and refugees.<sup>136</sup>

**Fighting migrant smuggling:** The EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling (2014-2020)<sup>137</sup> recommends specific actions such as destroying smuggler vessels and seizure and recovery of criminal assets.

In early 2015, Europol launched the Joint Operational Team Mare (JOT MARE) aiming at combating organized crime and subsequently integrated into the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC)<sup>138</sup> created in 2016. ESMC aims at supporting EU Member States in dismantling criminal networks involved in organized migrant smuggling by focusing on geographical criminal hotspots and promoting national capacity building activities.

Complementing Europol and Frontex, the EU launched in 2015 the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED)<sup>139</sup>– better known as Operation

Sophia – to systematically identify, capture, and dispose smugglers’ vessels and confiscate assets suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or human traffickers. While the contribution in dismantling smuggler networks has been recognized, concerns have been expressed with regards to possible risks for migrants an initiative like Operation Sophia may entail (e.g. shift to more dangerous routes to EU, violation of the right to leave a country, and non-refoulement principle).<sup>140</sup>

Another tool is the hotspot model<sup>141</sup> for irregular arrivals in Greece and Italy. Hotspots are aimed to assist national authorities in the fields of registration, identification, asylum support, intelligence sharing, criminal investigations and the prosecution of criminal networks of people smugglers. They have proven to be a useful coordination tool and have increased in numbers since their introduction.<sup>142</sup> However, there is a need for improvement as reception capacities are insufficient and follow-up procedures often delayed.<sup>143</sup> The EU aims at devoting 8 billion euro to this program until 2021.<sup>144</sup>

**Securing settlements and camps in Libya:** The ongoing trend to externalize EU border management – often labeled as the “outsourcing of migration control” – is increasingly criticized by migration experts and human right organizations. Incidents of violence and systematic abuse of migrants raise questions about the EU’s responsibility to guarantee the protection of migrants’ rights.<sup>145</sup> According to official reports,<sup>146</sup> there are currently 24 Detention Centers for migrants under the control of the Libyan Interior Ministry’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM) and at least two in the West under the control of the “Passport Investigation Department”.

There are also reports about private detention camps under the control of militias, smugglers and traffickers and grave violations of basic human rights of migrants. In order to change that, the UN and internationally recognized Government of the National Accord (GNA), which committed to adhere to international standards, needs and receives international advice and assistance including from the EU, UNHCR and IOM (see above, including results of the August 2017 summit in Paris) and it needs to attain effective control of the country. The recent agreement, reached in July 2017 in Paris, and endorsed by UN SC Res. 2376 (2017) and UNSMIL, between Prime Minister Sarraj and General Haftar on a ceasefire and a continued political dialogue based on the Libyan Political Agreement from 2015, is a step in the right direction. In August 2017, Italy reached an agreement with Libya’s government on an integrated border and migration management.<sup>147</sup>

On the local level, Italy launched a new program involving 14 local communities whose mayors committed to prevent irregular departures in exchange for economic development assistance. In April 2016, the UNDP and Germany launched the Sta-

bilization Facility for Libya in order to help communities organize the critical period of transition from humanitarian relief to sustainable development and governance. The Facility has already engaged in Benghazi, Kikla, Obari, Sebha and Sirte. Since 2016, Libyan communities also benefit from the “Nicosia initiative” – a bottom-up, peer-to-peer stabilization program funded by the European Committee of the Regions – which aims to connect cities in Libya and Europe to promote economic cooperation projects.<sup>148</sup>

**Rescuing migrants stranded in the desert:** Since the beginning of the migration crisis, the focus of the media and general public has mainly been on migrants losing their lives while crossing the Mediterranean Sea. IOM’s Missing Migrants Project<sup>149</sup> and the Migrant Files<sup>150</sup> – a consortium of European journalists – stress that many migrants do not even get to North African shores and face death in the Sahara Desert. Thus, in April 2017, IOM launched the project “Migrants Rescue and Assistance in Agadez Region” (MIRAA) targeting hard-to-reach areas and complementing the EUTF-funded “Migrant Resource and Response Mechanism” (MRRM) in Niger. Only from April to June 2017, IOM rescued more than 600 migrants from the desert.<sup>151</sup>

In July 2017, the declaration adopted at the Rome Ministerial Conference “A shared responsibility for a common goal: solidarity and security” indicated, among others: the need to increase capacities of host governments, IOM and UNHCR to assist migrants and refugees in transit countries, and to intensify information programs raising awareness of the risks related to irregular migration. More governmental presence in the north of Niger and Chad would increase the ability to rescue migrants in danger in the Sahara and improve border control operation towards Libya.<sup>152</sup>

The 2017 Paris Summit (see above) raised the question whether EU Hotspots should be extended further south. Participants recommended fostering economic cooperation with local communities along migratory routes in transit countries (e.g. Agadez in Niger).

## 1.7 Reference 7: The African Union - Activities and Regional Economic Communities

### 1.7.1 AU and the Agenda 2063

The African Union (AU)<sup>153</sup> as well as a number of African regions, are developing regulatory frameworks to enhance the mobility of persons. In the context of its

“Agenda 2063”, the AU aspires to develop capacity to manage the flow of cross border migration with attention to the concerns of women, youth and vulnerable groups. It also aspires to end all forms of illegal migration and trafficking of youth by 2025.<sup>154</sup>

The Agenda 2063 framework, ‘The Africa We Want’, captures the seven African aspirations,<sup>155</sup> as derived from a consultative process with the African Citizenry, provides the selection criteria for the favorable goals and priority areas, and lays the foundation for the implementation plan which aims to guide all stakeholders with clear responsibilities, time-lines, policy guidelines for implementation, activities and issues related to capacity and communication.<sup>156</sup>

The Agenda 2063 is supported by the First Ten Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023), adopted in June 2015, which offers a basis for preparation of medium term plans of Member States of the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and AU organs. The First Ten Year Implementation Plan will be integrated into National Plans.

The First Ten Year Implementation Plan includes priority areas<sup>157</sup> as well as twelve flagship programs/projects, as approved by the AU Summit 2015, which should be implemented immediately.<sup>158</sup> So called Continental Frameworks which have been developed by the AU Commission (AUC) need also to be captured in the priority areas of the First Ten Year Implementation Plan.

With regard to migration, the AU set as a flagship program ‘The African Passport and free movement of African citizens in all African countries by 2018’, resulting in the abolishment of visa requirements for all African citizens by the same year.<sup>159</sup> Indeed, in the AU Summit 2016 in Kigali, the AU launched the new biometric African passport, capitalizing on the global migration towards e-passports and granting visa-free access to all its Member States. The first passports were issued to heads of states and senior officials while the AU aims to distribute them to all African citizens by 2020.<sup>160</sup>

#### AU Flagship Projects/Programs in the First Ten Year Implementation Plan

- Integrated African High Speed Train Network to enable movement of goods, services and people, reduce transport costs and relieve congestion of current and future systems.

- African Virtual and E-University to increase access to tertiary and higher education and offering Open, Distance and eLearning (EDel) resources to safeguard access to university (24/7).
- A formulation of a Commodities Strategy to enable African Countries to add value, extract higher rents and integrate into global value chains.
- Annual multi-stakeholder African Forum to address developments and constraints to realize the Agenda 2063.
- Launch of a Continental Free Trade Area to double trade within Africa by 2022 and to strengthen global trade negotiations.
- The African Passport and free movement of African citizens in all African countries by 2018.
- Implementation of the Grand Inga Dam Project, which will generate 43,200 MW of power (PIDA) to support power pools to transform to modern sources of energy and to ensure access for all to clean and affordable electricity.
- The Pan-African E-Network to lead towards transformative e-applications and services in Africa.
- Ending intra-African wars, civil conflicts, gender based violence and prevent genocide by 2020 and measure through an African Human Security Index (AHSI).
- Africa Outer Space Strategy to improve crucial access to space technology products to boost agriculture, disaster management, remote sensing, climate forecast, banking and finance, as well as Defense and security.
- Creation of a single African Air Transport Market to facilitate air transportation in Africa.
- Establishment of the Continental Financial Institutions to accelerate integration and socio-economic development.

### 1.7.2 AU Activities at the Continental Level

The position of the AU on migration is stated in two policy documents: The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) and the African Common Position on

Migration and Development (ACPMD). Both MPFA and ACPMD were presented and agreed upon in 2006 and both provide the appropriate platform on the need to link migration to the development agenda at the national, regional, and continental levels. With the MPFA the AU provides for Member States and African RECs a basis to develop policy strategies through which migration can enable development, although new development plans, including the Agenda 2063 and SDGs, still need to be integrated. The ACPMD proposes eleven key policy issues and recommendations for national, continental and international measures.

What is more, the AU has launched numerous policy instruments which influence migration, but without specifically managing migration. These include the 2004 AU Plan of Action on Promotion and Poverty Alleviation, the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development, the AU Framework on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (Kampala Convention); the Joint Africa-EU Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings especially Women and Children, the AU Plan of Action on Employment Promotion and Poverty Alleviation, the Social Policy Framework for Africa, the 2012 AU Plan of Action on Boosting Intra-African Trade as well as the Declaration on Migration adopted at the 25th AU Assembly in June 2015. These instruments have a non-binding character, but they can be seen as guidelines.

Two further policy initiatives to manage labour migration in Africa at the continental level are worth mentioning. First, the Joint Labour Migration Program (JLMP), formally adopted in January 2015 by African Heads of State and Government, is an AU-led initiative and a joint program under the aegis of the AU and its international partner organizations. The JLPM is a comprehensive labour migration governance program, financed by the AUC, the ILO, IOM and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), with the aim to support effective implementation of human mobility and labour rules and to promote effective management of labour migration in the context of regional integration and inclusive development in the African RECs. This initiative seeks to establish Schengen type mechanisms for the movement of skilled labour as well as the development of skills in the respective regions.

Second, the Intra-Africa Talent Mobility Partnership Program (TMP) started in 2014 as a voluntary selected initiative of African countries in West, East and Southern Africa. The TMP aims to set up mechanisms on the free movement of skilled workers according to the Schengen model and to promote the qualification of specialists and skill development in the respective regions. The TMP also intends to accelerate economic integration, promote the opening of borders, and develop common laws and policies on the mobility of workers in African countries. The TMP Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed in December 2016 and prepared

for the countries involved, addresses key issues that aim at tackling the challenges faced by migrant workers. These include, inter alia, rules which prevent migrants from obtaining a work permit, common standards on which qualifications can be assessed for certain occupations, and the establishment of employment information systems.<sup>161</sup>

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an economic development program of the AU, supported by G8/7 governments via the G8 Africa Action Plan, launched at the 2012 G 8 Kananaskis Summit.<sup>162</sup>

NEPAD advocates that migration management should focus on:<sup>163</sup>

- Building political, social and economic conditions in Africa that would assist as encouragements to restrain the brain drain and attract investment;
- Establishing a trustworthy record on the brain drain both to define the level of the issue, and to stimulate networking and cooperation between specialists in the country and those in the diaspora;
- Safeguarding that the knowledge of Africans living in the industrialized countries is used in the implementation of some of the projects envisioned in the NEPAD.

The AU recognizes that a comprehensive approach with long term vision is required to address the root causes of irregular migration and promote regular channels of migration. For this reason, it has introduced the following flagship programs to address various migration related issues:

- The AU Commission Initiative (AU.COMMIT) Campaign to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, launched with ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC in 2009 in line with the Ouagadougou Action Plan, is a call to action towards the African member states, RECs and civil society to implement serious measures against combating trafficking, while encouraging to develop and reform policies, laws and interventions on trafficking in human beings, especially women and children. <sup>164</sup>
- In response to the irregular migration flows within and from the Horn of Africa to different locations, the African Union Horn of Africa Initiative (AH-HOAI) on human trafficking and smuggling of migrants was launched in 2014, intending to secure justice for victims and ending impunity for traffickers. A forum was also created in order to enhance cooperation among Member States



in the Horn of Africa as well as other transit and destination countries<sup>165</sup> (the initiative is also mentioned in the EU section above).

- Concerning the nexus between migration and development, the AUC has established the African Institute for Remittances (AIR), launched in November 2014, in order to reduce the transaction cost of remittances, while encouraging member states and migrants to leverage remittances for socio-economic development of Africa.

Last, in line with building identity systems in Africa, which can facilitate development, economic activity, free movement of persons and empower people to claim their rights, the AU adopted, in July 2014, the Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection in order to promote data privacy and security and prevent misuse of personal data.<sup>166</sup>

### 1.7.3 African Regional Economic Communities

African RECs, such as ECOWAS, EAC and SADC, are striving for greater economic integration to create conditions which promote the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services among the Member States. The establishment of a free trade zone is generally considered as a prerequisite for integration since it leads to the elimination of trade barriers between contracting parties. Once all restrictions on the circulation of capital, goods and services within the group are eliminated, a common market will have been reached. Finally, the economic and political union can be sealed by a supranational institutional governance system, which is pursued by the AU and the RECs, although regional freedom of movement remains controversial.<sup>167</sup>

At a summit in 2005, COMESA, EAC and SADC advocated for a stronger, more far-reaching economic integration. Hence, a three-sided free trade zone was created for 26 African countries. Three years later the decisions-makers concerned devised a harmonization of regional infrastructure programs and institutional arrangements for cooperation and the free trade zone was established in 2015. Political strategies for cross-border migration and labour policies, however, are planned for Phase II of the negotiations, which are expected to be completed in 2017.<sup>168</sup>

### 1.7.4 Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS)

The objective of ECOWAS, an initiative founded in 1975 by the Treaty of Lagos, includes the free movement of goods, capital and passenger transport, as well as the right of residence and establishment for citizens in all 15 member states. The Protocol on the free movement of persons is the legal framework for migration in ECOWAS. The protocol implementation plan is consisted of three phases: the right of entry and the abolition of the visa requirement, the right of residence, and the right of establishment.

In January 2016, ECOWAS launched the biometric identity (ID) card program, which was designed to ensure the unrestricted movement of citizens from member nations of the community and to replace in the future the residential card and travel certificate that is currently in use.<sup>169</sup> Samples of the ID card were presented at 48th Ordinary Session of Authority of Heads of States and Governments of the AUC in Abuja, Nigeria, but it has been the responsibility of each member state to issue the ECOWAS Biometric ID Cards to its citizens. As of November 2016, Senegal was the first of the 15 member states to issue the biometric ID cards to its citizens.<sup>170</sup>

Other regional legal instruments on migration, such as the Joint Approach to Migration, are accelerating the implementation of the above mentioned protocol. The Common Approach is formulated in a policy paper on regional migration and stresses the link between migration and development. Other topics include illegal migration, migrant rights, female migrants and human trafficking.<sup>171</sup> Within the framework of the Joint Approach, a regional fund is also being set up to finance cross-border cooperation and a regional territorial strategy for the promotion of new growth and development areas. By adopting this strategy, member states have demonstrated their commitment to a common regional methodology to migration and its management. The employment policy and action plan of ECOWAS supports the flexibility of the regional labour market and human capital development. The region's ministers have committed themselves to the promotion of the rights of migrant workers.<sup>172</sup>

Despite these efforts, the development in the implementation of ECOWAS policies in the main areas such as trade, economic and financial cooperation, energy and social development still remain a challenge. With thirteen out of the eighteen ECOWAS member countries classified as 'least developed' in the Human Development Category and with 60 per cent of the population expected to live on less than a dollar per day, there are obstacles to the free circulation of people and goods

as well as political, institutional and socio-economic challenges that remain to be addressed.<sup>173</sup>

### 1.7.5 The East African Community (EAC)

In EAC there is a consensus among the member states to exchange information on employment opportunities, to set up an East African Centre for Productivity and Promotion of Employment, and to provide training for citizens of the Member States. The Protocol of the Common Market of the EAC from 2010 guarantees five regional freedoms: the free movement of goods, persons, workers, services and capital. The protocol defines migrants as individuals, workers and self-employed persons. There are specific provisions for each type.

However, EAC has not yet formulated a regional protocol on the free movement of persons, workers, services, and the right to establish, as agreed in the EAC Treaty. The commitment to international conventions on migration is less pronounced in the EAC region than in ECOWAS. In contrast to the latter, however, there were no mass expulsions of citizens from a Member State of EAC, the only exception being the exclusion of hundreds of Ugandans and Rwandans from Tanzania.<sup>174</sup>

### 1.7.6 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

The core objective of the foundation of ECCAS is trade and market integration, with the Establishing Treaty of ECCAS not mentioning peace, security, stability and governance in its institutional structure, despite the political unrest and conflicts in the region. Regarding trade and market integration, it is worth mentioning ECCAS is implementing trade facilitation programs, including the construction of one-stop border posts that are becoming more frequent in the region. defining a Regional Strategy on investment and establishing a Small and Medium Enterprises Guarantee Fund.

In 1983, ECCAS adopted the Protocol on Freedom of Movement and Rights of Establishment of National of Member States, which includes provisions for the freedom of movement, residence and establishment for all citizens in the ECCAS region. Despite the implementation plan in a four and twelve year time-frame after the Treaty Establishing ECCAS and considering also that ECCAS has been inactive for several years,<sup>175</sup> there has been little progress to implement the free movement of people. ECCAS also adopted (1999) an initiative to fast-track free movement of persons, meant to be effective by 2005, but is still pending.<sup>176</sup> In practice, the free movement of people is effective only in Cameroon, Chad, Congo and the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. The rest of the member States require visa for fellow ECCAS citizens,<sup>177</sup> although more recently more member states are offering visas on arrival and movement is becoming relatively fluid.<sup>178</sup>

To deal with the conflicts and political instability in the region, ECCAS adopted in 1999 the Protocol of Peace and Security, which is aligned with the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture regarding defense and security mechanisms and gave way for the establishment of the Security Council in Central Africa (COPAX) with three key instruments: the Commission for Defense and Security, the Central African Early Warning System and the Central African Multinational Force. Moreover, ECCAS (assisted by the EU Delegation in Gabon)<sup>179</sup> has implemented the ECCAS Support Program for Peace and Security in Central Africa (PAPS) which aims to increase the ECCAS' capabilities and level of involvement with respect to consolidating peace and security in Central Africa, in accordance with both its own schedule concerning peace and security and the African Union's continental-level programs (The African Peace Facility).

### 1.7.7 The Community of Sahel - Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

CEN-SAD, established on February 1998 and with the status of a REC since July 2000, aims to remove restrictions that hamper integration of member states and ensure: free trade, free movement of persons, right of establishment and exercise of economic activity.<sup>180</sup> Free movement of persons is a core objective of CEN-SAD, as defined in Article 1 of the Establishing Treaty, and stipulates that the same rights, advantages and obligations granted to a member state's own citizens should be applied to nationals of the signatory countries, in conformity with the provisions of their respective constitutions. A number of member states, whose membership also overlaps with membership in ECOWAS, have been increasingly liberalizing their policies and have successfully implemented schemes to foster the intraregional movement of people.<sup>181</sup>

Due to its geographical position, the Sahel-Sahara region has long been subject to strong migratory turbulence while it is the region where instability is the most endemic in Africa. It has become the place of most of intra-African conflicts and the sanctuary of all of the continent's jihadist movements. Therefore, peace, security and stability have become essential topics within CEN-SAD. Peace, security and stability in the Sahel-Saharan region is supported by the provisions of the CEN-SAD Security Charter (2000) and the Niamey Declaration on Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (2003). The maintenance of peace and stability is derived through a process of normalization of relations with countries affected by conflict – when a number of procedures are followed: Protocol on Prevention

Mechanism, Management and Resolution of Conflicts; Convention on Cooperation on security issues; and the realization of the Security Charter.<sup>182</sup>

For coordination of regional cooperation on development policies and security matters in central Africa, G5 Sahel was also formed in February 2014, as the institutional framework for such coordination. G5 Sahel includes five Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) and its purpose is to strengthen the bond between economic development and security as well as combat the threat of jihadist organizations operating in the region.

### 1.7.8 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (The COMESA)

Two main policies drive migration management in COMESA:<sup>183</sup> the Visa Protocol (1984) and the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Services, Labour and the Right of Establishment and Residence (2001). Both Protocols call for the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, the right of establishment, and the right of residence. However, the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) has not been mainstreamed but it has rather been operating as a model for revising existing protocols. Nevertheless, Zambia and Zimbabwe took the lead in putting the COMESA free movement agenda forward and launched the National Monitoring Committee (NMC) in July 2016 to monitor the implementation of the COMESA 2001 Protocol.

### 1.7.9 Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)

In July 2012, IGAD was the first REC to prepare a Regional Migration Policy Framework (IGAD-RMPF). The IGAD-RMPF (2015-2020) is a coherent strategy that aims to guide and deliver recommendations on various migration issues to allow Member States to adopt and implement their own strategies, while also addressing other social and economic issues.<sup>184</sup> By means of a wide-range of measures for strengthening the legal, institutional and policy frameworks for migration management and in order to enhance the benefits of migration for development IGAD developed “a common strategy for implementing migration policy among IGAD Member States that reflect harmonization of laws, standards, procedures, information dissemination and sharing; compilation of statistics, production of documents, and efficient use of resources.”<sup>185</sup>

IGAD has also developed the Migration Action Plan for realizing the AU MFPA and the IGAD-RMPF and launched the Regional Migration Coordination Committee

and the Regional Consultative Process (RCP) to improve the implementation process. Moreover, the Ministerial Sectoral Committee on Migration was established to strengthen the realization of IGAD-RMPF, during the Ministerial Meeting in Kampala, Uganda, in November 2016.<sup>186</sup>

The ultimate aim of the IGAD-RMPF as well as the IGAD policies on migration is to ensure migration is voluntary and legal through methods that respect the human rights of migrants and collaboration among actors, including migrants, countries of origin, transit and destination. They focus on building the capacity of African states to effectively respond to crises of forced migration including refugees, asylum seekers, and particularly IDPs.<sup>187</sup>

### 1.7.10 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Labour migration in Southern Africa is regulated by national immigrations laws and bilateral agreements, especially since the 2005 Draft Protocol on SADC – aimed to regulate the implementation of the SADC Treaty provision on the free movement of persons in the region – has not been set in force.

The national immigration legislation is primarily oriented towards safety issues. SADC Member States approved the Regional Labor Migration Plan 2013-2015, the first real regional labor migration initiative and launched the 2016-2019 Labour Migration Action Plan. With the action plan, SADC members have committed to harmonizing their data collection systems in the labor markets as well as immigration policies and legislation.

Independent of national laws, SADC members also concluded bilateral agreements. For example, there are Memoranda of Understanding between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, which facilitate the exchange of workers. Bilateral agreements contain employment arrangements and engagements for the return of former migrant workers.<sup>188</sup>

### 1.7.11 Key African Programs on Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency

ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE)

In 2009, ECOWAS in cooperation with the governments of Austria and Spain, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), established

ECREEE as a unique regional renewable energy and energy efficiency promotion agency. The main objective is to create favourable framework conditions and an enabling environment for RE&EE markets.

On the policy level ECOWAS, together with its partners, has formulated the Renewable Energy Policy (EREP)<sup>189</sup> and the Energy Efficiency Policy (EEEP).<sup>190</sup> Both documents were adopted by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in 2012 and outline clear targets and provide a strong contribution from ECOWAS to the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative. An additional document is the special report of the ACP-EU Energy Facility.<sup>191</sup> Further, ECREEE supported member States in developing a regional road map and National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs), National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) as well as National SE4ALL Action Agendas—all with a view to achieving the regional policy objectives and Sustainable Development Goal 7, which includes the SE4ALL targets.<sup>192</sup>

The ECREE Business Plan (2011-2016)<sup>193</sup> is the strategic framework and contains concrete targets: the share of renewable energies in total electrical power is to be increased to 10 percent by 2020 and to 19 percent by 2030. Assuming the performance of the large hydro power plants in the region, the rate of renewables in the same period increases to 35 and 48 percent, respectively. Around a quarter of the rural population will be supplied with decentralized renewable energy solutions. By implementing measures to increase energy efficiency over the next five years, the construction of around 40 power plants with an output of 50 megawatts each will be superfluous.

Flagship programs implemented by ECREEE include the Rural Electrification Program, the ECOWAS Solar Thermal Energy Program,<sup>194</sup> the West African Clean Cooking Alliance,<sup>195</sup> the ECOWAS Small-Scale Hydro Power Program,<sup>196</sup> EEEP and the ECOWAS Program on Gender Mainstreaming in Energy Access (ECOW-GEN).<sup>197</sup>

As a global leader in developing hydro power, the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC) is one of the key-partners of the ECREEE and will continue to support ECREEE with a core funding to its Business Plan 2011-2016 and the secondment of a technical assistant.<sup>198</sup>

Austria was, for example, instrumental in setting up the Centre in Cape Verde and provided financial resources and an expert. Southern and Eastern Africa are now moving and planning similar regional centres. Then a total of 34 countries in sub-Saharan Africa will start an energy transition. The centers respond to the urgent need for increased regional cooperation, and complement and strengthen ongoing

national activities in the areas of policy and capacity development, knowledge management and awareness-raising, as well as investment and business promotion.

The fifth Vienna Energy Forum 2017, co-organized by UNIDO, IIASA, the Austrian Government, and SE4ALL, underscored Austria's engagement as evidenced by the outcome document Sustainable Energy for All for the Implementation of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement.<sup>199</sup>

## The Great Green Wall

Led by the AU, the Great Green Wall is Africa's flagship initiative to combat the effects of climate change and desertification by creating 'a mosaic of green and productive landscapes' across North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn to address the challenges people face in the Sahel and the Sahara. Starting from the initial idea of developing a line of trees from east to west through the African desert, the AUC and the CEN-SAD Secretariat continued discussions that led to the establishment of the Great Green Wall of the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI) and its development to something more than a reforestation initiative, but rather a programming tool for rural development, which integrates actions to strengthen natural systems with sound ecosystem management, the protection of the rural heritage, the resilience of the region's population and the improvement of their living conditions.<sup>200</sup>

With regard to migration, the GGWSSI has recognized that the inability to make a living from the land is one of the biggest factors for migration and is increasingly integrating the issues of employment, social security and natural resource security.<sup>201</sup> The GGWSSI promotes greater investment in the region in various sustainable land-use practices that can strengthen local resilience to land degradation and climate change and promote economically viable Sustainable Land and Water Management (SLWM) practices.<sup>202</sup> At the same time, in a more general context, it holds and promotes an approach that is one of integrated landscape, regional and partnership oriented, and promotes African ownership, a deeper recognition of the poverty-environment-climate nexus, and stronger networks for sharing experience, and inspiring change.<sup>203</sup>

## 1.8 Reference 8: International Financial Institutions



## 1.8.1 European Investment Bank (EIB)

The EIB is the largest multilateral borrower and lender worldwide with expertise in financing, bundling and technical assistance. It offers financing and know-how for sustainable investment projects that contribute to the achievement of the EU objectives, with 90 percent of funds spent in Europe. and ten percent (8 billion euros) spent on thousands of projects outside the EU, as EIB is a major multiplier of the EU's external action.

The Sustainable Development Goals are reflected in the EIB mandate under the External Lending Mandate (ELM) and the Cotonou Agreement for the ACP region. There are two main objectives: local private sector development and development of social and economic infrastructure, which are complemented by the cross-cutting objectives of climate change mitigation and adaptation and regional integration.

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the EIB is one of the largest microfinance lenders with a total portfolio of EUR 36.5 million committed to microfinance providers. The Neighborhood Investment Facility is a new risk capital facility launched in 2014 worth up to EUR 300 million. This complements the existing EUR 6 million FEMIP Impact Investment Envelope, which provides risk capital for investment in microfinance institutions pursuing economic, social, environmental and/or innovation goals as their primary objective.

The fiscal instruments of EIB range from medium to long-term loans to microfinance providers, direct equity investments in microfinance institutions, equity and debt investments, equity and guarantees to microfinance institutions which offer a wide range of financial services to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, such as savings, loans, transfers and insurance. The financing terms are individually negotiated – following a thorough due diligence appraisal of potential EIB clients to verify their eligibility and financial standing – and adapted to the type of investment.

The External Lending Mandate (ELM) covers 68 countries and/or territories in four regions: the EIB lends at its own risk for investment grade operations in Pre-Accession and Neighborhood countries. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement covers operations in the 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, while aiming to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, in line with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the global economy. The approved lending for 33 new projects in the ACP region was EUR 762 million.

Grants such as the Eastern Partnership Technical Assistance Trust Fund (EPTATF), FEMIP Trust Fund, Neighborhood Investment Facility Trust Fund (NIF TF), Western Balkans Investment Facility and EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund enable to deliver the provision of technical assistance and advisory services, investment grants (including interest rate subsidies) and diverse financial instruments.

The EIB Group - the EIB, the European Investment Fund (EIF) and the EIB Institute - has been active in the microfinance sector for many years and has extensive experience in this field. The EIB has provided EUR 5 million in risk-absorbing equity financing to the Luxembourg Microfinance Development Fund, which is investing in seven to ten emerging microfinance, while building on its existing investments in Haiti, East Timor, Niger and Mali, aiming to support the financial inclusion for a further 333,000 micro-borrowers and their families. 65 per cent of the final beneficiary borrowers are expected to be women, and around one third farmers, while some 40 per cent are expected to come from the poorest segments of society. For 20 years now, the Micro-fund for Women has been awarding microcredits to women who wish to become entrepreneurs.

The Energy Access Ventures Fund (EAVF) is a EUR 55 million venture capital fund investing in high-growth businesses providing new and improved energy solutions in Africa, and aiming to deliver reliable and affordable energy to rural and underserved areas and populations.

The Microfinance Center of Expertise (MCE) is a forum where different sectors can share their experiences, best practice and developments in this sector, and use the lessons learned for their work. Through this platform, the EIB is involved in several microfinance initiatives.

The Economic Resilience Initiative aims to boost economic resilience in the Southern Neighborhood and the Western Balkans by upgrading and developing social and economic infrastructure and stimulating growth and job creation. It forms part of the joined-up EU response to the challenges posed by forced displacement and irregular migration, and will be implemented in close cooperation with the EU institutions, Member States and other partners. The resiliency initiative is part of the EU's actions in close cooperation with the EU Member States and other partners to tackle the challenges of displacement and migration, while creating jobs to promote sustainable growth, build important infrastructures and support social cohesion in eligible countries of the Southern Neighborhood and the West Balkans.

Mobile phones are playing an important role in development in much of Africa. EIB is lending EUR 24 million to a EUR 60 million project by African Mobile

Networks to extend access to mobile phones and data networks to people in rural areas of Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, powered by solar energy. 650 mobile base stations will be built in areas with no existing coverage, providing both phone and 2G data connections, and at the same time enabling a low-carbon solution. The "Job Compact" initiative in Ethiopia is seen as a flagship project for sub-Saharan Africa and aims to prepare financing to support a programme of investment in Ethiopia aimed at helping thousands of refugees.

The EIB is also supporting studies on branchless banking and mobile financial services in Africa in close collaboration with UNCDF and in the Mediterranean partner countries via the Deauville Transition Fund/G8 initiative. Up to date, the EIB has produced several initiatives and projects on migration related issues, such as Migration and the EU; the EIB outside of the EU 2016; financial Inclusion and supporting microfinance outside of the EU.

## 1.8.2 EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

The EBRD works to engender sustainable development in its 27 countries of operation. The Bank has invested EUR 20 billion, since 1991, which in turn has catalyzed more than EUR 60 billion of further financing. That has supported privatization, helped to restructure companies and to make them viable, and provided loans or equity to start-up or existing businesses. That injection of capital has more impact when the receiving countries have strong macroeconomic conditions and have introduced reforms.

EBRD financing for private sector projects generally ranges from USD 5 million to USD 250 million, in the form of loans or equity. The average EBRD investment is USD 25 million. Smaller projects may be financed through financial intermediaries or through special programmes for smaller direct investments in the less advanced countries. The forms of direct financing are loans, equity Investments, and guarantees to promote trade as well as support small and medium-sized enterprises via assistance through financial intermediaries.

The EBRD operates through Banking and Treasury segments. It offers loans for private sector projects and local commercial banks; equity investments; and guarantees, as well as it provides assistance through financial intermediaries.

EBRD activities also cover business advisory services; project finance; project and corporate procurement, and consultancy services; trade facilitation program; funding, investments-credit, balance sheet management, and client risk management;

and loan syndication services. Its treasury activities include raising debt finance, investing surplus liquidity, managing the foreign exchange and interest rate risks, and assisting clients in asset and liability management.

EBRD serves agribusiness, equity funds, financial institutions, information and communication technologies, legal reform, manufacturing and services, municipal infrastructure, natural resources, nuclear safety, power and energy, property and tourism, and transportation sectors in South-eastern Europe, Central Europe and Baltic States, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Central Asia, Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, Russia, and Turkey.

Under its Small Business Initiative the EBRD also helps small and medium-sized businesses access the business advice they need to grow, succeed, then grow again, becoming genuine catalysts for their local economies and region.

For each partner country, the EBRD has a tailor-made country strategy, including African countries such as Egypt and Morocco. In Egypt EBRD is focusing on the development of the private sector, strengthening competitiveness, better economic integration and increased opportunities for women and young people. While in Morocco a new constitution was adopted and approved through a public referendum, undertook a free and fair parliamentary election and formed two governments based on a parliamentary majority.

To tackle the refugee crisis caused by the civil war in Syria, in 2016 the EBRD announced a financing package of up to EUR 900 million. The package will support private sector and infrastructure projects in Turkey and Jordan, which host some 2.8 million and 1.4 million Syrian refugees, respectively. Examples of refugee response investments in 2016 included a loan worth the equivalent of EUR 22.5 million to the Water Authority of Jordan for improvements to wastewater treatment infrastructure that serves 690,000 people, including around 250,000 refugees.

EBRD investments in industry, commerce and agribusiness (ICA) promote competition and foster resilience by helping to develop a private corporate sector, that is strong and well-governed, and by encouraging economic diversification. During 2016, the Bank invested EUR 2.46 billion in 137 ICA projects. The sector accounted for 26 per cent of Annual Bank Investment and 36 per cent of the number of operations.

For example, the EBRD works with producers, processors and retailers to maximize the export potential of the agribusiness sector while ensuring that local consumers have access to high-quality, competitively priced food and beverages. In 2016, the EBRD invested a total of EUR 817 million (2015: EUR 770 million) through 51

projects in agribusiness. These included debt and equity ventures in local and foreign currency. An example of an equity project was the purchase of a USD 100 million (EUR 94 million equivalent) stake in the United Sugar Company of Egypt. As part of that transaction, the Bank also converted an earlier loan for the same amount into equity in the sugar refinery.

Sector strategies of the EBRD include: 2010 Agribusiness sector strategy, Financial Sector Strategy, Information and Communication Strategy, Municipal Strategy, Natural Resource Strategy, Energy Sector Strategy, Property Sector Strategy and the Transport Sector Strategy.

Policy strategies range from the Bank's Strategic and Capital Framework 2016 to 2020, to Gender Equality Strategy, the Green Economy Approach and the Integrity Risk Policy.

### 1.8.3 Ongoing Initiatives in Africa

Various initiatives are taken or hosted by the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, and the World Bank Group towards facilitating effective and sustainable domestic and international private investment, with relevance to Africa, many supported by G-20 members and others.<sup>204</sup> These and further initiatives from bilateral G-20 members are provided as tables in appendix 5.2.

## 1.9 Reference 9: Civil Society and Private Sector Programs

Addressing the drivers of migration, facilitating migrants' socio-economic integration and promoting the role of migrants in job creation, entrepreneurship and investment cannot be achieved by national governments and IOs alone. More efforts are required in involving and teaming up with other actors.

As highlighted by the 2016 Council conclusions on the EU approach to forced displacement and development, both the civil society and the private sector are "crucial to offer much-needed services and opportunities for employment, business and investment for both forcibly displaced persons and their host communities".<sup>205</sup>

Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that migration is ultimately a local reality. Local actors – be it public ones (e.g. city councils), private enterprises

(e.g. business chambers) or non-profit entities – are best familiar with the specific context of intervention. They represent a key partner for any policy or program aiming at sustainable impact.

### 1.9.1 CSO Involvement in Migration Policy Debates

Given their role as key players in addressing emerging migration challenges, CSOs have been increasingly involved in global, regional and national migration consultations. For instance, the consultations between the African and European Civil Society at the 2015 Valletta Summit or the Taking Stock of the Valletta Conference in early 2017 led to statements and a position paper outlining civil society’s recommendations and priorities for the implementation of the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP).<sup>206</sup>

Similarly, CSOs are involved in the drafting of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM). In August 2017, Regional Civil Society Consultations (RCSCs) have been held for the MENA region and Africa. The Global Coalition on Migration – an international network of migrant associations, migrants rights organizations, trade unions, faith groups and academia – is working actively to ensure that the proposed Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration advances the rights of migrants and respects them as stakeholders.<sup>207</sup>

Another initiative worth mentioning is the People’s Global Action on Migration, Development & Human Rights (PGA), an independent civil society event parallel to the states-led Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) that prioritizes the voices and leadership of organized grassroots migrant and diaspora networks and communities, which are typically marginalized in international forums.<sup>208</sup>

### 1.9.2 Key CSO Plans and Programs

The Migration and Development Civil Society Network (MADE)<sup>209</sup> is an evolving global civil society movement working and networking to promote policies for the well-being and protection of all migrants and communities. Organized in thematic and regional working groups, MADE contributes in shaping agendas on diaspora communities, global governance of migration and development, labor migration and recruitment.

The GFMD Civil Society Program 2016 – organized under the overarching title “Time for Action: Doing rights-based governance of migration and development;

in our communities and across borders” – highlighted that today’s priority is not to discover principles, rights and practices but to implement them. The ten major recommendations touch upon a broad range of topics going from crisis management to integration, forced migration and return and vulnerable groups such as migrant children and women.<sup>210</sup>

An Action Committee established in New York in 2016 to monitor the outcomes of the Summit on Refugees and Migrants developed key advocacy documents identifying “red lines” and priorities.

At a regional level, a key initiative worth mentioning is a proposal developed by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) – a European think tank for South East Europe and enlargement – which proposes immediate steps to promote a credible EU policy on asylum, border and migration management.<sup>211</sup> In particular, ESI proposes four steps for the EU: 1) to set up another agreement, similar to the EU-Turkey agreement, with countries in Africa, as for example an agreement with ECOWAS countries, provided that there is a ECHR- proof understanding of what is a safe third country, or a safe country of origin; 2) to increase humanitarian aid to intra-African IDPs and refugees; 3) to speed up asylum procedures at the EU’s external borders (especially in Italy and Greece); and 4) to open up more legal pathways for immigration, especially through ambitious resettlement programs.<sup>212</sup>

With regard to Africa, ICMC Europe in collaboration with the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana (CMS), the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) and the Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations (FORIM) is currently coordinating the “MADE West Africa – Migration and Development Partnerships for rights-based migration and mobility governance in, from and to West Africa” (“MADE Rabat”). This 3-years-project (2017 – 2020) aims to promote good governance of migration and mobility in major migrant sending and receiving countries in the Rabat process region and along major migration corridors (within West Africa, between West Africa, North Africa and Europe) with a view to enhancing the development benefits of migration and mobility.

Activities include capacity building of both the civil society and national/local state authorities, outreach to diasporas in particular with regards to maximizing the impact of remittances, and involvement of the civil society in labour migration governance to protect migrant workers and promote fair and safe recruitment practices. The project foresees strengthening collaborations with key regional partners such as the Rabat Process and ECOWAS.

In 2017, the Rabat Process in view of preparing the new multi-annual programme for the dialogue 2018-2020, launched informal consultations involving, for the first time, selected European and African CSOs, diaspora members and academics.<sup>213</sup>

Also worth mentioning from an EU-Africa perspective, is the identification of migration as one of four priorities for the ENP by the 2017 Civil Society Forum on Neighborhood South. Priority actions for 2017 include i) advocating for a mobility policy based on human rights; ii) jointly evaluating AU-EU initiatives; iii) building CSO capacities to improve migrant protection; and iv) encouraging cross-border partnerships and networks between CSOs.<sup>214</sup>

When talking about CSOs contributions, it is important not to focus on European actors only. In fact, African CSOs play a major role even before migrants come to Europe<sup>215</sup> and, at the same time, urgently need to be reinforced both in terms of financial resources and operational capacities. A 2016 MADE report highlights how CSOs in Africa increasingly support irregular immigrants struggling within their country after traditionally focusing on the wellbeing of their fellow citizens in the global North. Major activities relate to humanitarian assistance, much more needs to be done with regards to labour migration and the migration and development nexus.

The report also stresses an urgent capacity building need for CSOs in Africa, be it for international or national actors. Capacities, expertise and focus of CSOs differ significantly between countries and regions, for instance, in Sudan CSOs are perceived as having a mandate to protect indigenous people, Egypt has strong migrant associations and links with diaspora communities, and in Morocco CSOs contribute to the implementation of the new immigration policy.<sup>216</sup>

Financing CSOs initiatives: Foundations play a key role in financing both CSOs and research initiatives.<sup>217</sup> With regards to migrant entrepreneurship, labour market integration and job creation, most research initiatives are however targeting mid- or high-income countries.

Studies in low-income transit and destination countries tend to focus on other aspects of migration, such as the protection of migrant rights, the environment-migration nexus, or access to basic services such as nutrition and health. There is a need to partially refocus and increase funds available for migration research.



CSOs in Austria also contribute to these global efforts. The “Freedom in Mind – HEMAYAT”, for instance, has been rewarded in 2017 by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) as one of the good practices to follow.<sup>218</sup> The project provides medical, psychological and psychotherapeutic treatment to survivors of war and torture, raises public awareness of the mental health issues and needs of highly traumatized migrants and refugees and also provides support to refugees facing racism, discrimination, prejudice and xenophobia.<sup>219</sup>

### 1.9.3 Getting the Business Community on Board: Business Mechanisms

Traditional development aid is insufficient to meet the challenges of achieving sustainable development both in quantity and by design.. The new European Investment Plan (EIP), as explained, proposes a new model aiming at attracting investments of the private sector through measures creating a business climate, co-funding projects and providing investment guarantees. There is a need to proactively involve the private sector to develop a joint strategy maximizing the development impact of migration for the benefit of all.

The 2016 GFMD attempted to move into that direction by creating a “Business Mechanism”. This new mechanism connects companies and employers organizations from all sectors of the global economy and offers them an international platform for a dialogue on migration issues of paramount concern to companies, with the output feeding into both the GFMD and GCM.<sup>220</sup>

Coordinated by the International Organization of Employers (IOE) and the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Business Mechanism’s first thematic meeting in April 2017 delivered a set of recommendations on skills mobility, responsible recruitment, employment of migrants and refugees, and entrepreneurship in the context of circular migration.<sup>221</sup> At the 2016 GMFD, one of the roundtables (3.1) also focused on possible partnerships harnessing the potential of the private sector for global skills partnerships.

Similarly, the Business Framework in the context of the G20 Compact with Africa, including the “Investors Roundtable”, also indicates the need to maximize migration and development benefits (see above).

In Austria, the Federal Economic Chamber (WKO) launched the initiative “Go International”. It provides up-to-date information, tailored trainings, technical and financial support to entrepreneurs interested in investing and/or exporting into new and strategic markets worldwide. WKO is directly present in 6 African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia.

In September 2016, following the global debate of launching a comprehensive Investment Plan for Africa (e.g. EIP), Advantage Austria - WKO's foreign trade promotion organization - organized a conference to discuss the role of the private sector for dynamic growth and development in Africa. Discussions focused on public-private partnerships (PPPs); vocational education and training (VET); integrative solutions for environment, water, renewable energy, agriculture and food; health improvements as economic requirement for development; and possible financing tools.

The role of migration was highlighted in relation to remittances, diaspora contributions and incentives for return (<https://www.go-international.at/index.html>).

## 1.10 Reference 10: Country Actors

### 1.10.1 Austria

The Austrian Development Cooperation (ADA) has several relevant instruments in Africa, at continental and regional level, including the 2006 AU Migration Policy Framework and the AUC Strategic Plan 2014-2017 with its Strategy to “Promote Labor Migration.”

In addition, intergovernmental dialogues have been guided to improve collaboration and exchange of information among states on various areas of migration. Especially the nexus between development and migration has been given great attention in most migration discussions, in which both Austria and ADC partners are playing an active role, as in the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (the Rabat Process), the Khartoum Process and other formats.

Furthermore, Austria assists countries and regional organizations in handling migration, such as the AUC, ECOWAS, EAC, and IGAD in creating free movement systems to safeguard migration in a regulated and safe way. It also defends the rights of the people on the move by building upon the EU principle of free movement and supporting the establishment of the necessary requirements and mechanisms for a visa free regime through training and knowledge transfer.

Regarding reintegration and resettlement programs, ADA focuses on the reintegration of voluntary returnees to their countries of origin (ADA partner countries) by supporting structural development programs that enhance reintegration capabilities in host communities. A specific focus will be put “on human rights of migrants, fighting discrimination and strengthening their integration in society with a particular focus on women, youth and persons with disabilities. These activities should link up with already existing development programs so that they can benefit from these experiences and foster synergies.”<sup>222</sup>

The Three-Year Program on Austrian Development Policy 2016-2018<sup>223</sup> defines as one of its substantive priorities “ensuring peace and human security, human rights and migration” and is developed in a broad and inclusive process with all state actors, parliament, as well as partners from business, science and civil society. The Development Cooperation Act (ADC Act)<sup>224</sup> forms the basis for a uniform Austrian development policy and contains a specific target catalogue, which prescribes development policy criteria applicable to the entire federal administration, coordinated by the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and External Affairs (BMEIA).

Concerning, the nexus of migration and development, ADC is aiming to create supporting conditions for sustainable development and offering partner countries prospects and opportunities for the future while contributing to “ensuring that migration is a voluntary mobility option that can be managed to the benefit of the migrant and his/her family as well as the mutual benefit of the home and destination country.”<sup>225</sup> Yet, Austria has no specific Migration Strategy, besides a set of steps for implementing migration aspects in ADA programs and projects.<sup>226</sup> The next Three-Year Program on ADC 2019-2021 aims to address the migration aspect more in depth.

ADC covers bilateral and multilateral development cooperation instruments, managed by BMEIA and ADA. The most common instruments are programs and projects, budget support, cooperation with bilateral and multilateral agencies, regional support programs, co-financing of civil society organizations (CSOs) and economic and development activities. Because of government-sponsored export credits, the government is responsible for the eligibility as ODA, such as aid loans for developing countries as well as costs for the multilateral Creditor Forum of the Paris Club, to debt relief.

Information on Austria’s Official Development Assistance, on all relevant projects financed by the Development Bank of Austria (OeB) and on Austrian Development Cooperation with Africa and ADA’s projects (e.g. on Dual-Vocational Trainings together with Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland; on Economic Partnerships

including ADA's Business Partnerships program with 180 partnerships formed since 2004) are available in the annex to this paper.

Information on Austria's relevant activities in the field of Defense and Security and as regards Human Trafficking are also available in the annex to this paper.

### 1.10.2 China

China has become Africa's largest trading partner and the volume of trade has more than tenfold in the last decade, reaching more than 300 billion dollars in 2016,<sup>227</sup> while growing approximately 20 per cent per year.<sup>228</sup> In terms of market penetration, according to a recent study by the consulting firm McKinsey, China is present with around 10,000 companies in Africa, of which 90 per cent are privately owned, while it is estimated that about 1 million Chinese workers have moved to Africa in recent years. McKinsey found that across eight African countries, 3.7 times more Chinese companies are present than listed in the data-base of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM).

Since the end of the 1990s, China has been compelled to pursue new ways to meet the growing food and raw material demand for its growing population. In this regard, the Chinese-African relations for development led to the implementation of a Chinese-African strategy, which was presented at the China Africa Forum (FOCAC) in October 2000 in Beijing.<sup>229</sup>

So far, the Sino-African cooperation has focused mainly on foreign trade and infrastructure expansion. In the future, it will focus on industrial links, for example, by outsourcing production units at the beginning of the value chain from China to Africa. Today, a much stronger diversification of Chinese investments is being made in all areas, such as tourism, the food industry, hotel construction, agricultural production, metal production, repair companies, and many more.

China also increasingly relies on peace missions; it has been involved in seven of the nine UN peace missions in Africa. China is committed to Southern Sudan, Sudan and Mali. In the Djibouti region, China is currently setting up its first naval base in Africa, supporting the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden.<sup>230</sup> The stated aim of the base is to support peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid in Africa and West Asia.

At the Johannesburg Summit of FOCAC in December 2016, the Chinese President Xi Jinping announced USD 60 billion financial assistance to African partner countries tied to ten concrete cooperation plans to be implemented over the next three

years.<sup>231</sup> The aim is to tackle three problems, the lack of skilled workforce, low funding and inadequate infrastructure.

At the May 2017 Summit on the New Silk Road, the Chinese leadership announced construction of a dense network of new ports, railways, roads and industrial parks to connect, through two new trade corridors – one overland, the other by sea – Africa with Asia and Europe. A USD125 billion investment was promised by China.<sup>232</sup> According to the Action Plan, the Silk Road “upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”<sup>233</sup>

China’s goal is to have countries manage their policies such that their economic development plans feed into a greater concept, including free trade zones, both bilaterally and regionally, as well as comprehensive financial integration. The funding for the so called Belt and Road projects will be carried out through China’s own Silk Road Fund, the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and probably through a finance mechanism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.<sup>234</sup>

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) sees great potential in China’s crucial role in addressing global development issues. Thus, a strategic partnership with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce for Development Policy Cooperation was formed in March 2017 including a German-Chinese Centre for Sustainable Development, aiming to provide a platform for development policy dialogue and, in particular, to support the global implementation of the Agenda 2030.<sup>235</sup>

### 1.10.3 France

France provided in 2015 EUR 8.1 billion in ODA, which represented 0.37 per cent GNI and a 2.8 per cent increase in real terms from 2014, the first since 2010.<sup>236</sup> France is the world’s fifth largest official development donor (ODA). For sustainable development, an additional EUR 4 billion should be provided by 2020. Meanwhile, further EUR 400 million will be granted in the form of bilateral aid, in particular to highly fragile countries.

Africa is the largest recipient of French ODA (45 per cent), in particular sub-Saharan Africa (41 per cent). France development policy has benefited from the impetus given by the promulgation of the first law on development policy and international solidarity in 2014. The introduction of “differentiated partnerships” according to the

geographic areas and the convergence between the different actors in development cooperation creates a positive and innovative dynamic.

France runs the flagship project RECAMP (renforcement des capacités africaines en maintien de la paix) and promotes financial contributions from European partners, including Germany.

France is pursuing an increasingly diversified African policy, but retains its traditionally close ties with the French-speaking countries. The military intervention of France in Mali in January 2013 and subsequent operation "Serval" was transferred to the operation "Barkhane" in August 2014. The area has now been extended to five states of West Africa (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad). The aim of "Barkhane" is to permanently reduce the terrorist threat to the stability of these states in order to enable the security forces of the concerned states to take over this protective function in the future by self-responsibility.

At the same time, economic relations with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa have also been stepped up in recent years. Africa remains a privileged partner for French development cooperation and France emphasizes African self-responsibility for more democratization, freedom of expression and human rights.

#### 1.10.4 Germany

Germany is one of the largest DAC donors by volume and has in 2016 for the first time reached the UN ODA target of 0.7 per cent of GNI. Germany invested EUR 22 billion in development cooperation in 2016 and thus ODA rose in the last year by 36.1 per cent due to the scaling up of its overall aid programme as well the doubling of in-donor refugee costs from 2015.

The German Development Cooperation promotes regional, political and economic integration in Africa. It advises the AU, regional economic associations and other institutions. The main thematic focus in Africa is good governance, human rights, rural development, water, sustainable economic development, health, energy, education and the establishment of civilian structures for crisis prevention and crisis management. With EUR 1.2 billion per year and thus 50 per cent of the bilateral funds, Africa is the main contributor to the BMZ.

The International Cooperation Action Plan<sup>237</sup> of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research is an internationalization strategy from 2008, reviewed in 2017, which addresses the new globalization, digitalization, the development of the European Research Area<sup>238</sup> and the improvement of new, global innovative centres, which

have a significant impact on international cooperation in education, science and research. The focus of the strategy is on five target areas: distinction through worldwide cooperation; enabling international innovation; international education and qualification; a global knowledge community; and collectively tackle global challenges.

The Africa Strategy 2014-2018 of the BMBF was developed together with African partners and offers a framework for an intensified cooperation “at eye level”. The research cooperation with Africa is geared towards mutual benefit. The framework provides an overview of the objectives, priorities and instruments in cooperation with Africa in education and research. It addresses topics such as climate change, health, nutrition and urbanization, and contains a catalogue of 30 measures that are now being implemented.

The Federal Government and its Ministries have also developed key strategic frameworks for development cooperation: Strategy of the Federal Government on the European Research Area; International Cooperation in Vocational Education and Training (VET);<sup>239</sup> Federal Government Policy Guidelines for Africa;<sup>240</sup> Action Plan for International Cooperation; the Africa Strategy 2014-2018;<sup>241</sup> the China Strategy 2015-2020;<sup>242</sup> Global Health G7 Concept; BMZ Educational Strategy;<sup>243</sup> Free and fair trade as a driver for development;<sup>244</sup> Water Strategy;<sup>245</sup> Development Policy Action Plan on Gender Equality 2016-2020;<sup>246</sup> and Religious communities as partners for development and Religious communities as partners for development cooperation.<sup>247</sup>

Further, the German Development Minister Gerd Müller has presented the “Marshall Plan with Africa”<sup>248</sup> in order “to save people’s lives, to limit the effects of climate change and avoid “climate refugees,” to prevent mass migration and to help create a future for Africa’s youth.” Equal cooperation in areas such as trade, business development, energy and education. Better market access for Africa exports, an end to illicit financial flows from Africa and tax evasions by multinational companies. The policy paper invites the African governments to ensuring good governance, fighting corruption and strengthening the role of women. It is also aiming to create a framework for private and public investment to fall on a fertile ground. The BMZ also plans to invest additional 20 per cent of German development funds for Africa countries that undertake necessary reforms.

Migration has great potential for development. For this reason, BMZ commissioned the German Association for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the working group CIM (Center for International Migration and Development) to develop guidelines and implement to increase the chances of migration. Thus, the GIZ has developed offers for each phase of the migration cycle, such as advice for potential migrants,

pre-integration and training; integration, cooperation with migrant organizations; and reintegration. While addressing migration policy advice; mobility of workers; the development effect of money transfers of migrants; private economic development through contributions from migrants; charitable engagement of diaspora communities in the countries of origin; transfer of knowledge by return and integration and reintegration.<sup>249</sup>

GIZ has more than 100 refugee and migration projects: Short-term cash-for-work programs offer many refugees who do not find employment on the local labor market, with direct income. Other programs support receiving communities to create a good base for cohabitation, or protect themselves from tugs and traffickers. GIZ is also active in the regions of origin. With various education and training programs, GIZ offers long-term prospects for especially young migrants. On the labor market in Germany as qualified specialists - and on a return also in the home country.

General documents on the topic of migration and development include an information brochure on Harnessing the opportunities to promote development;<sup>250</sup> a discussion paper on Migration and Sustainable Economic Development;<sup>251</sup> and a leaflet on Returning Experts Programme;<sup>252</sup>

Tackling the root causes of displacement, stabilizing host regions, supporting refugees;<sup>253</sup> Partnerships for Prospects, Cash for Work;<sup>254</sup> Stories about Migration;<sup>255</sup> and Migration as a Driver of Private Sector Development.<sup>256</sup>

Most importantly, in November 2016 the German Government adopted a “Strategy for Migration and Development / Action Plan for the external dimension of the policy on migration and refugees” (Strategie für Migration und Entwicklung/Aktionsplan für die Außendimension der Migrations- und Flüchtlingspolitik; Bundesregierung, Berlin, November 2016) which summarizes all current and planned undertakings of the Federal Government.

### 1.10.5 The Sahel Alliance

Germany, France, and the European Union have decided to expand their development cooperation with the countries of the Sahel region and join forces through the “Alliance for the Sahel”. The Sahel Alliance will include G5 Sahel countries (i.e. Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) as well as countries from the wider region. Special attention will be devoted to crisis zones, without neglecting all other regions. The Sahel region is viewed as a strategically important region of growing tensions. In order to achieve a quick and meaningful effect, develop-



ment partners are invited to develop an integrative approach based on security, short-term stabilization and medium to long-term development.

The intended focus is on the return to security, justice and the rule of law, the peaceful coexistence of communities, the provision of basic services, employment opportunities for young generations and real, long-term economic opportunities for local communities, especially in the most vulnerable areas. Germany's Federal Minister Müller announced that France and Germany will also cooperate in setting up migration advisory centers in Africa. After returning home, they will support refugees with job search.

A high level dialogue and regular joint discussion with Sahel countries and development partners, including the EU and its member states, the World Bank, the AfDB and UNDP will be organized once a year. An implementing committee will translate the strategic orientation of the political dialogue into concrete programs and projects of the Alliance for the Sahel.

The "Alliance for the Sahel" development policy initiative provides for more effective coordination of aid and aims at further improving the support of development partners for the region to contribute more effectively and fully to the stabilization and poverty reduction through development of rural areas, creating employment opportunities, improving energy infrastructure and strengthening public action. To address these issues in a sustainable manner, private investment needs to be mobilized.

The alliance will be based on four pillars: increased coordination in a number of key sectors, increased resources for security, short-term stabilization and development, and additional investment to bring visible and measurable local improvements in the short term.

All stakeholders will identify the innovative measures that have proved to be significant in the area and will use the Mutual Reliance Initiative (MRI). After consultation, each partner could adopt the objectives of a specific area or location. The Alliance will not model existing initiatives such as "Les Amis du Sahel", the United Nations Integrated Strategy for Sahel (OSES), nor the existing framework for coordinating aid. The Emergency Relief Trust Fund for Africa of the EU is proposed as one of the tools for pooling resources and carrying out projects in selected sectors and areas. The investment initiative for third countries of the EU should also be one of the mechanisms for promoting private investment in the region as soon as it is implemented.

Information on other relevant Franco-German activities in the fields of Defense and Security like the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are available in the annex to this paper.

### 1.10.6 Turkey

Turkish Embassies in Africa are now established in 39 countries of the continent and Trade Counsellor Offices in 26 countries, while there were 7 and 4 respectively in 2003. TIKA (Turkey's Aid Agency) Offices in the continent are now operating in 15 countries and Foreign Economic Relations Board have established Business Councils with African counterparts in 31 countries. As of today, Turkish Airlines fly to 48 destinations in 31 countries of the continent. In 2003, they were merely flying to North Africa. The number of the countries with which Turkey signed Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements increased to 39 in 2015 while it was 23 in 2003. These agreements establish a bilateral regular follow-up mechanism where several subjects, stretching from trade, investment and finance to SMEs, health and technology, are covered.

Free Trade Agreements with 4 African countries are in force now while there were none in 2003. Reciprocal Protection of Investment Agreements with 22 countries have been signed so far, as opposed to only 6 countries in 2003.

Prevention of Double Taxation Agreements with 11 African countries are effective today while there were only 4 in 2003. Turkey's trade volume with Africa totaled USD 19.5 billion in 2015, up 16 per cent from 2008 and 258 per cent from 2003. Turkey's export in 2003-2015 increased almost six fold and imports have more than doubled in the same period.

Turkey's share of Africa's trade volume raised to 2.3 per cent in 2014 and the share of Africa in Turkey's trade volume was 8.7 per cent in 2015. In 2003, they were 1 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively. Turkish FDI (stock) in Africa has exceeded USD 6 billion in 2015 whereas it was less than USD 100 million in 2003. Turkish contractors have continued to build Africa in 2015, and the volume of the projects undertaken by Turkish companies has grown to USD 55 billion so far since the early 1970s.



## Proposals and Recommendations

Chapter 1 clearly shows that the International Community and European and African stakeholders make every effort to cope with the short-, medium- and long term aspects of the current migration situation along the Central Mediterranean Route and in Africa. There is no lack of initiatives, programs and projects. Furthermore, the initiatives are, as a rule, in line with UN principles and goals including the SDGs. In the same vein, initiatives from the European Union and *mutatis mutandis* from the African Union are, as a rule, embedded in a coherent overall strategy like the Joint Valletta Action Plan.

We do, however think that there is room for improvement when it comes to improving synergies and information sharing.

Proposal 1: The creation of an overarching Austrian Migration and Development Strategy.

Proposal 2: Austria, in building momentum for its forthcoming EU presidency, should offer to its EU and international partners to contribute to improved synergies and better information sharing regarding existing initiatives on Migration and Development in Africa, e.g., by further exploring which mechanisms could be strengthened.

In fact the Joint Valletta Action Plan contains all the different elements of a sensible strategy and can therefore guide our proposals in this Chapter 2: 1) reinforce protection of migrants and asylum seekers; 2) prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; 3) work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration; 4) enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility and 5) address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. All elements are equally important and reinforce each other.

Proposal: Austria has no overarching Migration and Development Strategy. We propose that the next government develops such a strategy, containing all the above elements. Developing this strategy would also make it very clear that there is no trade-off between

- a Human-Rights oriented approach and a security oriented approach (“letting people die in the desert instead of the Mediterranean” is no strategy at all, it is simply unacceptable),
- more humanitarian funding in the short term and more private funding in the medium term and
- cherishing Austrian culture and being an open society.

## 2.1 Reinforce protection of migrants and asylum seekers

As described in detail in Chapter 1, there are alarming reports with regard to existing migrant and refugee camps and settlements along the Central Mediterranean Migration Route, especially in Libya. These reports have renewed the calls for safe and secure places for all migrants.

In this context, it has been proposed to export the EU “hotspots,” as realized in Italy and Greece, to key African countries, including for registration and — under a proposed new EU asylum regime — asylum application processing of migrants. It has also been proposed to combine this idea with offering more legal pathways to migration including labor migration. It should be noted that for the time being these and similar ideas, including EU-run “reception centers,” are mere proposals, they are not EU policy. This is for good reason, because the legal and practical problems connected with these proposals are immense, including the question why people would come there in the first place if the chances for being accepted for asylum, and in all likelihood also for labor migration, are low.

This picture might change if it was possible to come to an agreement with an African State or a group of African states which would be similar to the EU-Turkey agreement, as it has been proposed by ESI (see Chapter 1).

In the short term, it is imperative to improve the situation in existing camps and settlements along the Central Route by creating “protection centers” or further improving existing transit centers — very much in line with the EU/Germany/Italy/IOM project for Migrant Protection and Reintegration of Returnees along Central Mediterranean Migration Routes, which covers the Sahel and Lake Chad region and neighboring countries, including Libya.

It is also necessary to focus on the dire situation in the Lake Chad region, which is evidenced by the Oslo Humanitarian Conference in February 2017. As a

result, the Lake Chad Consultative Group (present membership includes i.a. the UN, the World Bank, all relevant governments in the region, the AU, the G7 and several EU Member States) has been founded to engage in the region with additional humanitarian, conflict prevention and stabilization efforts.

Proposal 1: Austria is already engaged with significant contributions to the EUTF for Africa. We propose that in addition Austria considers supporting the initiative “Migrant Protection and Reintegration of Returnees along Central Mediterranean Migration Routes” on the basis of identified funding gaps.

Proposal 2: On the basis of its ongoing engagement in conflict prevention and stabilization efforts in its partner countries, Austria could consider joining groups like the Lake Chad Consultative Group or the Sahel Alliance and increase humanitarian funding on the basis of identified funding gaps.

The way forward, however, is a new initiative which Austria could launch and which combines the advantages of creating safe and secure places for migrants with a boost to urban and economic development — the creation of Special Development Zones as detailed in Chapter 3.

## 2.2 Prevent and fight irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings

As described in Chapter 1, the EU is firmly engaged in the prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, through EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia) and other programs. Austria is a partner country for Operation Sophia and it also supports other programs.

Proposal 1: We propose that Austria underlines its continued full support to the ongoing EU operations, stressing that international law, in particular the human rights of migrants, must be respected at all times and under all circumstances.

Proposal 2: In addition, Austria could suggest an impact study assessing the implications of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia on migrants and refugees stranded in transit countries.

## 2.3 Work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration

As described in Chapter 1, the EC's Renewed Action Plan on Return from March 2017 – to be implemented on the basis of the EU Action Plan on Return from 2015 – aims at substantially improving return rates of migrants by i) increasing financial support for national and joint return and reintegration activities (200 million euro in 2017 alone); ii) improving information exchange to enforce returns; iii) exchanging best practices to ensure reintegration packages are consistent and coherent to avoid “return-shopping”; iv) setting up a commercial flight mechanism for financing returns; and v) concluding readmission agreements with Nigeria, Tunisia, and Jordan and continue negotiations with Morocco and Algeria.

Proposals like the one from ESI to seek an agreement, similar to the EU-Turkey agreement, with an African State or a group of African states (see 2.1) deserve support, if their design is such that human rights of migrants are respected at all times and under all circumstances.

As explained in Chapter 1, Austria (ADA) puts a special focus on the reintegration of voluntary returnees to their countries of origin (ADA partner countries) in its development cooperation. Also, Austria is currently chairing a Working Group on the harmonization of Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR), established under the European Reintegration Network (ERIN) project.

Proposal 1: We propose that Austria underlines its continued support to the EU plans and operations, stressing that international law, in particular the human rights of migrants, must be respected at all times and under all circumstances.

Proposal 2: We propose that Austria supports the gist of the ESI proposal to seek an agreement similar to the EU-Turkey agreement with an African State or a group of African states in the understanding that international law, in particular the human rights of migrants, must be respected at all times and under all circumstances.

## 2.4 Enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility

All relevant EU plans and programs as described in Chapter 1 underline the necessity to open up more legal pathways for immigration in order to combat illegal immigration. In this context, the EU's Resettlement and Relocation schemes from 2015 play an important role. With regard to labor migration, it is noteworthy

that, in July 2017, the EU Council presidency obtained a mandate to pursue the so called “Blue Card Directive” covering entry and residence for highly qualified workers coming from third countries.

According to the Sept 2017 progress report from the EU Commission, Austria is on track with regard to its resettlement commitments, especially under the EU-Turkey agreement, and has started with intra-EU re-locations.

The Commission has now invited Member State to submit resettlement pledges for 2018 with a particular focus on North Africa and the Horn of Africa. It should also be noted that Austria has already changed its immigration law in 2011 to allow for legal labor migration from third (basically non-EU) countries. The instrument used is a credit system (like e.g. in Australia) which can lead to the issuance of a “Red-White-Red Card”.

Proposal 1: We propose that Austria advocates for intra-EU compliance with the EU Resettlement and Relocation Schemes.

Proposal 2: We propose that Austria announces its readiness to continue to with the EU’s resettlement scheme with a particular focus on North Africa and the Horn of Africa (also considering its development partner countries including Ethiopia).

Proposal 3: Austria could explore the possibility to develop privately sponsored resettlement programs following the example of the Government of Canada/Open Society Foundations.

Proposal 4: Austria could contribute to UNHCR’s Emergency Resettlement Country Joint Support Mechanism (ERCM) by sharing national resettlement expertise and through the provision of financial resources.

Proposal 5: Austria should advertise its “Red-White-Red-Card” immigration system as one way of making labor migration possible, and confirm support for the “EU Blue Card Directive” project.

## 2.5 Address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement



## 2.5.1 Political root causes

Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement starts and ends with political efforts for peace, conflict prevention, reconciliation and democracy. In this field, Austria is engaged in many different ways including e.g. its very significant contributions to UN- and EU-missions in Africa and its development cooperation including e.g. in the Eastern Sub-Sahara region with projects like CEWARN, the regional conflict early warning system.

Proposal: Austria should continue its exemplary engagement for peace, conflict prevention, reconciliation and democracy in Africa, also in support of the UN-SG's agenda for more and better conflict prevention.

## 2.5.2 Economic and social root causes

As detailed in Chapter 1, most if not all recent initiatives on combating the root causes of irregular migration in Africa are about strengthening private investment and infrastructure in order to facilitate effective and sustainable growth. This is a good development, as it represents an at least gradual departure from “supply driven” donor concepts with heavy reliance on public funds. The authors of this paper are convinced that it is necessary to go even further in the direction of a “demand-driven” strategy which sees all individuals including migrants first and foremost as consumers and producers rather than objects of care.

Proposal: Austria should advocate a new thinking in migration policies, where migrants are seen as consumers, producers and more generally economic assets rather than liabilities.

In the following, we make a number of general recommendations to international actors and specific proposals for Austria. These recommendations and proposals are examples, more could be added to the list. Our most important medium term proposal is specified in Chapter 3.

### Unlocking Private Investment

The persistent problem remains that investment opportunities and the vast majority of active and innovative entrepreneurs remain invisible and difficult to access. With the exception of already successful ventures most have difficulties to access regional and international partners. Two exemplary initiatives are meeting this challenge.

Through its focus on action and identifying specific constraints and solutions for real opportunities in Africa, the Development Finance Forum initiated by the World Bank aims to contribute to the timely development of a pipeline of projects by in essence offering a pre-investment platform for participants to explore market-building alliances and development opportunities.

The Global Impact Investing Foundation, initiated and co-launched by Austria, is undertaking a number of activities: It offers a global industry know-how database, uniting information from various sources all over the industry and ranging from books and press articles to reports and events as well as focused studies executed by the foundation itself. A global impact investing platform (GIIVX) serves as market place where impact investors and entrepreneurs offering projects with specific and measurable impact can link up and co-operate.

Proposal 1: Austria should continue to strongly support the concept of “investing in investment” in close cooperation with the WB group, UNIDO and the Austrian financial sector.

Proposal 2: Austria should consider joining the G20 Compact With Africa initiative, as other non-G 20 countries like the Netherlands and Norway have done, and advertise participation of Austrian firms (the next presentation of investor prospectuses is planned to take place in the context of the next IMF/WB annual meeting in October 2017 in Washington), see also proposal 3.

Proposal 3: In more concrete terms, Austria should consider to create a public (ADA, OeEB, others)-private (WKO, others) internet platform focusing exclusively on advertising, broadening and deepening all existing initiatives for unlocking private investment in Africa including those where Austria is not, or not yet, a contributor, see e.g. the table under Ref. 8 in Chapter 1. Like in that table, and in the G20 CWA, the initiatives could be presented in different groups pertaining to the Macroeconomic framework; the Business framework; the Financing framework and other initiatives. It would also make sense to go into the sub-groups, e.g., in the Financing Framework that would be Efficient risk mitigation instruments; Domestic debt market development; “Crowding in” Private Finance, Institutional Finance, Bondholders and Official Finance as well as the Financially Excluded and Land-value.

Proposal 4: With regard to the proposed platform, it is also necessary to focus on specific Austrian comparative advantages and interests and, where necessary, develop new initiatives, e.g., in the following fields:

- Help countries to issue local currency loans and strengthen local capital markets with Austrian know-how.
- Strengthen bilateral Austrian investment- and export loan-guarantee instruments where necessary; advertise the multilateral instruments.
- Advertise the EIB’s “Small and Growing Business Fund,” which is already used by a growing number of SME’s in nine African countries.
- Consider accelerating the process of “covering Africa” with bilateral double taxation agreements.
- Expand Austria’s engagement for Renewable Energies (see proposals on Energy).
- Further enhance Austria’s ongoing efforts on dual vocational training in Africa to address youth unemployment.

### 2.5.3 Trade

As described in detail in Chapter 1, the EU is currently in the process of putting its trade relations with the ACP countries and Africa in particular on a new basis, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). There is still a lot of criticism from Civil Society and various governments claiming that the EPAs will do more harm than good, e.g., by exposing African countries ultimately even more to the EU’s exports, undermining their capacity to substitute imports, e.g., with regard to food and agricultural products.

Proposal: Austria could call for a national or EU-wide experts hearing with regard to continued criticism regarding EPAs. Such a hearing would help to prepare the forthcoming EU-Africa summit in November 2017 on “a renewed impetus for the Africa-EU Partnership”.

### 2.5.4 Energy

As described in Chapter 1, Austria has already a leading role in the SE4ALL initiative as evidenced inter alia by the fifth Vienna Energy Forum in May 2017. Austria and the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC) also have a leading role in key African Programs on Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency, especially in cooperation with ECOWAS. There is, for obvious reasons, a particular strong profile

with regard to hydro-power (e.g., by supporting the ECOWAS Small-Scale-Hydro Power Program) and sustainable off-grid solar markets (e.g., by supporting the IBRD/IFC led „Lighting Africa“ initiative). It should also be noted that the Development Bank of Austria (OeB) is co-financing several renewable energy projects in the MENA region and Africa.

When it comes to “thinking big(ger),” Austria and its solar industry should explore all possibilities to further engage with Desert Solar Projects like “Noor I” in Morocco.

Proposal 1: We propose that Austria continues and reinforces its current engagement, in particular by connecting it even closer to the Austrian Development Agency’s (ADA’s) Economic & Business Partnerships Program and by reaching out to potential investors. Up to date only some 20per cent of the Business Partnerships are with Africa and even less are on renewable energies. There are, however, examples to be followed like Strabag erecting the Thiba Dam in Kenya or Sunnybag providing off-grid solar solutions.

Proposal 2: When it comes to “thinking big(ger)”, Austria and its solar industry should explore all possibilities to engage with emerging Desert Solar Projects (like “Noor I” in Morocco).

### 2.5.5 Environment

As described in Chapter 1, Austria already has a leading role in the water sector, e.g., in Uganda, and it is key to projects like the AfDB’s African Water Facility and The Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership. As also described, in the Energy section of this Chapter, Austria has a leading role with regard to renewable energies, in particular hydro-power. It is necessary that this engagement continues, also with regard to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement.

In this context, it should be noted that the AU’s flagship initiative, the “Great Green Wall of the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI)”, as explained in Chapter 1, has gained a lot of deserved attention in recent months, as it has become very clear that the inability to make a living from the land is one of the biggest factors for migration. GGWSSI, however, is seriously underfunded, regardless of some support including from the EU.

Proposal: Austria could take the initiative for boosting international support to the GGWSSI, e.g., by making it a subject at the next EU-Africa summit in November 2017.

## 2.5.6 Drought and natural disaster insurance

As described in Chapter 1, the African Risk Capacity was established as a specialized Agency of the African Union to pool natural disaster risks and reinsure them. At the 2015 Summit in Germany, the G7 endorsed ARC as exactly the kind of initiative they wanted to help meet their “InsuResilience” target of extending climate risk insurance to 400 million people in the most vulnerable developing countries. The G7 and the World Bank’s position is that climate insurance policies should be expanded to include individuals. Also UNISDR, led by SRSG Robert Glasser from Austria, is engaging with the insurance and reinsurance industry to address business and sovereign risks, particularly in more vulnerable states. Austria is contributing significantly to its work.

Proposal: Austria could consider to strengthen public support for insurance solutions as a supplement to direct support and encourage UNISDR to go further in that direction.

## 2.5.7 Urban Development

As described in Chapter 1, UN Habitat supports the African Urban Agenda (AUA), which currently runs two projects, “The Strengthening Partnership for an African Urban Agenda (SPP)” and the “Presidential Initiative (PI),” led by Nigeria and Ghana respectively. The SPP focuses on the involvement of non-state actors; the PI promotes the prioritization of urbanization in national and regional development plans. In general, cities should consider three modalities for growth: planned expansion, new cities, and slum upgrading in existing cities.

### Planned Expansion

In this context, most growth in African cities occurs through informal extension, without an orderly street network or planned public open spaces. Because of this, most rapidly growing cities are surrounded by informal settlements. This system effectively provides housing for new migrants but has serious market consequences due to poor services, traffic congestion, and issues of tenure. Planners should instead encourage planned extension by laying out streets and public open spaces

before development occurs and connecting those streets and roads to the existing city. Planned extension makes it easier to join newly built areas to existing infrastructure systems, maintaining the fabric of the city. It also increases productivity by improving connectivity within the city. Planned extensions can shorten travel times by encouraging compact development and good road infrastructure and can aid in-situ upgrading of informal settlements. Despite all this, planned extension is rarely used in African cities today, and almost never at a scale that can accommodate the amount population growth.

## New Cities

Experiments to create new cities are underway in many African countries. Newly built cities offer a chance to model high quality infrastructure and services, but only provide space for a fraction of the anticipated population growth, often at a very high cost. The construction of new cities does not provide a final answer to the demographic and development problems of the continent, but examples like the Green City King Mohammed VI in Morocco or Nova Cidade de Kilamba in Angola can provide lessons learned.

## Slum Upgrading Development

Informal settlements in developing countries are characterized by housing of poor structural quality, inadequate access to social and technical infrastructure, overcrowding and insecure tenure. According to UN-Habitat, approximately 70 per cent of the urban population in Africa lives in informal settlements. The expected increase of African slum dwellers over the next 15 years is approximately 240 million.

Urbanization has been associated with important economic and social transformations, which have brought longer life expectancy, higher levels of literacy and greater access to social services, education and political participation. Nevertheless, rapid unplanned informal urban growth threatens sustainable development. Whilst informal settlements are all different and sweeping generalizations are risky, one recurring factor in their formation is that they typically provide an initial point of access into the urban environment for incoming migrants, or for those moving from other parts of the city, at a very low cost.

**Recommendation:** Rather than strive to eliminate informal settlements, international actors should support governments in enabling or facilitating settlement im-

provement by ensuring the availability of the basic inputs, namely urban infrastructure, land with tenure security, and appropriate financial and technical services, that enable people to improve their living situation themselves. These things can be delivered through site and service schemes as well as through in-situ upgrading.

Chapter 1 also refers to UN-Habitat's New Urban Agenda of October 2016 and its emphasis on city networks for advocacy and mutual support.

Proposal: Austria could encourage more city partnerships with African cities, especially in the ADC partner countries Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda, on the basis of the existing international networks for know-how transfer and best practices.

## 2.5.8 Financial Services and E-Money Banking

Digital Cash-based transfer systems are key

Modern financial services are central to enabling the poor and migrants as consumers and actors in the formal economy. Existing service providers and technology allow for funds to be delivered directly to recipient's bank accounts with greater efficiency and effectiveness than ever before. These mechanisms are concrete and time-tested and yet controversial in humanitarian aid.

Cash grants carried out through a modern financial services infrastructure holds tremendous promise for growth. Over the past 25 years NGOs and UN agencies have gone from a complete opposition to cash grants, to acknowledging conditional cash grants may be good in some cases, to, finally, acknowledging that unconditional cash grants are far more efficient, direct, and immediate than all other approaches to alleviating poverty. Many arguments have been laid to rest in the past years by some 30 longitudinal studies underwritten by the World Bank. In short, these studies state that:

- Unconditional cash grants work, are efficient, and alleviate poverty.
- Poor people know how to spend their money wisely and do not squander it.
- Unconditional cash grants lead to increases in spending on health, education, and capacity-building services including recipient's own businesses.

Cash transfers are becoming even more effective with technological advances, such as self-service mobile banking. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has already introduced programs that enable approximately 350 million poor people to become banked and included in the formal economy of India in the past 5 years. Additionally, some 60 new banks are competing for business, which has resulted in lower fees, better service, and faster movement of liquidity through value chains in society.

Nevertheless, NGOs and UN agencies sometimes still oppose these mechanisms because they are perceived as weakening these organizations' reason for existence. Some NGOs and UN agencies are acting as banks and cash-flow management companies. We do not recommend this.

Once beneficiaries are banked and receiving unconditional cash grants, they are also enabled as consumers, which allows for other financial services to exist, including:

- Insurance
- Savings incentives
- Small Business Loans and Equity investments
- Remittances from relatives at lower cost
- Credit rating leading to various opportunities for investment based consumption such as mortgages and larger purchases

Consumption by the poor and migrants can catalyze change across multiple sectors.

Banking the poor requires reform to banking laws. Such reforms have already been successfully outlined, implemented, and tested in many countries.

In the near term, host populations and migrants should both have a clear path to being banked through private partnerships. This will be outlined further in Chapter 3.

### 2.5.9 Education & Healthcare Service Delivery

The demand-driven approach requires education and health care service delivery to become more responsive to the individual choices of beneficiaries. Generally speaking, this requires more reliance on the private sector, which is better able to



flexibly respond to consumer demand. However, the public sector plays a crucial role in ensuring the poor have access to these services and, in some cases, temporarily ensuring adequate supply and quality, particularly in countries with few health and education resources.

The primary role for assistance is to empower beneficiaries to make health and education decisions for themselves through cash transfers. Cash transfers can either be unconditional (i.e., with no strings attached) or conditional / voucher-based. Conditional cash transfers must be used only for certain defined purposes (e.g., for health, education, or food) and voucher programs deliver resources directly to the provider whenever a consumer chooses its services. Generally, unconditional cash transfers are preferred, since they tend to produce more efficient results and are easier to administer.

**Recommendation:** We recommend developing healthcare and education services in strategic African cities aligned with the methods outlined above. Pilot programs can be introduced in migrant-inclusive SDZs (see Chapter 3). Specifically:

- Cash transfers should be distributed to empower families to make health and educational choices for themselves.
- Beneficiaries should contribute to health insurance and, potentially, educational savings funds. These contributions can be automatically deducted from the transfers.
- Partnerships should be formed with private sector providers of health and education services to improve the quality and responsiveness of services.
- Beneficiaries should have the freedom to choose any health or educational service provider.
- Financial services providers should hold funds in trust with oversight from financial services authorities either by donor countries or locally.

## 2.5.10 ID for Development: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa

(Excerpts and edited from AFRICA Policy Review 2016)

ID Management is, for good reason, a global trend. In Sub-Saharan Africa, at least 23 National Identification (NID) programs or programs of similar type have been introduced since 2000 compared with only 15 in the four prior decades. Many countries are modernizing their systems. This often includes adopting digital biometrics (fingerprints, face and increasingly iris) and issuing ‘smart’ ID cards that enable more accurate user authentication and access to financial transactions as well as other applications. Following the lead of countries like Estonia, which has the world’s most fully developed e-ID system, African countries such as Kenya are starting to move towards e-services and e-government in a more broad sense. With growing momentum, the Third Government Forum on Electronic Identity in Africa (ID4Africa) took place in Namibia in April 2017. The World Bank has also launched an initiative, ID4D, to provide a more integrated approach to ID issues as they relate to development.

Identity is the key to development: ID systems can facilitate public programs while saving funds by improving targeting and reducing leakage.

Africa has been at the forefront of innovative uses of ID. Since the mid-1990s, South Africa has used fingerprint-based biometric ATMs, smart-cards and bank accounts to deliver pensions and social grants, including to locations with limited connectivity. The system of social grants now covers some 16.5 million people. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, iris technology facilitated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Ex-combatants were enrolled in a cash transfer program to help them adjust to civilian life. Following iris scans, 110,000 received an ID card and a PIN which they could use to collect 13 monthly cash payments from over 8,000 airtime sales agents. In rural areas where distribution through vendors proved difficult, mobile teams delivered cash using only iris scans for identification.

Digital ID systems also facilitate the delivery of emergency relief. The Dowa Emergency Cash Transfer (DECT) program in Malawi covered 11,000 rural families; fingerprints were used for initial registration and to verify payments at mobile ATMs in conjunction with smart-cards. The program improved recipients’ nutritional and health status but highlighted the cost of creating a special system for each program in the absence of a proper national ID system. Digital ID systems underpin emergency relief in several other countries, for example, programs for refugees in Northern Kenya.

Strong ID can also support financial inclusion. In Kenya, bank, mobile and micro finance account-holders are identified by their national ID numbers. Negative and (more recently) positive credit histories must be shared across the system. Non-financial entities, such as utility companies, may also participate on a reciprocal basis. The result has been a sharp fall in the ratio of non-performing loans, and

an increase in the number of credit accounts and information-based financial products.

Strong ID can save governments millions by cutting leakage and corruption. As part of a civil service reform, Nigeria eliminated over 43,000 ghost workers from the public payroll following an audit using biometric identification in 2011; this is reported to have saved the country over USD 60 million. The largest case of using an advanced ID system to underpin subsidy reform comes from India which eliminated around 40 million “ghost” beneficiaries when it replaced its market subsidy on LPG cylinders by direct bank transfers. The annual saving from this one initiative, at about USD 1 billion, recoups the entire cost of providing a unique ID number (Aadhaar) to some 830 million people — a figure almost as great as the entire population of sub-Saharan Africa.

Robust ID credentials can also facilitate free movement of persons across Africa’s numerous borders without compromising security. The 15 ECOWAS member states are taking the lead. The Community launched a biometric ID card in 2016 to serve as a travel document in the region. In East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have also concluded an agreement to accept national ID credentials for travel among the three countries.

Proposal and recommendations:

- 1) The following recommendations on ID Management require political, technical and financial resources through direct project support or partnership and mentoring arrangements. Austria could support this with technology and technical assistance bilaterally or through multilateral agencies.
- 2) Development of integrated ID Systems: African countries, like others, need a strategic approach to ID to maximize its development impact. They confront a number of challenges that call for innovation and coordination, including the design of their ID architecture and ID management, as well as technology and legislative action. Fragmented systems need to be integrated. Some countries have a multitude of ‘functional’ programs, each developed to serve a particular purpose — voter registration, customer ID for banks and healthcare cards, among others — that coexist with national ID initiatives. Multiple systems drive up costs, hamper interoperability across programs and can also undermine demand for a core system of civil and national registration.
- 3) Strengthening of birth registration: In much of Africa, birth registration rates are too low to provide a strong foundation for national ID. Less than 45 per cent of Sub-Saharan African children under the age of five have been registered in contrast

to 98 per cent in Central and Eastern Europe, 92 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and over 75 per cent in East Asia. Birth registration was boosted by providing incentives, using mobile technology and making the process more flexible. South Africa linked registration to the provision of child support grants. Uganda piloted the use of mobile technology for birth registration as part of an EU-UNICEF program, which has led to entire villages and hospital settings moving from negligible birth registration rates to almost 100 per cent coverage; the program has been extended to Mozambique and Burkina Faso. In Kenya, the MOVE-IT program uses health workers to report births that can then be registered by the local offices of the civil registry.

4) Establishment of financially sustainable ID systems and providers: Basing an ID program in continuous civil registration and its integration across applications is vital to bringing down costs and ensuring that the program is financially sustainable. Interoperability should be a primary concern when developing a harmonized ID infrastructure and as new applications are added, countries need to be aware of the risk of lock-in to proprietary vendor hardware or software that can inflate long-term operating costs and reduce flexibility. The more widely the ID is used, the greater the potential cost-recovery. Pakistan's ID agency, NADRA, covers its operating costs from revenues and cross-subsidizes the provision of the basic ID from the fees levied for more sophisticated services. Rwanda follows a similar approach, charging more for drivers' licenses and passports than for basic national ID.

5) Ensure Inclusiveness and avoid statelessness in line with the African Union proposal for a Convention on African Nationality and Recommendations<sup>257</sup> by UNHCR and IOM:<sup>258</sup> Strong identification can facilitate inclusion but can also be a mechanism for exclusion. There are over 720,000 formally stateless persons in Africa – a number that is underpinned by exclusionary nationality laws, but many other people have unclear national status. Over 20 countries have no provisions regarding a child's right to nationality or a path to citizenship for those with foreign-born parents and only a handful of African countries automatically confer citizenship from birth to those born on their territory. Several countries still grant greater rights to men than women to pass citizenship to their children or spouses. Citizenship by naturalization is often almost impossible to obtain in practice and many countries allow naturalized citizenship to be withdrawn on arbitrary grounds. Half of Africa's states even allow revocation of a person's birth nationality. Strengthening NID programs therefore risks formalizing exclusion, leaving many long-term residents, their children and even their grandchildren permanently stateless. This is an urgent problem that, if left unattended, could greatly complicate the process of formalizing nationality in Africa.

6) Data management to protect personal data and privacy: National ID programs do not themselves need to collect and store large volumes of personal data, but the use of a common number facilitates the integration of other databases such as those dealing with medical records or financial status. The growth of such large databases raises concern over data security and data privacy, and misuse of data by the government or private entities. African countries lag in this area — as of 2015, only 14 countries had adopted laws providing a framework for data privacy. However, many are catching up: seven African countries are considering the implementation of data protection bills. The number is expected to continue to increase as countries accede to the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (2014).

# Special Development Zones and Cities

## 3.1 Introduction

Humanitarian action and development assistance is often seen as the easy remedy to problems; however humanitarian funding is not sufficient to address the immediate needs at any given moment of the some 120 million people impacted from forced migration or other humanitarian crises.

Funding appeals have risen almost six-fold since 2005, when the UN sought USD 3.7 billion, versus the USD20 billion sought in 2015. Though funding has increased, donor countries have generally not met the necessary funding requirements to cover all needs. Humanitarian appeals remain largely underfunded which means that only part of the population in need can be assisted with aid, showing signs that the status quo approach may have fundamental flaws that needs to be addressed.

Official development cooperation amounts to some USD 200 billion annually,<sup>259</sup> which is insufficient under status quo approach considering the enormous challenges in addressing poverty and inequality. As all will agree the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) may not be reached until 2030 should the only prescribed financial solution be the traditional concept of aid. The “Great Bargain”<sup>260</sup> is an attempt to both address the financial shortfall and shift 25 per cent of the available resources to local providers rather than international aid agencies.

The aid sector with its myriad of aid organizations and structures is not equipped neither in terms of knowhow, technical capacity nor the ability to scale up addressing these problems in a meaningful manner.

It is structured and financed in a way that it will patch and provide first aid and cure some of the visible symptoms rather than being able to introduce lasting change.

Simply multiplying the funding would not resolve what are rather structural, governance and policy related root causes rather than blaming lack of funding as the root cause.

Paramount to success is the paradigm shift from an approach of assisting victims and helpless poor people to a logic of harnessing the incredible potential for leapfrogging progress through intelligent use of investment, finance, knowledge and best practice transfer with proven market driven approaches.

It requires to look at demographic changes, poor service delivery, lack of infrastructure and poor populations as a wealth of opportunities for investment, collaboration and innovation.

The mobile phone industry and the related digital revolution has already harnessed these opportunities and shown us the example in a number of African countries; e-wallet payments in Kenya outpacing traditional banking, off-grid energy solutions and utilities, e-mobility and innovative blending of finance will provide many more options.

It is crucial to acknowledge the poor as economic contributors, producers and consumers rather than helpless victims in need of aid, as experience has shown in places such as Jordan's Zaatari refugee camp, Daadab camp in Kenya or observations made in informal neighborhoods such as the Kibera slum in Nairobi and other settlements.

These and many more examples demonstrate how much consumer demand in poor communities drives economic activity. Consumption leads to the creation of formal and informal economies with manufactures, services, shops and other value chains to supply what is in demand. The informal economy in Africa represents some 80 per cent of all transactions and remains almost fully untapped as for providing finance for investment into public services and infrastructure.

When consumer demand is allowed to determine resource allocation, individual needs are addressed and supply rises to satisfy demand. By contrast, when aid or government agencies determine resource allocation, market forces are inverted by setting supply before demand, leading to perpetual poverty and stigmatizing the poor as victims or bad customers for government services.

Instead of seeing migrants as a negative force, this proposal sees migrants as agents of change by presenting a demand-driven approach to poverty, crisis prevention, and thus migration. It does this by giving migrants and poor populations the tools they need to kick start new economies and become consumers treated with dignity. It equips receiving communities with the tools to receive newcomers and trigger positive change. This approach is "demand-driven" because it allows the choices of beneficiaries and communities to drive resource allocation, including private and public sector investment.

The role of NGOs, UN, and other aid and development organizations in such a demand-driven scenario by default will be limited to best practices, policy development, capacity building, protection, counselling and identification of those in need for targeted social assistance.

First, it is important to define the nature of the “customers” (the beneficiaries), who create the demand to which national action and international assistance must respond.

Second, recommendations for how international assistance can be refocused in accordance with the demand-driven approach and relevant national requirements. Next, the specific role of cities and special development zones (SDZs) in addressing migration is examined. Then, potential opportunities for attracting investment to stimulate economic activity and job growth are explored.

Finally, specific recommendations for delivering financial services, health care, and education in line with the demand-driven approach are proposed in the context of the SDZ beyond the general need to address these issues (Chapter 2).

The demand-driven approach provided in this chapter is simultaneously ambitious and practical. It is very ambitious because it aims to go beyond helping communities cope with migration: it positions them to benefit and grow from it. This approach is more practical than current methods of passive migration management responding to situations as it acknowledges that migrants will not stop trying to move toward economic opportunities and therefore develops the tools for concerned communities to manage and benefit.

## 3.2 Understanding Migration and the Target “Customers”

The demand-based approach requires to understand migrants and take their motivations seriously and aspirations as consumers.

For roughly 200,000 years, humans have migrated in search of new opportunities – from low-yield situations to higher-yield situations and from a poor quality of life to a higher quality of life. Today’s migrants are no different.

Migrants are, and should be treated as, valuable, autonomous individuals interested in, and capable of, pursuing happy, healthy, and meaningful lives. It is precisely



this interest that leads them to migrate to new locations often at great personal risk.

There are three types of target customers (i.e., beneficiaries) for the demand-based approach to migration:

- Africans potentially interested in migrating;
- Migrants within Africa, either en-route to another destination or more settled migrants (informally and formally);
- African migrants in Europe who are returning (voluntarily and involuntarily) to their countries of origin.

The second category, migrants within Africa, are the most strategic customer to target. Inter-Africa migration will be difficult to stop similar to Europe, Asia or Latin America. Therefore any strategy to keep people in their countries or regions of origin will likely fail. Moreover, creating more opportunities for inter-African migrants can expand opportunities for host communities, as will be discussed further.

The most strategic locations to reach these migrants are in the countries of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). These countries currently host large numbers of migrants, including many who are seeking to move to Europe. Additionally, many of these countries are “push” countries, sending migrants out because of poor conditions. Therefore, they make ideal locations for demand-based interventions. But there are other strategic locations such as the East Africa and especially the Horn of Africa.

The rate of African migration is expected to increase substantially in the coming decades. According to a Gallup poll conducted from 2007 to 2009, 31 per cent of sub-Saharan African adults would like to migrate to a new country.<sup>261</sup> If we assume that African children will adopt comparable attitudes as they age, then over 290 million sub-Saharan Africans will be interested in migrating to a new country.

A greater percentage of sub-Saharan African adults are interested in migration than any other region surveyed by Gallup. The strong demand of sub-Saharan Africans in migration demonstrates the lack of opportunity in many of their countries. With Africa’s high birthrate, poor governance and poor economies, the number of migrants can only be expected to increase. The middle class has increased to an estimated 200 million persons throughout the continent and as this number is ex-

pected to rise further, migration will increase as well as there is strong correlation between wealth and the ability to migrate.

Africa is the youngest continent, with a median age of 19.<sup>262</sup> The still-rapid population growth is driving a demand for rapid job creation and opportunities, which given the high rate of African migration, has yet to be met.

## 3.3 The Demand-Driven Strategy

### 3.3.1 Key Recommendations for Addressing Migration

The high rate of migration and particularly rural-urban movements in Africa demands that current and future cities and enhanced Special Development Zones (SDZ) be flexible and innovative, able to respond to the demands of their citizens and the needs of the new migrants. Migration can either be a tremendous burden or a tremendous opportunity, depending on the response of cities and national governments. If a strong, enabling environment for economic opportunities is provided, migrants can attract new investment, create jobs, and raise wages in cities.

Special Development Zones is a term coined here in this report to include special economic zones, free trade zones, free zones, free ports, export processing zones, and economic and trade cooperation zones, but the proposal goes beyond, by also referring to new governance models e.g. for their migrant-inclusive set-up and for establishing institutional safeguards to ensure social inclusion, protection and ecological sustainability.

Ensuring African cities respond well to migration requires commitment from both the international community and African governments at national and local levels. Cities will require long-term technical support, project-specific support, and primary budget support to build local capacity for urban governance. International actors in particular must be encouraged to take a long-term view, recognizing that investments in sustainable and resilient urban governance will pay dividends long into the future. While the emphasis must be on managing the current rapid urban expansion a number of initiatives have successfully started to reclaim and work agricultural land and create jobs. A combination with processing of agricultural produce in SDZ may be an option.<sup>263</sup>

Recommendations:

1. Open up barriers to legal recognition and employment of migrants. Economies that allow migrants greater freedoms stand to gain the most from their presence. Greece and Jordan are two examples of countries that have recognized this fact and eased labor market restrictions for refugees. It is proposed that, as part of this strategy, cities that are selected to receive international assistance should commit to granting migrants a wider range of legal rights, including the right to reside and work in the city and in SDZs. Specific ideas include:
  - a) Encourage cities to develop localized registration and permitting processes that allow migrants to live and work legally in a city or SDZ. Local permits would allow cities to benefit from migrants' presence more quickly by permitting them to find housing and employment through legal means.
  - b) Allow employers in participating cities or SDZs to receive work visas for their workers more quickly and with raised quotas.
  - c) Make skills and language training and job placement services available to both migrants and the host population
  
2. Make more urban land available for development. There is no current alternative to urbanization in Africa. Cities must either adopt responsive development plans or face sprawling slums. Migration only makes the challenge of urbanization even more pressing. Specific ideas include:
  - a) Ease zoning restrictions to allow for greater population density where there is demand.
  - b) Allow land to be converted from inefficient uses (such as underutilized state-owned property) to create new opportunities for development.
  - c) Upgrade and expand infrastructure.
  - d) Develop city-to-city partnership to help with best practice knowledge sharing, through such networks as 100 resilient cities and the Nicosia Initiative.<sup>264</sup>
  - e) Grant permission to self-house and build incrementally.

- f) Provide greater legal recognition of property rights in informal settlements
3. Re-fashion humanitarian aid and social services to stimulate local markets. Any significant influx of refugees, migrants and persons of concern (POC) will also create economic opportunity for current residents, provided market mechanisms are employed to meet the needs of the newcomers. A demand-driven model for services can improve the fit of services (particularly housing and food) and bring wealth into existing communities. Specific ideas include:
- a) Use cash transfers, rather than direct service provision or in-kind goods, to give migrants and poor residents greater choice and flexibility to address their needs while stimulating local industry. These transfers should be facilitated through normal banking, credit card, and point of sale infrastructure.
  - b) Expand banking for the poor and for migrants using private sector financial service providers.
  - c) Focus assistance on improving health and education to help migrants and poor residents lead self-sufficient lives. These services should be made more demand-driven by having migrants pay for themselves, including health insurance with assistance from cash transfers as needed.<sup>265</sup>
  - d) Facilitate private sector language and translation services to help migrants more quickly integrate and contribute productively.

When adopting such an approach city governments should be prepared to swiftly address issues of fraud and profiteering, as migrants and refugees may be unfamiliar with the trading customs of the city and could be easily taken advantage of by unscrupulous merchants and landlords. Legitimizing the presence of migrants helps avoid this outcome by giving them access to formal legal protection.

4. Introduce specialized services and regulatory reforms through SDZs to address key blockages in the business environment. Perhaps the most important function that SDZs can perform are to pilot specialized policies and services that the country as a whole needs to implement. When this occurs, SDZs overcome political and economic hurdles and become drivers of the country's progress. Specific ideas include:

- a) Analyze the major impediments on the business environment in the area surrounding SDZ.
  - b) Reform ineffective laws and regulations through special rules introduced in the SDZs.
  - c) Provide tailored infrastructure and business support services that cater to the needs of targeted industries.
  - d) Expand SDZs to encompass residential, commercial, and industrial uses, or entire cities.
5. Engage the private sector to make development projects financially sustainable and attract investment. Accommodating migrants through SDZs and urban developments need not – and should not – strain government budgets. If projects are developed in locations with strong demand and are supported with good infrastructure, private sector investment can finance projects, creating “win-win” scenarios for government, host communities, and migrants. Social and ecological sustainability must be ensured through governance structures involving communities, civil society and expert organizations. Specific ideas include:
- a) Conduct rigorous market demand studies to find the optimal locations for new SDZs and urban infrastructure projects and designate those areas for development.
  - b) Negotiate public-private partnership (PPP) concession agreements with private sector developers and operators of SDZs and infrastructure projects, enabling them to achieve a return on investment while stimulating economic growth for the city.
  - c) Model the economic and financial returns of new projects for the city and the investors.
  - d) Implement international investor protection mechanisms to address country risk, such as through guarantees and co-financing from multilateral lenders and legal protections enforceable through international arbitration.
6. Strengthen administrative capacity. Public sector capacity greatly impacts the ability of cities to enjoy the economic benefits of migration. Difficulty

dealing with government when obtaining approvals or complying with regulations is often a major impediment to attracting the investment necessary to create jobs and stimulate economic growth. Specific ideas include:

#### 7. Strengthen Public Servants

- a) Provide technical training to public officials at the city and national levels.
- b) Streamline procedures and consolidate requirements through “one-stop shops.”
- c) Establish a single SDZ authority over all the SDZs and give it the power to independently perform a wide range of governmental functions typically performed by multiple agencies.

Broadly speaking, the focus should be on improving services and opportunities for all urban residents as part of accommodating migrants. Offering higher quality services to migrants exclusively may lead to political and social tension that threatens to undermine the long-term success of assistance.

### 3.3.2 Cities and Special Development Zones

This strategy employs two channels for strengthening capacity to address migration through economic development: cities and special development zones (SDZs).<sup>266</sup> Both channels further the demand-driven approach by focusing on areas naturally prone to match migrants with economic activity, and where investments will deliver maximum impact.

The city channel focuses on city-wide improvements in planning, development, management, and service delivery, which benefit all residents, including migrants and host populations. Cities are best positioned to maximize the potential benefits of migration for host populations, for migrants, and for businesses by leveraging existing infrastructure and labor, consumption, and supplier markets. Furthermore, the revealed preference of migrants shows that they prefer to live in cities than in camps (even illegally) and cities are a better environment for service delivery and economic and social integration.<sup>267</sup> Cities offer normalcy and familiarity, which can be critical in stabilizing the lives of people who are displaced.

The SDZ channel supplements the city-wide improvements by attracting industries and stimulating economic activity in strategic locations. Priority locations for SDZ

would be in cities and in peri-urban areas with the strongest potential for expansion.

SDZs are strong tools for catalyzing job creation for both migrant and host communities. They encourage the formation of industry clusters that help new businesses overcome obstacles of starting up by offering shared services, facilities, and infrastructure tailor-made for their needs. Best practice SEZs, such as in China, Mauritius, and Dubai, also improve upon the existing business environment through better governance, which streamlines administrative functions, delivers high-quality public services, and reforms major regulatory inefficiencies. These improvements attract the investment necessary to expand employment opportunities and improve wages, making host communities better able to accommodate migrants.

Provided below is an overview of the current status of SEZs and cities in Africa, along with key concepts, strategies, and recommendations that will be necessary if the program is to succeed.

## Performance of Cities and Existing Zones in Africa and Their Potential for Addressing Migration

### Performance Overview of African Cities

People are urbanizing, or moving to cities, in Africa at an increasing rate. The pace of urbanization in Africa is second only to Asia.<sup>268</sup> According to the *Atlas of Urban Expansion: 2016 Edition*, there are 461 cities in Africa with populations greater than 100,000. With the exception of the cities of South Africa, they are almost uniformly in the bottom half of the income distribution.

Unfortunately, African cities have not adjusted well to urbanization. Unlike other continents, where urbanization has led to higher living standards, African cities struggle to address access to drinking water and improved sanitation, affordable housing, high unemployment, congestion, informality of all kinds, personal safety and security, environmental degradation, and inadequate and badly maintained infrastructure. Over 50 per cent of urban African residents live in slums and 60 per cent lack access to improved sanitation facilities, a figure that remains unchanged since 1990. Transnational migrants are adding to pressures already imposed by migrants from within the country, whose needs cities already did not have the capacity to address well.

Over the past two decades, much of the growth in African cities has been informal and unplanned.<sup>269</sup> While this growth is a natural and alleviating response to housing shortages, it leads to serious deficits in quality of life and impedes productivity growth by increasing congestion.<sup>270</sup> It has also increased the cost and difficulty of providing services; in many cases, cities have not even attempted to provide services in the newly built areas.<sup>271</sup> Unmanaged urban growth can contribute to security risks, instability, and conflict. This is occurring in the context of increasing rural to urban migration and against the backdrop of overlapping and continuous refugee crises.

Cities' response to new residents has enormous impacts. People's experience of government, their interactions with the economy, and their feelings about future prospects are all mediated through the lens of the city or urban area in which they are living. The Tunisian Revolution (and the Arab Spring) was sparked by the confiscation of goods by a municipal official – a local dispute over a corrupt permitting process.

Many cities are hindered by poor management, which is aggravated by a lack of autonomy. In Francophone Africa, cities are managed from the center (often by the Ministry of the Interior), with limited fiscal and administrative decentralization. This worsens the prospects for improvement by reducing the accountability of civil servants and making local resource availability dependent on political maneuvering at the center. Corruption is a common problem, as is staffing.

Despite these obstacles, African cities are growing rapidly and are much more productive than their rural hinterlands. Africans who live in cities have longer life expectancy and more wealth. They are more likely to send their daughters to school, more likely to have a cellphone and an internet connection, and less likely to die of preventable disease.

There is a significant gap between primary cities (e.g., country capitals and largest cities) and secondary cities in this regard due to the uneven quality of internal improvements. The primary cities in most African countries are increasingly connected to global markets whereas secondary cities remain largely disconnected. It is possible to surf the web while eating sushi in Kinshasa, but Mbandaka, a bit up the Congo River, is almost completely isolated. The trend, though, is toward greater integration, and this is being catalyzed by massive investments in industry and infrastructure.

While migration is a challenge for cities, it is also an opportunity. Migrants have the potential to increase economic growth through their labor, skills, and consumption, which can, in turn, attract new investment and create jobs. Moreover, new resources



brought in to assist migrants could also help cities address other problems, and a holistic approach will be more successful than one that privileges specific groups.<sup>272</sup> A one-size-fits-all approach to this kind of aid will clearly not suffice, but cities in Africa do have some common characteristics that are worth considering.

If increased investment is accompanied by improvements in public sector capacity and by the implementation of a demand-based service delivery model, dramatic improvements in cities are possible, even rapidly growing cities. These improvements may help slow the restless movement of the refugees and migrants by giving them safe havens closer to home. To do so, however, the cities will require technical support and budgetary support, along with new and well-supported SDZs that can attract investment and create jobs.

### Performance Overview of African Special Economic Zones

Generally speaking, Africa's existing SEZs are not well suited to address migration. With limited exceptions, these zones have failed to attract significant investment. They have also failed to produce other important dynamic and socioeconomic objectives for zones seen in non-African contexts, such as technology transfer, economic "spillovers" to the local economy, initiation of nationwide policy reforms or structural transformation, gender empowerment, or improvements to job quality.

Reasons for underperformance vary by location though there are general patterns. Many SEZs have unfortunately been located in areas with weak demand, often because their location was driven by political (i.e., supply-driven), rather than market, forces. Land constraints also pose problems for the development of SEZs, especially difficulty resolving land titles, registration, and connective infrastructure. In addition, many governments have shown only halfhearted commitment to their zones, for instance, by passing zones laws but failing to follow through with a regulatory framework or resources for program implementation. Also, despite perception, tax incentives, trade preferences, and low wages have not contributed significantly to sustained SEZ success.<sup>273</sup>

Another cause of poor performance in some countries is poor state capacity which often results in zones becoming captive to vested interests.<sup>274</sup> In such countries, it is necessary to have a high degree of private sector participation and significant legal and regulatory autonomy to help bypass destructive political influences.

That being said, African zones have managed to provide better infrastructure than surrounding areas. For instance, firms in zones report 50 per cent less downtime

from electricity failures and 30 per cent faster customs clearance times compared with firms outside zones. Nevertheless, these improvements have often not been strong enough to compete successfully for international investment.<sup>275</sup>

For those SEZs that have been successful, major factors in their success include:

- Access to large markets of consumers, suppliers, and labor;
- Political stability and a strong overall business environment;
- High-quality infrastructure and trade facilitation (e.g., customs clearance, storage, logistics)

Since 2006, China has announced intentions to make heavy investments “Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones” (ETCZs) in Africa. Actual investment has been slow, through some progress has been made in a few zones as shown in the box below.<sup>276</sup>

The World Bank reports that the sectors with the most potential in Africa’s SEZs are those that leverage the continent’s competitive advantages. These advantages generally lie in natural-resource based sectors (agriculture, minerals, oil and gas, and tourism) and potentially some manufacturing and trade and logistics-related services. Of particular interest is downstream processing of natural resources, especially in the extended value chains of agriculture. To accomplish this, however, barriers to competitiveness in these value chains will need to be tackled.<sup>277</sup> This possibility is further developed later in this chapter.

Given the weak performance of most existing African SEZs, it seems likely that the concept of the new SDZs will need to be developed in high-demand urban areas. When doing this, it is essential that they be founded upon a solid business rationale and the recommendations provided in the next section.

### 3.3.3 SDZs as Platforms for Migrant Integration and Host-Community Capacity Building

SDZs in the proposed form can be strong platforms for launching the demand-driven approach. Efforts to expand migrant participation in the economy and deliver new forms of assistance to them can be piloted in SDZs. Furthermore, many of the problems of inadequate infrastructure, planning, and management can be addressed through specialized policies and institutions that act as a catalyst for broader city-



**Figure 3.1:** Examples of SEZs. Source: Neway Consulting

wide or nation-wide change. More ambitiously, innovative policies and forms of governance that improve the investment climate and quality of life can be tested out in SDZs by giving them a degree of autonomy from their surrounding political environments.

Special zones in various forms have a history of introducing positive change for countries. They have catalyzed policy reform and economic growth when nationwide progress is stalled. Innovative policy makers can overcome bureaucratic hurdles by piloting a beneficial concept within an SEZ without directly facing entrenched interests. China's special economic zones, for instance, introduced reforms to traditional communist policies regarding investment, labor, land use, and trade. We propose using new, well-structured zones expanding to introduce change in immigration, social services, urban planning, and the business environment in Africa.

Special development zones (SDZs) are the next generation of special economic zones (SEZs). SDZs have deeper reforms, are privately run, and are mixed use. Taking and improving on the best practices from SEZs, SDZs create the environment to stimulate long term economic growth. Most SEZs seek to make policy improvements on the margin, for example lowering taxes, expediting customs, or simplifying business registration. SDZs instead start with as much of a blank slate as is politically feasible, then ask how to build the best legal system. SDZs are privately run, exposing them to the profit and loss system, ensuring that inefficient SEZs go out of

business while successful ones can expand. Lastly, SDZs are mixed use, they have residential, industrial, commercial, and service sectors, ensuring a solid economic base for long term development. It will be important to establish institutional safeguards to ensure social inclusion, protection and ecological sustainability where civil society, specialized organizations and academia must be coopted.

### Integrating Migrants through SDZs

First and foremost, SDZs developed under this strategy should be migrant-inclusive. This means that in an SDZ migrants who would ordinarily be prohibited from working or living in the country can find legal housing and employment, operate their own businesses, and train in new skills. Other members of the surrounding population should also be free to live and work in the SDZ so that opportunities are enjoyed by all.

Migrant-inclusive SDZs are the strongest step forward for national and city governments that face political opposition to allowing migrants access to the formal economy. Such SDZs help these countries convert migration from being a perceived problem into an attractor of investment.

Migration, both legal and illegal, is an inescapable reality. Most unauthorized migrants find ways of living and working in the cities informally, where they have a less positive impact on the economy than if they were allowed to work legally.<sup>278</sup>

Economists have strongly established that allowing migrants to work legally will normally benefit the economies of the countries hosting them. Over the medium- to long-term, migrants tend to raise wages and create jobs by starting their own businesses and purchasing goods and services.<sup>279</sup> A migrant-inclusive SDZ allows the country to capture some of the benefits from allowing these migrants to work while aiming for broader inclusion. Allowing migrants to use their skills and engage in rewarding work will also make them think more favorably of their lives and surrounding communities, making them better members of society.

Migrant-inclusive SDZs are also better tools for accomplishing the goal of transforming refugee camps into sustainable settlements. Host countries often use refugee camps to keep refugees in clusters where aid can be distributed, where they will not compete for jobs in the major cities, and where they can be more easily located and eventually repatriated. Because camps provide few opportunities, however, most migrants avoid them and scatter throughout the host country. As newly created places of opportunity, SDZs would reverse this trend by attracting migrants rather

than repelling them and would bypass political contestations over existing resources by creating new jobs in new urban areas.

To implement a migrant-inclusive SDZ, we recommend partnering with national and local authorities to establish an SDZ registration and visa regime. This registration and visa card should be generally available to all migrants and should entitle them to work and live within an SDZ. Similar programs have been implemented by cities like New York City for undocumented immigrants ensuring their legal stay, rather than have migrants be pushed into illegality.

It is critical to avoid isolating, or “ghettoizing,” migrants within an SDZ. Therefore, if and when possible, cities should be empowered to issue similar registration and visa cards to all migrants, allowing them to live and work within the city. Gradually expanding the range within which migrants can live and work formally reduces the risk of exploitation and sectarian violence and allows an entire economy to benefit from migrants’ presence.

The SDZs can also offer “investment for passport” citizenship which will eventually give access to all AU countries. This can be modelled after Portugal, Greece and some island citizenship programs allowing for residence and citizenship provided investment and capital is provided by the applicant.<sup>280</sup> Similarly, “e-residence” programs can be introduced, similar to Estonia.

### Deploying Demand-driven Social Services and Humanitarian Assistance through SDZs

Migrant-inclusive SDZs can serve as launch pads for new methods of assisting migrants and poor communities. Innovative and experimental solutions can be tested in SDZs to determine their effectiveness. Ideas that are successful can then be implemented more broadly across the city or nation.

SDZs allow NGO entrepreneurs and social enterprises a chance to begin delivering services more quickly and at a more manageable scale. This is especially true for service providers that would otherwise have to deal with bureaucracy and poor administration at the city or national level.

Later in this chapter, specific recommendations for financial services, health services, and education are provided. These solutions should be introduced in the SDZs if not possible at a city or national level.


## Improving the Investment Climate through Special Policies and Infrastructure in the SDZs

Recognizing the problems to the business environment in African cities and existing SDZs discussed in the previous section, migrant-inclusive SDZs should offer high-quality infrastructure, services, and policies that are distinct from the surrounding economy. When Special Economic zones have performed well in other countries, they often offer a higher-quality business environment than the rest of the nation. To generate employment, migrant-inclusive SDZs will need to do the same.

To accomplish this, we recommend undertaking a careful assessment of major constraints on the business environment and exploring SDZ-based solutions. The following measures are proposed:

- Adopt special SDZ laws at the national and local levels that reform ineffective and burdensome laws and regulations for people in the SDZs.
- Allow SDZs to include a wide range of residential, commercial, and industrial uses, creating a diverse urban environment.
- Ease zoning restrictions to allow for greater population density.
- Develop or extend new, high-quality urban infrastructure.
- Provide on-site security services and customs-clearance.
- Offer small-business support services and translation assistance.
- Improve worker productivity through language training, skills development, childcare, and job-placement services.
- Streamline and consolidate procedures for obtaining permits and licenses of all kinds, especially those measured by the World Bank's Doing Business Report.
- Being among the first jurisdictions to adopt policies that welcome innovative activities, such as mobile financial services and crypto currencies.

SDZs can also encourage new activities to develop in an economy through the formation of clusters. This can occur by offering infrastructure, services, and policies tailored to meet the needs of emerging sectors. Businesses in these sectors can use



**Figure 3.2:** Examples of Successful SEZs. Source: Neway Consulting

these offerings, as well as the benefits of co-location with similar industries, to leap over market barriers to entry.

For instance, SDZs might be able to attract investment in digital sectors, such as data centers and connectivity and onshore/offshore opportunities through appropriate infrastructure. The services provided by e-Estonia could be a useful model.

If possible, SDZs should be highly autonomous jurisdictions offering world-class laws and policies. Hong Kong, Singapore, and other “city states” provide useful models. If SDZs can achieve this autonomy and establish highly advanced laws and policies, it is conceivable that they could become leaders in in the global economy in 10 to 20 years’ time.

## Governance Framework

SDZs will depend upon capable institutions to finance, construct, service, and govern activities. Internationally, successful SEZ have tended to rely on a private sector developer-operator that is responsible for development, financing, promotion, and services in the zone. They have also featured special zone regulatory authorities that are able to independently perform many government functions for the zones and facilitate others through a one-stop shop.

A master developer-operator is key to a successful SDZ. The host country government should form an agreement with a private sector development company to develop infrastructure, buildings, and utilities, and to provide basic services for the zones. The developer should be selected based on a competitive and transparent bidding process that includes highly experienced and well-resourced firms. Then, the developer acquires land and existing assets from government through either a purchase or a 40-50 year lease/concession on land and existing assets. The agreement should be enforceable through international investor-state arbitration and the New York Convention.


International development banks should support the SDZ through direct financing or loan guarantees. This will make the project more commercially viable and help reduce political risks. An involvement of specialized entities to ensure social inclusion, protection and ecological sustainability is necessary and can be drawn from civil society, academia, UN, NGOs and other specialized entities.

A migrant-inclusive SDZ should be self-supporting and generate reasonable returns on investment. Successful SDZ developers and operators generate a profit by recovering their initial startup development costs through rent and service charges to businesses.

Initial development costs will naturally be significant and returns on these costs will likely take a long period of time and involve risk. Thus, risk-tolerant lenders, such as international development banks and foreign governments, will need to provide guarantees for loans from commercial banks and possibly lend money themselves to the developers.

The developer can begin collecting rent and service charges from businesses that open in the SDZ. Initially, rent and service charges will need to be heavily subsidized for people arriving with few resources. Over time these subsidies can be scaled back as residents earn income. Over time (perhaps 20 to 30 years) the developer should deliver a return for its investors. The host country government should have direct





**Figure 3.3:** Institutional Relationships in a Migrant-Inclusive SDZ

“buy in” to the project and a financial interest in its success, such as by owning the land or owning a minority interest in the developer.

### 3.3.4 Infrastructure Plan for SDZs and New Urban Development Projects

Cities in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa often face significant challenges in providing their residents with basic infrastructure services. Water, power, and sewerage are often in short supply, with frequent interruptions. Transportation service can be erratic and in many cases is provided by an informal network rather than by the municipality. Garbage is particularly problematic, with much waste going uncollected. These problems will only be exacerbated by the presence of more people and refugees in particular may be last on the list for resources in an environment of scarcity. A high degree of internal rural to urban migration poses is already placing stress on current infrastructure.

Infrastructure problems can also pose challenges for SDZs. The development of parallel systems can help with some of this - water, power, and wastewater treatment can all be provided within the SDZ itself. However, providing these services in a parallel manner raises costs and does little to assist the city as a whole. In addition, SDZs are reliant on transportation infrastructure outside the zone.

Cities will require assistance in upgrading infrastructure and improving service delivery capacity which can be built through PPP formats combining public and private sector capability. The specific needs will vary from city to city - clearly, a medium-sized city in Kenya will have different needs than, say, Benghazi. However, some general principles can be elaborated.

### General Approach to Infrastructure Improvement

A holistic approach should be adopted in providing services. It is neither sustainable nor fair to target service upgrades to one group of urban residents. Rather, the emphasis should be on making investments in long-term capacity and overall improvements in services. That said, improvements should initially target low-income areas, informally developed areas, and areas with the lowest quality of services in order to advance the goal of equity.

These infrastructure decisions should respond to the settlement model and geographic characteristics of each area. The presence of large informal settlements in practically every major African city increases the challenge of developing new areas. The development of an SDZ should run in parallel with slum upgrading projects and other synergistic improvements within the poorest parts of the city in order to fight poverty not as a sectoral problem but as a general threat to peace and well-being.

International funds should be focused on building local management capacity and on assisting through co-financing with capital projects. These funds can also be used to subsidize services but this should be done at a consumer level through cash transfers not through price subsidies. When possible, people should pay for services through fees and taxes. In some cases, subsidies will be required when people cannot afford these charges.

## Specific Recommendations for Infrastructure

Most urban water systems require significant upgrades and repairs since water scarcity is endemic throughout Africa. Centralized pumping, storage, treatment, and distribution of water can improve efficiency and cut waste, provided the cities maintain and extend their distribution networks and monitor leakage. Storage and treatment facilities may also have to be expanded. Where possible, water should be provided through standpipes and in-home connections, not through trucks. City governments should be supported in rapidly connecting newly built neighborhoods to the water distribution system in a modular approach and water should be metered.

Power generation and distribution is commonly handled on a national scale. However, opportunities must be seized to leapfrog and while the reliability of local power supplies through improvements to the existing distribution networks must be improved emphasis must be decentralized / smart grid power production. The geographical characteristics of some parts of Africa make it an attractive area for sustainable energy production and it may also be possible to install additional local generating capacity using renewables. In addition, the utility company should be supported in rapidly connecting newly built neighborhoods and in regularizing power connections in informal settlements. Energy saving building technology is a perfect opportunity for technology and best-practice transfer. Like water, power should be metered.

Synergies may be achieved by pairing energy production projects with the extraction of water from aquifers or the construction of desalination plants. This should make large scale projects more attractive to investors and simultaneously address water scarcity and energy needs. Small off grid solutions providing renewable energy combined with water treatment and communication are being introduced in a number of countries and could serve smaller neighborhoods and communities

Wastewater treatment is a challenge for even the most advanced countries. In the near-term, it is unlikely that large scale wastewater treatment facilities can be realistically installed in cities that do not already have them. In these communities, resources and assistance should be provided to construct improved pit latrine toilets and to install simple drainage systems for household wastewater and runoff. In cities that do have wastewater treatment plants, upgrades and reliability improvements can be supported, along with conservation programs. Sewerage should be extended to new settlements as roads are constructed and connections should be made to individual dwellings whenever possible. Modular systems growing with population

and adjusting to urban growth are being used in China and reduce immediate capital investment requirements.

Garbage collection is commonly provided by the private sector. This is an excellent opportunity for small entrepreneurs but it does not provide a comprehensive solution to sanitation issues. Street cleaning should be prioritized and supported in newly developed areas and informal settlements as a mechanism for generating employment. City governments should be supported in the establishment of recycling facilities that can capture value from waste and garbage collection firms should be paid appropriately for the separation of organics and recyclables. Co-financing can be sought through the R20 Secretariat for instance.<sup>281</sup>

In Africa, public transportation services (buses and motor taxis) are commonly provided by the private sector and this is unlikely to change. City governments should instead focus on ensuring that newly developed areas - including SDZs - are serviced by a grid of arterial roads and are built with rational street layouts. This will involve securing and demarcating land for roads in advance of development as part of the process of preparing land for urban extension. In existing informal settlements, land titles can be used as an incentive to adjust plot boundaries in order to make room for these critical roads (many models exist for how to do this).<sup>282</sup>

If city governments effectively prioritize these sorts of roads, they will eventually be able to implement a subsidized municipal trunk bus network, for example, that can provide rapid and low-cost transportation along main routes as a supplement to the private services. An emphasis should also be placed on the paving and upgrading of local roads. This can be a jobs generator, in the model of the Ethiopian cobblestone roads program, and it can also help with drainage.

### 3.3.5 Spatial Design Principles

The spatial design of new settlements should aim to create cities that are orderly, equitable, sustainable, and productive. Designers should orient their efforts around the following primary and secondary objectives:

Primary Objectives:

- Maximize connectivity within the settlement and between the settlement and the city.
- Minimize transport and infrastructure costs by minimizing route distances.

- Maximize route options to reduce traffic.
- Preserve environmentally sensitive areas.

Secondary Objectives:

- Facilitate service provision.
- Support walking and cycling.
- Encourage the formation of communities.
- Promote small and medium sized entrepreneurs.
- Ensure that no resident is more than a 15 minute walk from a public open space.

Cities should prepare land for urban expansion based on estimates of projected growth. These estimates can be developed in collaboration with international consultants. Minimum preparations for urban expansion consist of laying out a simple arterial grid, spaced 1km x 1km, along with a hierarchy of small, medium, and large public open spaces. The large public open spaces should be used to preserve environmentally sensitive areas and to direct development away from steep slopes and waterways. The grid should occupy 5-8 per cent of the new urban area. It may not be necessary to pay compensation for this land, as the value of the land will increase significantly once the road is constructed.

Planned expansion in the cities should take the form of extension wherever possible, utilizing lands immediately adjacent to the existing built-up area. This will provide continuity in the urban fabric and facilitate the formation of the metropolitan labor market.

The arterial grid should consist of a series of macro blocks. The land within these blocks will be privately owned or owned by the government. Landowners should receive material assistance in complying with subdivision regulations; specifically with surveying and laying out plots, roads, and public open spaces. Land for streets and roads within the block should occupy 20 - 25 per cent of the land. Land for public facilities such as schools, clinics, and police and fire stations should be donated to the municipality. Schools and clinics should be located in the center of the macro block, police and fire stations should be located on the edge, along the arterial roads. In the case of government-owned land, streets and roads should be laid out and demarcated by the municipality, along with plots and public open

spaces. These plots can then be sold at a discount to low-income families or sold in blocks at market price to developers.

SDZs should also be located along the proposed arterial grid, within a few kilometers of the existing city. Dedicated transportation connections may need to be built to the port or to the airport.

### 3.3.6 Demand-based Model for Selecting Strategic Locations for Assistance

To maximize the impact of this effort, we have begun to develop a simple model for selecting the most strategically important cities for intervention. The goal of this model is to distill the many factors that impact the fortunes of a city and an SDZ into a ranking that can be used to compare and assess different candidate cities.

The model aims to be comprehensive—incorporating economic, political, and social factors. The selection of a site or a city depends on more than just infrastructure and proximity to markets; it also depends on commitments from governments and private sector actors. This model aims to capture some of that nuance.

Much of the primary data used in the model can be gathered from publicly available sources or through collaborations with NGOs. Countries hosting or sending large numbers of migrants, such as CEN-SAD states should be focusing on these issues. However, an important part of the model will be made available to governments. Governments should be approached and technical support be provided based on the criteria laid out below. Only after a country or group of cities has political buy-in will it make sense to consider the other factors.

The model is divided into two parts: assessing cities and assessing potential SDZ locations. These parts are somewhat nested: many of the things that make a city successful are also necessary for the success of an SDZ. However, it may be possible to locate a successful SDZ some distance from a city, provided there is a mechanism for bringing in a supply of labor and it may be desirable to do so in some cases. In general, however, the two sets of criteria should be evaluated in tandem to answer the multi-part question, “Is this city a good candidate for an SDZ and urban management and infrastructure assistance”?

Criteria for Selecting Cities for City-Wide Assistance:

Political:

- Proportion of migrants in country
- Willingness to create work/residence permits for refugees and migrants
- Positive/Negative public statements regarding migration
- Openness of policy toward migrants and historical pattern of accepting migrants
- Political stability (from World Bank)
- Government effectiveness (from World Bank)
- Openness to expansion
- Decentralization of budgetary and administrative functions
- Existing conflicts within the city or country that may contribute to distrust toward migrants
- Primary / capital city vs. secondary city

International:

- Number of migrants originating from country
- Participation in regional partnerships
- Status of existing conflicts

Economic:

- Macroeconomic stability (World Bank Africa Development Indicators)
- GDP performance (IMF)
- Ease of doing business index (World Bank)
- Local unemployment rate (if known)
- Local workforce skill level (if unknown, to be gathered through surveying)

Location (City):

- Location on existing migration routes
- Proximity to known conflicts
- Share of residential land developed informally
- Security
- City size
- Distance to seaport
- Distance to international airport
- Connections to railway and highway
- Availability of potable water
- Availability and reliability of electrical supply
- Availability and reliability of telecommunications
- Availability of land for development
- Intensiveness of surrounding land uses
- GDP per capita

Criteria for SDZ Development:

Location (SDZ):

- Distance to existing settlements
- Distance to major highway
- Distance to railroad



- Distance to international airport
- Distance to seaports and dry ports of different types

Land & Infrastructure:

- Existence of effective legal mechanism to obtain land for SDZs and infrastructure corridors (i.e., eminent domain)
- Agreement to use this mechanism to secure land for the project
- Access to water (expressed in available liters of potable water)
- Access to power (expressed in kwh x per cent online)

Government Buy-in:

- Agreement to provide customs-clearing facilities in an SDZ
- Agreement to provide tax incentives for an SDZ
- Agreement to assist in improving infrastructure and transportation links
- Agreement to streamline business processes and permitting

The model will aim to combine these factors into seven coherent indices - Political, International, Economic, Location City, Location SDZ, Land & Infrastructure, and Government Buy-in. These can then be combined to produce a single score for each city or location that is under consideration, and the scores can be ranked.

The future development of this model will focus on determining the relative importance of each factor in each index and how they should be merged. This will be followed by a data gathering phase, in which all of the necessary layers will be assembled, candidate cities will be identified, and a shortlist of likely candidates will be developed. At that point or sometime before, it may be correct to consider approaching governments with a package of proposals and gauging the response.

### 3.3.7 Strategic Opportunities for Investment

Accurately identifying opportunities for investment is a crucial component of the demand-driven approach. This section provides an overview of potential opportu-

nities for investors in African cities and SDZs in four categories: commodities, land and infrastructure, labor-intensive employment, and consumer goods. Furthermore, it provides a plan for exploring further investment opportunities.

The establishment of SDZs creates a special opportunity to improve upon the business environment within a special zone. Infrastructure, services, and regulatory procedures can all be improved in quality and efficiency. Additionally, political risks can be reduced through development bank or sovereign guarantees, investor-state contracts enforceable in international arbitration, and other measures. Therefore, this section takes into account the possibilities for investment assuming current general business environments in migrant-hosting areas and assuming business environment improvements can be attained in SDZs.

### Commodities

Despite the growth of digital industries, strong investment opportunities still exist in physical commodities. Even though some of the most valuable companies are social networks, advertisers, and virtual goods and services providers, nothing exists without an underlying physical form.

Companies at the top of value chains ultimately reside and transact business within computer and storage servers, network and fibre optic cables, cell phone towers, and smart phones. All of these are physical assets made mostly of graphite, lithium, aluminium, silicates, cobalt, gold, silver, and copper.

Even though they enjoy lower premiums, minerals have strong growth potential. The supply of the Earth's minerals is inherently scarce and demand for them will continue to rise, fueled by technological advancement and a rapidly growing middle class in Asia. Moreover, much of the premiums enjoyed by high value-added industries may be driven by an irrational "fear of missing out" or a "bubble."<sup>283</sup>

This creates an opportunity for developing economies to capture and control their natural resources without much objection from global financial markets, which are busy investing in high-tech companies like Google, Amazon, and Facebook.

Therefore, there may be strong opportunities for African countries to capture investment in activities just up the value chain from mineral mining. This would enable processing activities to happen close to the point of extraction, rather than exporting unprocessed raw materials with very small margins. Reserves of iron ore, bauxite, copper, graphite, and other minerals are all located along migration paths.

Of particular interest is minerals that are realistic to process at small to medium scale and require less heavy logistics and machinery for extraction, transport, and manufacturing.

Cobalt processing is one key example. Cobalt is a key component in lithium-cobalt batteries, a type of lithium-ion battery that is the growing standard for electric vehicles. Electric vehicles are expected to dominate the car industry in the coming decades and batteries account for roughly 40 per cent of the cost of electric vehicles. Therefore, it can also be safely assumed that access to high quality and yet affordable batteries will determine the outcome of the global car industry's competitive race for mass production and sale of electric vehicles.<sup>284</sup>

To meet this demand, electric car manufacturers like Tesla and Nissan expect that large-scale factories, such as Tesla's "Gigafactory" in Nevada, are needed to produce the necessary economies of scale. Currently (with the exception of Tesla's "Gigafactory 1" in Nevada), nearly all of these factories, and the related know-how, are located in Japan, South Korea, and China.

However, there may be future potential for an African "Gigafactory", close to the continent's rich reserves of cobalt and lithium. Strikingly, 60 per cent of the world's cobalt reserves are in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Lithium sources are more diverse, though Zimbabwe has substantial reserves. Chinese firms have already secured a large part of the DRC's cobalt reserves as part of its determination to make advancements in e-mobility. More than 90 per cent of Chinese cobalt imports are from the DRC. The relevant investment pattern is commodities in exchange for infrastructure.<sup>285</sup>

In recent times, human rights concerns are giving rise to the possibility of a two-tier cobalt market. Civil society organizations report that child labor and other abuses allegedly occur in cobalt extraction in the DRC. Cobalt is not explicitly covered in global or EU agreements on extracting mining industries and conflict commodities, including in the EU's due diligence rules for the import of potential conflict minerals. As a result, some analysts predict that purchasers may pay a premium for non-DRC cobalt.

Therefore, it is necessary to subject DRC cobalt extraction to international standards. As a "stand-alone" approach this would probably be difficult. If, however, this approach is embedded in a strategy to process the commodity and add value, ideally in an African "Gigafactory" for batteries in or close to the DRC, raising standards is more promising. Development bank subsidies, especially if channelled into cobalt-focused SDZs, can act as leverage to raise standards, as well as other African Union initiatives supported by the World Bank.<sup>286</sup>

Similar opportunities could be identified with regard to other minerals and commodities in general.

## Land and Infrastructure

Urban expansion and SDZs create new opportunities for real estate and infrastructure investment. Improvements to governance and infrastructure in these areas increase land value, which real estate investors can capture and, in the process, create jobs and attract many more companies.

Africa's rapid urbanization, as discussed above, means strong demand for new urban space. In other countries, demand from urbanization has led to strong improvements to living standards. Africa can similarly begin to capture the benefits of urbanization with the right approach. Potential models range from costly private sector interventions to relatively simple public sector actions. These models, along with examples for each, are provided in the boxes below.

**Privately Built Cities**  
*Case Study (a):* Rendevour is Africa's largest urban land developer. They are a private company working on seven projects in five countries. Their projects are large scale urban developments, ranging from greater than 10,000 acres in the Democratic Republic of Congo to 300 acres in Zambia. This strategy leverages private funds to create new developments that often offer significantly better services and quality of life than the existing city.

*Case Study (b):* Similarly, Morocco recently partnered with a Chinese firm to develop a \$10 billion new city. When finished, the city will be home to 300,000 Moroccans. The city development is being coupled with a special economic zone modeled off the zones which have had such success in China.

**New urban master plans**  
*Case Study:* Nairobi, Kenya, recently updated its master plan with assistance from the Japan International Cooperation Agency. It lays out strategies for addressing the challenges facing the city. It includes sectoral analyses of water, power, sanitation, roads, economic growth, zoning, gender, telecommunications, equity, and more. It is a visionary plan, with implementation happening at the level of individual city agencies. This strategy relies on using large amounts of public funds to improve conditions in the existing city.

**Simplified extension plans**  
*Case Study:* The government of Ethiopia is currently engaged in a project called "Making Room for Urban Expansion," using locally available knowledge and resources to lay out the areas of expansion in rapidly growing cities. The cities make growth projections and plan a network of arterial roads and public open spaces in their expansion areas, while preserving environmentally sensitive areas. The private sector is left to fill in the new areas as it sees fit, with some restrictions on zoning and noxious uses.

**Figure 3.4:** Urban Expansion Models

There is high demand for all of these strategies from city governments in Africa. Choosing an appropriate approach should be based on the needs of the specific city and the resources that are available at that time. In general, simpler strategies such

as the extension plans are to be preferred because they interfere less with market processes and are easier to implement.

### Manufacturing / Labor Intensive Employment

Urbanization alone is not enough for success, it must be accompanied by good jobs. As Chinese labor costs are rising, Africa has the opportunity to become a manufacturing center. Unfortunately, until now it has been unable to take full advantage because of poor infrastructure and inadequate rule of law.

However, overall manufacturing in Africa is growing faster than many assume. Manufacturing investment is increasing in real terms by 3.5 per cent per year over the last decade, faster than the global average. The food and beverage sectors have been the best-performing manufacturing sectors. Textiles have lagged until recently, unable to compete with Asian imports. Manufactured exports also weather slow-downs in international trade better than non-manufacturing exports.<sup>287</sup>.

Additionally, the influx of Chinese investment and activity is creating knowledge transfers that are setting the stage for improved manufacturing. The Chinese are doing it partly out of necessity, as rising Chinese wages are making Chinese manufacturing less competitive than it once was.

The particular industries which should be targeted is highly dependent on the country. Different countries have different infrastructure, governance, labor markets, and supply chain capacity.

Two of the largest barriers to improving African manufacturing are governance and infrastructure. SDZs target changes in both by improving the business environment and creating new infrastructure which can catalyze further manufacturing investment.

### Consumer Goods

Communities with large migrant populations have the potential to develop markets for consumer goods but only if they adopt a demand-driven approach. Migrants require basic consumer goods which could be supplied by private entrepreneurs if humanitarian organizations shift out of their role as supplier. Instead of directly providing food, water, medical services, etc., humanitarian aid can provide cash grants. These cash grants will allow residents of SDZs to better fulfill their needs

while driving local suppliers to invest in capacity and job creation. Little additional action will need to be taken by the organizer of the SDZ as markets for consumer goods tend to be efficient.

### 3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation Methodology

Monitoring and evaluation is key to measuring the success and impact of the interventions under consideration. The general goals of the effort are to reduce the number of migrants making the risky crossing to Europe, to slow migratory flows in Africa by forestalling the conditions that cause migration, and to create accommodating circumstances for returnees in order to discourage serial migration.

Migration statistics are measured by UNHCR and other multilateral organizations and NGOs and there is no need to reproduce their efforts. In addition, migration statistics alone may not be the best indicator of success. It may be difficult to distinguish the specific impacts of the intervention proposed in this document from the effects of unexpected shocks or other external factors. Migration figures released by other organizations should certainly be monitored and particular attention should be given to the population subgroups discussed in this document. The purpose of this document is to suggest a strategy for monitoring the direct effectiveness and impacts of the proposed interventions by measuring specific programmatic outcomes.

Information should be gathered to measure the effectiveness of SDZs, focusing on the benefit to the host country and on the benefit to the participating firms. This should include total employment generated, business retention, volume of exports, cost to the government, amount of investment attracted, and total number of firms.

Socioeconomic indicators should be collected for a sample of the populations who live in areas that are receiving support or hosting an SDZ. Samples should also be gathered in sub-populations:

- Potential migrants (vulnerable individuals such as the poor and the unemployed)
- Migrants in Africa (people coming from other cities or other countries who identify as displaced)
- Returnees (people who have been sent back to Africa as part of a repatriation program)

This will allow for the measurement of conditions in the population as a whole, and also for the measurement of conditions in the specific smaller groups. The variables to be measured are drawn from the SDG indicators to allow for international comparability. Specific methodologies can be found in the SDG metadata.

Key population indicators:

- 1.1.1 Proportion of population below the international poverty line, by sex, age, employment status and geographical location (urban/rural).
- 1.4.1 Proportion of population living in households with access to basic services.
- 2.1.1 Prevalence of undernourishment.
- 3.2.1 Under-five mortality rate.
- 3.8.1 Coverage of essential health services (defined as the average coverage of essential services based on tracer interventions that include reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health, infectious diseases, non-communicable diseases and service capacity and access, among the general and the most disadvantaged population).
- 4.3.1 Participation rate of youth and adults in formal and non-formal education and training in the previous 12 months, by sex.
- 5.b.1 Proportion of individuals who own a mobile telephone, by sex.
- 6.1.1 Proportion of population using safely managed drinking water services.
- 6.2.1 Proportion of population using safely managed sanitation services, including a hand-washing facility with soap and water.
- 7.1.1 Proportion of population with access to electricity.
- 8.5.1 Average hourly earnings of female and male employees, by occupation, age and persons with disabilities.
- 8.5.2 Unemployment rate, by sex, age and persons with disabilities.
- 8.10.2 Proportion of adults (15 years and older) with an account at a bank or other financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider.

- 10.2.1 Proportion of people living below 50 per cent of median income, by sex, age and persons with disabilities.
- 11.1.1 Proportion of urban population living in slums, informal settlements or inadequate housing.

In addition, questions should be asked about participation in the sub-national identification system and receipt of electronic financial services.

Responsibility for collecting the data should not rest with the implementing organizations. This would be unnecessarily burdensome and would represent a duplication of effort. Instead, a portion of the budget should be set aside for monitoring and evaluation and grants should be awarded to organizations such as WHO, Slum Dwellers International (SDI), and UNHCR to undertake the monitoring. These organizations have an existing infrastructure and a track record of reliable data gathering that will enable them to undertake the task more faithfully and efficiently.

The use of the generated data is as important as the process for collecting it. Implementing partners should be encouraged to adopt a lean and agile framework that will enable them to rapidly prototype innovations, measure the results, and make improvements. Programs such as Beta.gov can be looked to for inspiration in this regard, but the general model is an increasingly important element of the implementation of public policy.





## Synopsis and Roadmap

On the following pages, we summarize the proposals (to Austria) and recommendations (for international actors) in table format. In the table, the full text of the proposals and recommendations is frequently compressed, therefore it is necessary to consult the relevant text sections of the report for details.

To provide a roadmap, the table also refers to time frames, partners, and feasibility of the proposals and recommendations; the last column is reserved for remarks (if any).

<b>Ref.</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>Partners</b>	<b>Feasibility</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
2.0.1	An overarching Austrian Migration and Development Strategy	Announcement now. Implementation after Oct 15 elections	Internal staff and expert consultants	Feasible	
2.0.2	Austria, in building momentum for its forthcoming EU presidency, should offer...to contribute to improved synergies and better info sharing regarding existing M&D in Africa initiatives	announcement now; implementation 2017/2018	EU and African partners, international community	Feasible	...but challenging
2.1.1	Consider joining the initiative “Migrant Protection and Reintegration of Returnees along Central Mediterranean Migration Routes”	now	EU, EU partners, IOM	Feasible	
2.1.2	Consider joining the Lake Chad Consultative Group or the Sahel Alliance and contributing to funding gaps	now	EU and African partners	Feasible	
2.2.1	Austria underlines its continued full support to the ongoing EUNAVFOR MED Sophia operation	now	EU, EU partners	Feasible	
2.2.2	Austria could suggest an impact study assessing the implications of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia on migrants and refugees stranded in transit countries	now	EU	Feasible	

<b>Ref.</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>Partners</b>	<b>Feasibility</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
2.3.1	We propose that Austria underlines its continued support to the EU return, re-admission and re-integration plans and operations	now	EU	Feasible	
2.3.2	We propose that Austria supports the gist of the ESI proposal to seek an agreement similar to the EU-Turkey agreement with African states	announcement implementation medium-term	EU and African partners	Difficult	
2.4.1	We propose that Austria advocates for intra-EU compliance with the EU Resettlement and Relocation Schemes	now	EU partners	Difficult	
2.4.2	We propose that Austria announces its readiness to continue with the EU's resettlement scheme with a particular focus on North Africa and the Horn of Africa (also considering its development partner countries including Ethiopia)	Announcement Implementation Oct 15 elections	EU, IOM, UNHCR	Feasible	Domestic politics aspect
2.4.3	Austria could explore the possibility to develop privately-sponsored resettlement programs following the example of the Government of Canada/Open Society Foundations	Announcement Implementation Oct 15 elections	now. Civil Society Foundations, UNHCR	Feasible	Domestic politics aspect

<b>Ref.</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>Partners</b>	<b>Feasibility</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
2.4.4	Austria could contribute to UNHCR's Emergency Resettlement Country Joint Support Mechanism (ERCJM) by sharing national resettlement expertise and through the provision of financial resources	now	UNHCR	Feasible	
2.4.5	Austria should advertise its "Red-White-Red-Card" immigration system as one way of making labor migration possible, and confirm support for the "EU Blue Card Directive" project	now	international community and EU	Feasible	
2.5.1	Austria should continue its exemplary engagement for peace, conflict prevention, reconciliation and democracy in Africa, also in support of the UN-SG's agenda for more and better conflict prevention	now	international community	Feasible	
2.5.2	Austria should advocate a new thinking in migration policies, where migrants are seen as consumers, producers and more generally economic assets rather than liabilities	from now on onwards	international community	Feasible	Could be quite rewarding
2.5.2.1.1	Austria should continue to strongly support the concept of "investing in investment" in close cooperation with the WB group, UNIDO and the Austrian financial sector	now	WB, UNIDO, Austrian financial sector	Feasible	

<b>Ref.</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>Partners</b>	<b>Feasibility</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
2.5.2.1.2	Austria should consider joining the G20 Compact With Africa initiative, as other non-G 20 countries like the Netherlands and Norway have done, and advertise participation of Austrian firms (the next presentation of investor prospectuses is planned to take place in the context of the next IMF/WB annual meeting in October 2017 in Washington), see also next proposal	now	G 20 and other countries, private sector	Feasible	
2.5.2.1.3	Austria should consider to create a public (ADA, OeEB, others)- private (WKO, others) internet platform focusing exclusively on advertising, broadening and deepening all existing initiatives for unlocking private investment in Africa	now	Austrian partners inside & outside government	Feasible	
2.5.2.1.4	With regard to the proposed platform, it is also necessary to focus on specific Austrian comparative advantages and interests and, where necessary, develop new initiatives	now	Mainly Austrian partners inside & outside government	Feasible	

Ref.	Proposal	Time Frame	Partners	Feasibility	Remarks
2.5.2.2.1	Austria could call for a national or EU-wide experts hearing with regard to continued criticism regarding EPAs. Such a hearing would help to prepare the forthcoming EU-Africa summit in November 2017 on “a renewed impetus for the Africa-EU Partnership”	announcement after Oct 15 elections	national and international trade experts	Feasible	Domestic politics aspect
2.5.2.3.1	On Energy, we propose that Austria continues and reinforces its current engagement, in particular by connecting it even closer to the Austrian Development Agency’s (ADA’s) Economic & Business Partnerships Program and by reaching out to potential investors	now	Austrian partners inside & outside government	Feasible	
2.5.2.3.2	When it comes to “thinking big(ger)”, Austria and its solar industry should explore all possibilities to engage with emerging Desert Solar Projects (like “Noor I” in Morocco)	now	Austrian partners inside & outside government	Feasible	
2.5.2.4.1	Austria could take the initiative for boosting international support to the GGWSSI, e.g. by making it a subject at the next EU-Africa summit in November 2017	now	EU and African partners	Feasible	Could be quite rewarding

<b>Ref.</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>Partners</b>	<b>Feasibility</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
2.5.2.5.1	Austria could consider to strengthen public support for insurance solutions as a supplement to direct support and encourage UNISDR to go further in that direction	medium term	international community	Difficult	
2.5.2.6.1	Rather than strive to eliminate informal settlements, international actors should support governments in enabling or facilitating settlement improvement by ensuring the availability of the basic inputs, namely urban infrastructure, land with tenure security, and appropriate financial and technical services, that enable people to improve their living situation themselves. These things can be delivered through site and service schemes as well as through in-situ upgrading	medium-term	international community	Feasible	Recommendation to int. actors
2.5.2.6.2	Austria could encourage more city partnerships with African cities, especially in the ADC partner countries Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda, on the basis of the existing international networks for know-how transfer and best practices	now	Austrian cities	Feasible	



<b>Ref.</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>Partners</b>	<b>Feasibility</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
2.5.2.7.1	We recommend developing healthcare and education services in strategic African cities aligned with the cash-based transfer systems as outlined above. Pilot programs can be introduced in migrant-inclusive SDZs	medium term	international community	Difficult	Recommendation to int. actors
2.5.2.8.1	The recommendations on ID Management require political, technical and financial resources through direct project support or partnership and mentoring arrangements. Austria could support this with technology and technical assistance bilaterally or through multilateral agencies	medium term	international community	Feasible, but challenging	Recommendation to int. actors
2.5.2.8.2	Development of integrated ID Systems: African countries, like others, need a strategic approach to ID to maximize its development impact	medium term	international community	Feasible, but challenging	Recommendation to int. actors
2.5.2.8.3	Strengthening of birth registration: In much of Africa, birth registration rates are too low to provide a strong foundation for national ID	medium term	international community	Feasible, but challenging	Recommendation to int. actors

<b>Ref.</b>	<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>Partners</b>	<b>Feasibility</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
2.5.2.8.4	Establishment of financially sustainable ID systems and providers: Basing an ID program in continuous civil registration and its integration across applications is vital to bringing down costs and ensuring that the program is financially sustainable	medium term	international community	Feasible, but challenging	Recommendation to int. actors
2.5.2.8.5	Ensure Inclusiveness and avoid statelessness in line with the African Union proposal for a Convention on African Nationality and Recommendations by UNHCR and IOM: Strong identification can facilitate inclusion but can also be a mechanism for exclusion	medium term	international community	Feasible, but challenging	Recommendation to int. actors
2.5.2.8.6	Data management to protect personal data and privacy: National ID programs do not themselves need to collect and store large volumes of personal data, but the use of a common number facilitates the integration of other databases such as those dealing with medical records or financial status	medium	international community	Feasible, but challenging	Recommendation to int. actors
Ch. 3	Promote idea and establish Special Development Zones (as detailed in Ch. 3)	announcement at least medium term	international community, private sector, PPP	Difficult, but worth every effort	Could be quite rewarding



## 5.1 Glossary of Key Terms

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Asylum	The grant by a state, of protection on its territory to persons from another State who are fleeing persecution or serious danger. A person who is granted asylum is a refugee. Asylum encompasses a variety of elements, including non-refoulement, permission to remain on the territory of the asylum country, and humane standards of treatment.
Asylum Seeker	A person who is seeking asylum and whose request or application has not been finally decided on by a prospective country of refuge.
Forced Migration	A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)	Persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their places of habitual residence, as a result of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.
International Protection	Interventions by states or UNHCR on behalf of asylum-seekers and refugees to ensure that their rights, security and welfare are recognized and safeguarded in accordance with international standards.
Irregular Migration	Movement of persons that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit, and receiving countries.

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Migrant	Any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of stay is.
Non-refoulement	The removal of a person to a territory where she/he would be at risk of being persecuted, or of being moved to another territory where she/he would face persecution. Refoulement constitutes a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, and is therefore a breach of refugee law and of customary international law. Refugee centers Locations where refugees reside or may gather to receive information, counselling, material assistance or other services.
Readmission	The act by a state accepting re-entry of a person who has been found illegally entering or being present in another state.
Reception Center	A location with facilities for receiving, processing and attending to the immediate needs of refugees as they arrive in a country of asylum.
Refugee	A person who is forced to leave his/her country because of war or violence or owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of origin and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country.
1951 Refugee Convention	The Convention that establishes the most widely applicable framework for the protection of refugees. Its restriction to events occurring before 1 January 1951 is removed by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. To date, there are 137 states who are parties to the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol. Also known as the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

Term	Definition
Resettlement	The transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another state that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized citizens. For this reason, resettlement is a durable solution as well as a tool for the protection of refugees.
Return (Assisted Voluntary Return)	Administrative, logistical, financial and reintegration support to rejected asylum seekers, victims of trafficking in human beings, stranded migrants, qualified nationals and other migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country who volunteer to return to their countries of origin.
Separated children	Persons below the legal age of 18 who are not in the company of parents, but are in the company of a legal guardian or primary care-giver.
Smuggling	The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state of which the person is not a national or permanent resident.
Trafficking in persons	The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include sexual forms of exploitation, forced labor/services, slavery or other forms of practice similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
Unaccompanied children (also called unaccompanied minors)	Children as defined in Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 (CRC), who have been separated from both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so.

## 5.2 Reference 1.8.3 tables

### 5.2.1 Macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Debt Sustainability Frameworks (IMF)	Analytical Frameworks (LIC-DSF and MAC-DSA) for assessing debt sustainability.	N/A	IMF	N/A
Tools for assessing fiscal transparency and the fiscal risk from PPPs (IMF)	Fiscal transparency Evaluation Tool and PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Tool.	N/A	IMF	N/A

### 5.2.2 Domestic Resource Mobilization, Investment-Friendly Tax Systems

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Addis Tax Initiative	Participating funders will collectively double their technical cooperation in the area of domestic revenue mobilization /taxation by 2020; Partner countries commit to step up domestic revenue mobilization for attaining the SDGs and inclusive development.	2015	Various	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Tools for assessing key elements of tax administration (IMF)	Analytical frameworks for assessing Tax/Revenue administration (Tax Administration Diagnostics Assessment, Revenue Administration Gap Analysis, Revenue Administration Fiscal Information).		N/A	IMF
Resource Management Trust Fund (RM-TF)	RM-TF (succeeding the Tax Policy and Administration Trust Fund, TPA) helps to meet LLMICs' increasing demand for TA in revenue policy and administration, through supporting comprehensive reforms beneficiary countries make to their tax systems, including redesigning tax policy frameworks and strengthening revenue administrations.	2016	IMF, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland	AUSD 60 million
Managing Natural Resource Wealth Trust Fund (MNRW)	MNRW assists resource-rich LICs/LMICs countries in mobilizing and managing their domestic revenues in a sustainable manner. The fund also helps foster a stable macroeconomic environment for exploration and exploitation of natural resources, and helps to ensure that resources are managed in a socially responsible way.	2011	IMF, Australia, European Union, Kuwait, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Switzerland	AUSD 30 million



Initiative	Description	Inception	Funders	Assets
Partnership with the African Tax Administration Forum Co-operation platform for training, research and statistics, also involving the AfDB, NePAD, SADC, and EAC.	MOU Renewed 2015	N/A	N/A	N/A
African Legal Support Facility (ALSF)	Provision of legal advice and technical assistance in negotiation of complex commercial transactions, creditor litigation and capacity building to African countries. ALSF also develops and maintains related knowledge resources and publications.	2008	AfDB, Belgium, Canada, ECOWAS, BIDC, France, Guinea-Conakry, India, Islamic Development Bank, Netherlands, Norway, UK, USA, BOAD, World Bank Group, KfW	

### 5.2.3 Public investment management to support external financing

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Public Investment Management Assessment (IMF)	Analytical framework for benchmarking of the quality of the management of public investment.	N/A	IMF	
Public Investment Management Framework (OECD)	A high level Framework for the Governance of Infrastructure (under development), whose preparation has been endorsed by the G-20 Investment and Infrastructure Working Group. The focus is on whole-of-government PIM.	2016	N/A	

#### 5.2.4 State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Network on Corporate Governance of SOEs in Southern Africa (OECD)	The Network undertakes consensus-based policy papers on governance reform of SOEs in the sub-region. The main areas include improving the governance of SOEs, and the enhancement of ethics in SOEs. Annual meeting reinforce the peer-learning process and dedicated regional taskforces, made of representatives from participating economies, ensure regional ownership.	2007	N/A	N/A

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Guidelines of Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises (OECD)	Guidelines are a benchmark for internationally accepted practices that support governance and efficiency improvements for state-owned enterprises.	2015 N/A	N/A

## 5.2.5 Business framework

Reliable Regulation and Institutions

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
SSA Power (WBG)	Technical assistance facility to catalyze investment in clean energy through advice to companies and public sector agencies and markets/sector level work to address market barriers and facilitate replication of advanced solutions. Priority countries are Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Togo, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.	2016 Various	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Resource Efficiency Advisory Services	Global technical assistance facility for catalyzing resource efficiency and clean energy solutions through advice to individual firms and sector work to develop scalable and replicable technical and transactional solutions. In the SSA region, REF advisory is active in South Africa, Kenya, Senegal, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, among other countries. Focus is on agribusiness and construction materials.	2015	Various donors	
Grid Connected Solar Development in Sub-Saharan Africa Project	Technical assistance facility to facilitate sustainable scale-up of solar electricity generation in SSA by improving enabling environment for investments and private sector participation in solar generation, including policy and regulatory support, planning, grid strengthening, system controls and dispatch arrangements, investment identification, and feasibility studies.	2018	World Bank, (TBD: ESMAP, PPIAF, WB China Trust Fund, Korea)	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Lighting Africa (IBRD/IFC)	Technical Assistance facility to support sustainable growth of the off-grid solar market by addressing supply and demand-side market barriers, including through providing Market Intelligence; Quality Assurance; Policy and Regulations; Access to Finance; Consumer Education; and Business Development Support.	2007	IBRD, IFC, GEF, ESMAP, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK and USA.	
ESMAP Program in Support of Universal Energy Access	Technical Assistance facility for countries in the SE4ALL initiative, helping them to develop policy frameworks, strengthen institutions, access expansion planning(grid and off-grid), and mobilize financing for their national energy access programs. Includes Burundi, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, and Senegal, and TA for regional power pools, in SSA.	2013	ESMAP	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (IBRD)	Support provided through a mix of Technical Assistance, Policy Advisory Support and Policy Based Lending, including for utility, regulatory, tariff, subsidy and electricity market reforms, transparency in procurement/bidding practices, and investment planning, which help build an enabling environment for private participation in the Power Sector.	1999	World Bank, IFC, France, ADB, Australia, Germany, Austria, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA	World Bank, France, ADB, Australia, Germany, Austria, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA
Power Sector Reform Assistance (IBRD)	Support provided through a mix of Technical Assistance, Policy Advisory Support and Policy Based Lending, including for utility, regulatory, tariff, subsidy and electricity market reforms, transparency in procurement/bidding practices, and investment planning, which help build an enabling environment for private participation in the Power Sector.		World Bank	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Regional transmission infrastructure and Power (IBRD)	Technical Assistance and Investment Finance for power trade and regional transmission infrastructure, which create better environments for private investment in the sector. Recent examples include: OMVG (Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal) and Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Guinea (CLSG) interconnection and building capacity in the Southern Africa power pool.		World Bank, AFD, AfDB, EIB, KfW etc.	
Business Integrity and Anti-Bribery (AfDB/OECD)	Network supporting 21 African governments to fight bribery and corruption and aiming to boost private sector competitiveness by promoting standards of corporate integrity and accountability.	2011	N/A	N/A

## 5.2.6 Improved Project Preparation

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
ADF Project Preparation Facility	Reimbursable project preparation advances for PPPs recoverable from the project, if materialized, or future ADF allocations. Targeted to preparatory activities of limited scope required to validate data and revise documents before project appraisal and execution.	AfDB	USD 6.77 million
Africa 50	Incorporated in Morocco, Africa50 seeks to mobilize both public and private finance to accelerate infrastructure development in Africa by investing in African infrastructure through Project Finance (PF) and Project Development (PD) windows. (AfDB contributing USD 100m for project finance, and approx. USD 28 million for project development.)	As of 31 July 2016 23 African countries, the AfDB and 2 African central banks were Shareholders	USD 750 million as of 31 July 2016.
Africa Renewable Energy Fund (AfDB)	Private equity fund for small and medium-sized renewable energy projects in SSA. AfDB, Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa and the Global Environment Facility jointly support the preparation and investment of bankable projects. Latter two limit their returns to enhance returns by other investors.	AfDB, Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa, Global Environment	USD 250 million close in 2015



<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
African Water Facility (AFDB)	Technical assistance/small grant facility for project preparation, sector governance and information systems, under an initiative of the African Ministers Council on Water (AMCOW). It is hosted and managed by the African Development Bank (AfDB). The Facility assists African countries mobilize and apply resources for the Water and Sanitation sector.	Algeria, Austria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, UK, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, AFDB, European Commission, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Nordic Development Fund	EUR 151.2 million mobilized since 2006

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Agriculture Fast Track Fund (AfDB)	Technical Assistance facility for project preparation for bankable food security projects that support Africa's agriculture transformation agenda. The AFT provides grant funds for project development costs such as feasibility studies, market research, financial modeling, business plan development, and environmental and social impact studies.	2013	USA, Sweden, Denmark	USD 46.36 million
New Partnership for Africa's Development Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility Special Fund (NEPAD-IPPF)	Technical Assistance Facility to assist RMCs to prepare high-quality, bankable regional infrastructure projects aligned to the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and Regional Infrastructure Master Plans to enable financing from public and private sources thereby contributing to bridging Africa's infrastructure financing gap.	Established 2004	Canada, Norway, many, mark, AfDB	USD 65.48 million

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Fund for African Private Sector Assistance (AfDB)	Technical Assistance Facility, supporting the AfDB's Private Sector Development (PSD) Strategy through technical assistance and capacity building to African governments, regional economic communities and similar intergovernmental organizations, business associations, market regulatory institutions, business development service providers, business training and research institutions, and public/private enterprises.	2006	Japan, AfDB, Austria	USD 68.92 million
Urban and Municipal Development Fund (AfDB)	Proposed Technical Assistance Facility, hosted by AfDB, to support preparation of urban projects, technical assistance to governments and municipalities to strengthen their governance and implement home-grown and country-owned urban reforms, and to support knowledge development in urban area.	Expected Q2 2017	Nordic Development Fund, Switzerland (SECO)	USD 9.3 million

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Infrastructures Infrastructure in Africa Special Initiative (WBG)	Global financial facility to help develop public-private partnerships and private projects for infrastructure in developing countries. It provides early-stage risk capital and actively participates in the project development phase to create private infrastructure projects that are commercially viable and able to more rapidly achieve financing close.	2009 expanded in FY14	World Bank Group	USD 150 million allocated
Global Facility on Mini-Grids	Technical Assistance Facility for activities such as geospatial planning, feasibility studies, design and preparation of bid documents as well as promoting an enabling environment for private sector participation in mini-grids. Examples include support to mini-grid developments in Rwanda, Ghana, Liberia, Congo DRC and Mali.	2015	ESMAP, DFID	

### 5.2.7 Standardization of Projects for Contracts and Financing

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Benchmarking PPP Procurement 2017 (IBRD/IFC)	This report aims to inform decision-making on the design of PPP procurement policies and regulations, by benchmarking against good practices across four areas of the PPP project cycle: preparation; procurement; contract management and unsolicited proposals. The WBG hope to publish this regularly, increase the number of countries (not least in Africa) and possibly increase the scope beyond the 4 areas covered.	2016	
Scaling Solar (WBG)	This joint WBG program brings together WBG services and instruments, including simple and rapid tendering using templates and credit enhancement, to help create viable, competitive and transparent markets for grid connected solar PV power plants in sub-Saharan Africa.	2015	WBG, Denmark, Netherlands, USAID, UK, DEVCO

## 5.2.8 Financing framework

Efficient risk mitigation instruments

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
African Guarantee Fund (AfDB)	The African Guarantee Fund helps financial institutions to increase their exposure to SMEs in Africa through providing guarantees and capacity development assistance to SMEs finance. AGF raises its capital from bilateral donors and development finance institutions. Once it has proven its viability, it expects to attract capital from private investors such as pension funds and social investors.	2012	AfDB, Denmark (DANIDA), Spain (AECID)	Portfolio guaranteed lending of USD 230 million since 2012
Guarantee Facilities (AfDB)	To further strengthen private sector financing in development, the AfDB has introduced partial risk and partial credit guarantees to help eligible borrowers crowd in private financing where the bank is not able to provide such financing directly.	2010	AfDB	N/A
Private Sector Credit Enhancement Facility (AfDB)	The PSF provides guarantees to the African Development Bank on selected private sector operations in low income economies (LICs) and fragile states, freeing up capital for the AfDB and thereby increasing the AfDB's capacity to extend additional private sector loans in the countries.	2015	AfDB	USD 230 million seed grant, USD 270 million additional contribution 2017-19

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Guarantee Facilities (IBRD)	World Bank Guarantees can mitigate a variety of critical sovereign risks and attract private sector equity investment and long term commercial financing in infrastructure development. Guarantees can also help sovereign governments access the commercial financial markets.		World Bank	
EU External Investment Plan	The Plan sets up a new European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD): a EUR 1.5 billion guarantee facility for private investment in Africa, the Southern Mediterranean, and the Eastern Neighborhood in combination with EUR 2.6 billion foreseen through two new regional investment platforms, building on existing blending facilities. This will be accompanied by TA to improve the regulatory environment and develop bankable projects, and policy dialogue to improve the investment climate.	2017	EC (and possibly member states)	
EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-AITF) (2007)	Increase infrastructure investment in sub-Saharan Africa by blending long term loans from financiers with resource grants.			

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
IDA 18 Private Sector Window (IDA PSW)	IDA PSW is a platform for expanding private sector investment in IDA-only countries through several dedicated facilities: Risk Mitigation Facility, MIGA Guarantee Facility, Local Currency Facility and Blended Finance Facility.	2017	IDA	Start-up phase
Luxembourg Rail Protocol	This Protocol to the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 2001 will, when ratified by sufficient countries, enable investors to have much greater security on investments in rail equipment such as rolling stock which crosses borders, and will therefore reduce risk to investors and costs to purchasers of such equipment.	2007		

### 5.2.9 Domestic debt market development



<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Africa Pension Funds Network (AfDB)	This is a platform for peer learning and exchange among African pension funds, recently launched by the Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A) Partnership, with a focus on increasing pension fund support for long-term investments, such as private equity and infrastructure across Africa. This will require regulatory changes in some jurisdictions and sustained engagement with regulators and trustees.	2014	MFW4A Partnership (see below)	N/A
African Financial Markets Initiative (AfDB)	This Initiative aims to contribute to the development of domestic bond markets in Africa through: i) the African Financial Markets Database (AFMD) and ii) the African Domestic Bond Fund (ADBF). The ADBF aims to improve liquidity in local capital markets which in turn should lower borrowing rates. It will be the first multi-jurisdictional Fixed Income ETF in Africa.	2008	AfDB	Fund has USD25 million from AfDB; total USD200 million target size fund

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Financial Sector Development Fund (AfDB)	Dedicated to supporting inclusive financial markets and dynamic institutions that promote robust African economies, FSDF provides Technical Assistance (TA) and Seed Capital Grants to early stage innovative projects. Focusing on: the need to activate capital markets, and develop instruments to scale up investment to raise private investment from pension funds, hedge funds, and other institutional investors; Africa's financial systems foundations via policy, legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks; Financial Inclusion by supporting Digital Financial Services companies and financial technologies (Fintech).	Projected 2017 Luxembourg; looking for additional donors	USD30 million target fund size
Local Currency Initiative (AfDB)	The AfDB introduced this in order to assist clients to mitigate foreign exchange risk and to help develop domestic capital markets. The Bank can lend in up to 10 African currencies. It also provides loans in local currency through its synthetic local currency loans, whereby the loan is booked by the Bank as a hard currency loan which the client exchanges into local currency at an agreed exchange rate.	AfDB 2005	Total approved portfolio USD2.6 billion equivalent

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Making Finance work for Africa (AfDB)	The Making Finance Work for Africa Partnership (MFW4A) is a platform for joint action, disseminating ideas, and coordinating amongst and between donors.	AfDB, AFD, BMZ/GIZ, EIB, IMF, MinBuza	2008 USD6.06 million
Efficient Securities Markets Institutional Development program (IBRD/IFC)	This Technical Assistance Facility, jointly managed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), IFC and the World Bank, aims to develop well-functioning securities markets in order to provide support to emerging African capital markets.		
Pan-African Domestic Medium Term Note Programme (IFC)	IFC's Pan-African bond program aims to facilitate local currency bond issuances by domestic and international issuers. Under the program, IFC has so far enabled several domestic medium-term note programs in local currencies.		Notes include some USD90 million equivalent in Namibia
Africa Affordable Housing	Addressing affordable housing gap by investing in supply- (developers) and demand-side (mortgage financing) initiatives. CITICC Pioneer Pan-African affordable housing project targeted at middle and lower middle income.	IFC and CITICC - NMRC, FBN Mortgages - Old Mutual, Nedbank	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Guarantco	Funded by the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) trust and the Dutch Development Bank (FMO), GuarantCo provides partial guarantees to lenders which serve as credit enhancements to facilitate local debt instruments.	2006	PIDG Trust, FMO Up to USD30 million per transaction	

## 5.2.10 Crowding in Private Finance

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Boost Africa (AfDB and EIB)	This investment program is to provide funding to private equity funds supporting start-ups and early stage SMEs across the continent, in order to generate sustainable employment opportunities for Africa's youth and women and enhance entrepreneurship and innovative business opportunities. There is also a separate Technical Assistance Facility (max EUR 20 million); and an Innovation and Information Lab (EUR 10 million).	2016	AfDB, EIB, EC	EUR 150 million initial investment envisaged, shared equally between the 3 institutions

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Climate Investment Funds (AfDB/IBRD)	These funds provide grants, concessional loans and risk mitigation instruments to leverage substantial additional funding for climate solutions from other MDB, national and private sector development resources. CIF includes a Clean Technology Fund (CTF), and a Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) which finances a Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, a Forest Investment Program and a Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries.	2008	AfDB, ADB, EBRD, IDB, World Bank	USD 8.3 billion
Loan Syndication (AfDB)	By bringing in private partners through syndication, the Bank can structure deals large enough to finance some of these big projects, and hence respond to the needs of RMCs. The Bank has recently begun a syndication program, and intends to scale it up going forward.	2011	AfDB	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
	<p>IFC's Global Warehouse Finance Program (GWFP) is a comprehensive USD 500 million investment and advisory program to increase post-harvest financing of agricultural commodities in warehouses. GWFP increases access to finance to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and small-hold farmers in emerging countries by providing them with a specific modality of inventory financing called "warehouse finance".</p>	2015	Netherlands, Japan	USD 500 million
	<p>The Program aims to modernize the hydrological, meteorological and early warning services of Sub-Saharan Africa through knowledge, investment and</p>	2016	IDA, Climate Resilience through early warning systems, GCF, EDF, Re-GEF, GCF	

Initiative	Description	Inception Funders	Assets
	<p>partnerships. It has potential for leveraging the private sector in upgrading Hydromet systems and services; in development of services and products that meet the felt needs of all users; and as service delivery partner in last-mile delivery to the end-users.</p>	2018	
	<p>The Program aims to modernize the hydrological, meteorological and early warning services of Sub-Saharan Africa through knowledge, investment and partnerships. It has potential for leveraging the private sector in upgrading Hydromet systems and services; in development of services and products that meet the felt needs of all users; and as service delivery partner in last-mile delivery to the end-users.</p>	2018	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
	<p>The EU's Electrification Financing Initiative (ElectriFI) is an innovative mechanism to unlock, accelerate, and leverage investments to increase access to affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy with a special focus on Africa. The G7 Leaders' Summit in Germany explicitly acknowledged ElectriFI in the Declaration of 8 July 2015. A contribution of USD 10 million targeted at Sub-Saharan Africa was made by USAID Power Africa to ElectriFI in 2016. Since its launch by the European Commission in December 2015 during COP21 in Paris, the ElectriFI initiative has expanded and currently operates a budget of EUR 238 million.</p> <p>World Bank administers a number of Trust Funds on behalf of developing partners that promote private participation in the Energy Sector. Examples include; Russian Trust Fund for Energy – Small and medium size enterprise support in SSA, the Trust Fund for Norway's Support to the Regional Power Infrastructure Projects in Southern Africa, and the Swedish Trust Fund for Tanzania.</p>	2015	European Union, USAID Power Africa	EUR 238 million
			Russia, Norway, Sweden etc	



Initiative	Description	Inception Funders	Assets
	<p>This Action Plan recognizes the critical role of the private sector and will use aid to leverage private sector investment and encourage greater engagement of the private sector and financing into the countries and areas where the private capital is scarce. The priority areas of cooperation are centered on the following five pillars, which correspond to the African Development Bank's High Fives: Transforming Agriculture, Enhancing Africa's Energy, Accelerating Industrialization, Integrate Africa, Improving Quality of Life. Financing is in concessional loans from the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), TA and capacity building through the KOAFEC Trust Fund and Knowledge Sharing Program, and private infrastructure financing from Korea Eximbank.</p>	Korea	<p>USD 5 billion,          USD 1 billion,          EDCF, USD          20 KOAFEC          Trust Fund          and Knowledge          Sharing Pro-          gram, and USD          4 billion Korea          ExIm Bank</p>

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
	<p>The AIF will promote strategic partnerships in Africa by linking African enterprises and major projects with potential partners and investors by showcasing bankable projects, attracting financing, and providing platforms for investing across multiple countries. It will also serve as a unique forum for international business and social impact investors looking to deploy funds in Africa and connect investors with both public and private sector projects throughout the continent.</p>	2016 AfDB	

### 5.2.11 Crowding in Institutional Finance

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Managed Co-lending Portfolio Program (MCP)	The core objectives of this program are to (i) increase the familiarity of institutional investors with emerging markets; and (ii) pilot a replicable structure for “crowding in” institutional capital. It gives investors access to IFC’s global network of infrastructure experts, and its pool of new investments. Through an IFC’s proposed first-loss, IFC can also create an investment-grade equivalent asset to attract those investors that, due to their own regulatory constraints, require such credit profile.	2016	IFC	
Long-term Financing for Infrastructure (OECD)	G-20/OECD High Level Principles of Long-Term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors, and follow-up reports on effective approaches to implementation of these principles, and on diversification of financial instruments for infrastructure and SMEs (latter endorsed by G-20 in 2016).	2013-16	N/A	N/A

### 5.2.12 Crowding in Bondholders

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Green Bond Program (AfDB)	The bonds enable investors to undertake project-level exposure as they become comfortable with the asset class. This, along with other products such as catastrophe bonds, channel efforts towards areas, such as energy efficiency, which play a vital role in helping African countries transition towards a climate-resilient lower-carbon development path.	2013	AfDB	USD 500 million initial offering; two SEK 1 billion offering

### 5.2.13 Crowding in Official Finance

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA/AfDB)	The ICA was established to support increased investment to infrastructure in Africa, from both public and private sources. The ICA is committed to improve infrastructure service delivery and advocates for increased investment for infrastructure development across Energy, Transport, Water and ICT. Funders incl. the World Bank Group, AfDB, EIB, European Commission, DBSA, African Continental Bodies (AUC and Agency) and Specialized Institutions (RECs, Power Pools, Corridors etc.) attend the meetings as observers	2005	G8 countries, World Bank	USD 4.86 million
Islamic Finance Fund for Africa	The IFFA Fund is a proposed Africa-wide fund to allow the AfDB and partners enhance the contribution of the Islamic Finance to growth and poverty reduction in Africa. It will comprise both a financing and a technical assistance component.	Q2 2017	ICD/IsDB	USD 15 million over 5 years

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Migration and Development Fund	This Fund provides financing for improving knowledge on migrant remittances in Africa; supporting reforms of the regulatory frameworks required to improve transfer conditions; developing financial products; supporting for productive investment in the migrants' countries of origin; and supporting local development in these countries.	2009	France, IFAD	USD 8.7 million
Multi-Donor Water Partnership Program (AfDB)	This Fund provides financing for improving knowledge on migrant remittances in Africa; supporting reforms of the regulatory frameworks required to improve transfer conditions; developing financial products; supporting for productive investment in the migrants' countries of origin; and supporting local development in these countries.	2006	The Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Sweden (SIDA), IsDB	USD 6.4 million

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Initiative and RWSSI Trust Fund (AfDB)	This platform was adopted by African governments and international development partners as the common framework for resource mobilization and investment at the First International Conference on Rural Water Supply and Sanitation in Africa, held in Paris in April 2005. The Trust Fund was also created to raise additional resources for financing relevant activities, including a 2016-2020 Strategic Plan to address current challenges.	Burkina Faso, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland	USD 178.89 million

### 5.2.14 Crowding in the Financially-excluded

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Microfinance Capacity Building Fund (AfDB)	This is a technical assistance facility aimed at scaling-up capacity building efforts to financial intermediaries and to support stakeholders for the benefit of poor and low-income people in Africa, with a special emphasis on women and rural areas.	Government of Spain, UNCDF	USD 6.8 million

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Partnership for Financial Inclusion (IFC)	This seven-year program works with microfinance institutions, banks and mobile network operators across the African continent to develop and test innovative business models for financial inclusion. The Partnership also pursues an extensive research and learning agenda, harnessing and sharing insights gained in program projects for the industry and the public good.	2012	MasterCard Foundation	USD 37.4 million
Banking on Women (IFC)	Under this program IFC is seeking to increase access to finance for women entrepreneurs by leveraging IFC's extensive global network of financial institutions. It also offers advisory services to financial institutions and customized training for women entrepreneurs.	2010	IFC, GIZ, USAID, AusAid, SECO, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	



<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
MCF Farmer Finance (IFC)	The objective of the proposed Program is to improve incomes of smallholder farmers and the livelihoods of rural households through access to financial and other value-added services, including financial intermediation, farmer support and enablers such as mobile technology.	2015	IFC	USD 40 million
Financial Sector Stability Fund (FSSF)	The FSSF will support financial sector stability, inclusion, and deepening, focused on LLMICs. Using standardized diagnostic assessments (“financial sector stability reviews,” or FSSRs) to detect risks and vulnerabilities in country financial sectors and by providing dedicated capacity development services, the FSSF will assist country authorities in addressing challenges related to the Financing for Development (FfD) agenda and the SDGs.	2017	IMF, Development Partners	USD 30 million

### 5.2.15 Crowding in Land-Value

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Land Value Capture	The Land Value Capture program supports the local governments of the cities of Johannesburg and Durban to set up Tax Increment Financing (TIF) schemes to capture land value increase as a result of infrastructure investment ex-ante and raise financing for such infrastructure improvements against the future revenue stream for property tax arising from such valorization.	2016	The Bank, Africa	World South

### 5.2.16 Not Easily Classified

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
New Deal on Energy for Africa	The New Deal is built on five inter-related and mutually reinforcing principles: (i) raising aspirations to solve Africa’s energy challenges; ii) establishing a Transformative Partnership on Energy for Africa; (iii) mobilizing domestic and international capital for innovative financing in Africa’s energy sector; (iv) supporting African governments in strengthening energy policy, regulation and sector governance; and (v) increasing African Development Bank’s investments in energy and climate financing.	2016	AfDB	USD 3.5 billion per year for 10 years (through 2025)
Feed Africa Initiative (AfDB)	Fulfilling Africa’s potential for Agricultural transformation will require seven sets of enablers: 1) increased Productivity; 2) increased value addition; 3) increased investment in enabling hard & soft infrastructure; 4) expanded agricultural finance; 5) improved agribusiness environment; 6) increased inclusivity, sustainability and nutrition; 7) coordination of actors as a partnership to drive transformation.	2016	AfDB	USD 3.2 billion per year for 10 years (through 2025)

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Industrialize Africa (AfDB)	The Bank will launch six flagship programs to accelerate industrialization. (i) foster successful industrial policies by providing advice to governments and funding key PPP projects; (ii) catalyze funding into infrastructure and industry projects (iii) improve access to market finance for African enterprises; (iv) expand SME-focused lines of credit, and provide TA to SME development institutions; (v) link African enterprises and major projects with potential partners and investors; and, (vi) support governments to develop industry clusters, through TA and funding in implementation and monitoring.	2016	AfDB	USD 4 billion per year for 10 years (through 2025)

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Jobs for Youth in Africa	The aim is to increase direct and indirect employment, resulting in reduced poverty, inequality, and economic and conflict driven migration, and increased social cohesion and political stability, through Innovation, Investment, and Integration. This will include direct and indirect debt and equity investments and reducing risks by providing guarantees and first-loss provisions for banks' lending to SMEs, especially those owned or managed by youth.	2016	AfDB	USD 500 million per year for 10 years (through 2025)
Conflict Affected States in Africa Initiative	The initiative contributes to IFC's work in fragile and conflict-affected states by removing upstream bottlenecks and supporting clients through (a) presence on the ground to collect market intelligence and be closer to clients, (b) the provision of flexible funding for technical assistance interventions with clients, and (c) creation and dissemination of operational knowledge on private sector development in FCS.	2008	Ireland, Netherlands, and Norway	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Africa Climate/SEF program	The program aims to improve access to finance for climate smart investments in SSA, such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, resource efficiency, water efficiency and smart, resilient, agriculture and crop insurance. The program will emphasize small-scale renewable energy, especially off-grid/captive renewables.	Expected 2017	Canada	
Great Lakes (WBG)	The joint approach seeks to mobilize and synchronize diplomatic, private sector involvement and other forms of development efforts at the international, regional and country levels to secure and sustain peace, and generate a development dividend in the Great Lakes area.	2013	World Bank Group	Bank
Horn of Africa (WBG)	The joint approach raises the profile of employment issues arising from regional conflict, and promotes more mutually beneficial economic relationships between nations and host communities.	2014	World Bank Group	Bank

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Sahel Initiative	The core countries of the Initiative, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger are beset by natural and climate induced challenges, as well as by conflicts and demographic pressures. The initiative aims to respond to these challenges including by encouraging entrepreneurship; improving the investment climate, and transforming key sectors where increased private sector participation is needed.	2013	World Bank Group	Bank
Health in Africa (IFC)	The project aims to improve health services delivered by the private sector in SSA by documenting and advocating the importance of the private sector in this area and outlining an agenda to support improvement in their effectiveness; identifying successful business models; building on IFC's investment and advisory activities in these fields and identifying pilot projects; and having IFC engage with a wider range of potential partners to explore new initiatives.	2006	Gates Foundation	Founda- tion

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
SME Ventures (IFC)	The ultimate goal of this global project is to identify and support up to 15 new fund managers with the objective of 1) building Fund Manager Capacity and operational platforms to function to IFC standards 2) Understand the Fund Managers' pipeline/existing portfolio constituents and TA needed to SMEs, and 3) enabling Environment development/enhancement (Macro-Context) represented in the financial infrastructure, and Private Equity Practice ecosystem.	2015	IFC	
Forestry Africa (IFC)	The overall goal of the programme is to promote sustainable growth of the forestry sector in Africa through helping IFC Clients improve the productivity of their forest plantations or naturally-managed forests; to apply sustainable land use practices, and to monitor and market the carbon in their forests.	2011	IFC	



Initiative	Description	Inception	Funders	Assets
2030 Water Resources Group (IFC)	This is a global partnership that brings governments, IFIs, NGOs, and private companies together to work towards a water-secure future within their respective countries. These multi-stakeholder platforms develop proposals for water programs, projects, and policy reforms; support public-private partnerships; and develop proposals for innovative finance mechanisms.	2012	IFC, Sida, SDC,Hungary, Nestle, The Coca Cola Company, PepsiCo, Grundfos, Dow Chemical	
The Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership	This fund is administered by the Water Global Practice to support client governments in integrated and innovative approaches to water and sanitation challenges. The funding will support activities from 2016 to 2022 in five priority themes: sustainability, inclusion, institutions, financing, and resilience. While this is a Global	2016	Sweden, Norway, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Switzerland. Future potential donors include the Netherlands, Australia, and Austria	

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
	Initiative, it will leverage investments in the water sector in the Africa region			
The Cooperation in International Waters in Africa	This initiative has leveraged USUSD75 million in grant funding to transboundary water institutions in the region. It assists riparian governments in Sub-Saharan Africa in addressing constraints to cooperative water resources management and development, with the goal of unlocking the potential for sustainable, climate-resilient growth. CIWA supports projects across the African continent, including in the Nile, Niger, and Zambezi basins.	2011	Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, United Kingdom, European Union	
The High Level Panel on Water	The Panel consists of 11 sitting Heads of State and Government and one Special Adviser, to provide the leadership required to champion a comprehensive, inclusive and collaborative way of developing and managing water resources, and improving water and sanitation related services.	2016	The World Bank,	
				The UN

Initiative	Description	Inception Funders	Assets
Africa Climate Business Plan	<p>This plan, launched at COP-21 in Paris in November 2015, aims to raise awareness and accelerate resource mobilization for priority climate-resilient and low-carbon initiatives in Africa. The plan estimates that implementation will cost about USD19.3 billion to be raised by 2020, USD8.5 billion of which is expected to come from the International Development Association (IDA), and the rest from bilateral and multilateral sources, dedicated climate finance sources, and the private sector.</p>	<p>2015 WBG, lenders and donors</p>	<p>other and</p>

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Inception</b>	<b>Funders</b>	<b>Assets</b>
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)	This Africa-owned and led initiative aims to accelerate access to renewable energy in Africa and mobilize substantial financial resources from private investors, development finance institutions and multilateral development banks by 2020, building on existing work and initiatives. Under the mandate of the African Union and endorsed by African Heads of State and Government, the initiative is set to achieve at least 10 GW of renewable energy generation capacity by 2020, and mobilize the African potential to generate at least 300 GW by 2030.	2016	AfDB, France, Germany, EU, USA, Canada, UK, Japan, Italy, Sweden, Netherlands	USD 10 billion by 2020
Renewable Energy Resource Mapping Initiative	This initiative has since 2013 been carrying out renewable energy resource assessment and mapping studies, focusing on biomass, small hydro, solar and wind. The results are being used to inform government strategies and the investment decisions of commercial developers. It also helps lower the resource risk in project development, thereby leading to lower electricity prices for solar power plants.	2013	ESMAP	

Initiative	Description	Inception	Funders	Assets
Africa Clean Cooking Energy Solutions Initiative	(ACCES) Africa Clean Cooking Energy Solutions Initiative promotes enterprise-based, large-scale dissemination and adoption of clean cooking solutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Examples include The Uganda Stove Distribution Challenge Fund.	2012	ESMAP	
RTACs: AFRITACs and METAC (IMF)	Network of six Regional Technical Assistance Centers (RTACs) that provide technical advice supporting macroeconomic institution building; economic reform implementation; and the planning, designing, and implementation of policies that focus on economic growth and stability, domestic resource mobilization, fair tax systems, public financial management, good financial governance, strengthening financial stability/inclusion, enhancing data availability and transparency as a basis of evidence-based policy decisions, and support to fragile states.	2002-2004	IMF, EU, UK, Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Lebanon, Canada, Australia, Kuwait, Italy, AfDB, EIB, and 47 member African countries	Funding needs 2017-21 approx. USD360

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## Notes for section 1.7

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